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Abstract 
 
The thesis provides a full assessment of the moral permissibility of a set of new belief 
and behaviour modification techniques, now commonly known as “nudges”, which are 
grounded in and justified by reference to our new insights into human psychology. It 
asks what forms of nudging are permissible in light of the state’s new understanding of 
its capacity to modify behaviour using these insights; and it develops an ethico-political 
account of living well that directs this normative investigation. There are two main 
strands to this analysis of public nudging, one relating to behaviour change policies 
designed for the sake of the target and the other relating to those designed for the sake 
of others. Across both strands, it is argued that the kinds of interventions that are 
permissible share a similar character: specifically, they are compatible with creating and 
sustaining the conditions for living well, on account of their playing an ecological-
educative role in supporting citizens’ personal autonomy and practical reasoning. The 
thesis uses its in-depth normative analysis as the basis for engaging with current 
practices in behavioural policymaking and for setting out an ethically-sensitive policy 
framework to guide the design of nudge interventions in practice. The extended 
argument presented in these pages offers a distinctive and timely contribution to this 
debate, setting out arguably the most sustained and complete philosophical assessment 
of the ethics of nudging in the literature to date. 
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1. Introduction: The Ethics of Public Influence 
 
“Love it, or hate it, nudging is here to stay.” (Halpern 2015a: 12) 
 
Our understanding of human agency has changed dramatically in recent years as the 
result of a robust set of discoveries in the cognitive and behavioural sciences. These 
discoveries, concerning the relationship between our conscious and subconscious selves 
and the complex interface between the rational and irrational (Whitehead et al. 2011: 
2819), have been at the heart of “a quiet revolution taking place in government” 
(Sanders and Halpern 2014). Knowledge of the variety of cognitive biases affecting our 
thinking and the deep impact of seemingly trivial situational factors on our behaviour 
has opened up new conceptual space within which to explore the possibility of 
innovative policy tools that work “with the grain” of our psychology (Cabinet Office 
2010: 2).1 The most influential of these rests on the idea of designing “choice 
architecture” in psychologically-informed ways in order to “nudge” people into making 
certain welfare-promoting choices (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). As a simple matter of 
fact, this application of cognitive and behavioural science to public policy has been 
reshaping the operational logics of policymaking in governments around the world – a 
shift referred to within policy circles as the behaviour change agenda, but which has been 
described, more critically, as “the rise of the psychological state” (Jones et al. 2013).  
 This development has been grounded in and putatively justified by a 
philosophical argument claiming that this nudge policy programme should be deemed 
an acceptable, even desirable, form of paternalism because the policies it recommends 
do not offend against liberal values (Thaler and Sunstein 2009; Sunstein 2014a, 2016a). 
This argument has played a part in reopening central debates in liberal political theory 
over what should count as permissible governmental interference with citizens’ 
behaviour. John Stuart Mill refers to this as the “practical question” of “how to make 
the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control” (2005: 8). 
He opens On Liberty by stating that this is “a subject on which nearly everything remains 
to be done” (ibid.); his analysis in the pages that follow, however, laid the foundations 
for liberalism’s anti-paternalist orthodoxy, which has remained largely unchallenged 
                                                          
1 This psychological evidence and the shift to thinking about these findings as “behavioural insights” for 
policymaking is outlined in full in §2.1.  
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until recent years. Has the naturalistic challenge to our prevailing conceptions of human 
agency called into question, or even undermined, this orthodox view on the ethics of 
public influence? Given these empirical findings, how should we think about the moral 
permissibility of designing policy environments based on knowledge of our predictable 
irrationalities for the purpose of improving citizens’ lives?  
These are complex questions about which much “remains to be done”. What is 
more, there is some urgency about the need to find philosophically coherent answers to 
these questions, particularly given the daily extension of the behavioural policy 
programme and the potential normative costs that are attached to this development. To 
this end, the main aim of this thesis is to defend an attractive and complete account of 
the conditions under which it is permissible for governments to seek to modify their 
citizens’ behaviour via nudge policies. In so doing, it will make important progress in 
clarifying the normative dimensions of this policy development and in presenting a 
comprehensive and philosophically sophisticated assessment of these issues.  
This introductory chapter has three main aims. The first is to highlight the 
political and philosophical timeliness of this type of investigation, which serves further 
to motivate the need for the inquiry carried out by this thesis (§1.1.1 and §1.2.1). The 
second is to lay the foundations for the remainder of the thesis by issuing some remarks 
relating to the scope of this inquiry and the methods it uses, which serve to clarify the 
thesis’s main assumptions (§1.1.2 and §1.2.2). The third is to provide a brief preview of 
each of the chapters and their main conclusions, which affords me the opportunity to 
sketch the shape of the extended argument and to clarify the links between chapters 
(§1.3).     
 
§1.1: Changing Citizens’ Behaviour  
Governments have always sought to influence the behaviour of those they govern, and 
have numerous tools with which to affect this influence, ranging from strong forms of 
coercion to educative means such as information provision and rational persuasion. In 
recent years, however, a distinctive approach to public influence has begun to command 
increasing interest from policymakers and social planners, and has had a significant 
impact on policymaking. This section first offers an overview of this “behavioural 
revolution” (Leggett 2014: 4), in order to illustrate its extensive reach and momentum as 
a policy logic (§1.1.1). Given this extensive reach, the second part of this section offer 
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some comments on the specific type of influencing activities that are the focus of this 
normative inquiry, which serves to clarify the scope of the thesis (§1.1.2).     
   
§1.1.1: Nudge: A New and Growing Movement 
By far the most influential account of behavioural policy to date is that advanced by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their book Nudge, which, to their minds, offers a 
manual for governments wanting to work with the grain of how people actually think 
and behave with the aim of making designing more effective policy. They have labelled 
their “new movement” libertarian paternalism, because it seeks to bring together the 
seemingly oxymoronic claims that governments should respect people’s freedom to 
choose and that it is legitimate for governmental actors to try to steer people’s choices 
in ways that will improve their lives (2009: 5). Its core tenet is that, in response to the 
knowledge that people are “so susceptible to various counterproductive behavioural and 
cognitive tendencies” (Anderson 2010: 369), it is appropriate for policy makers to use 
behavioural insights to modify decision-making situations – or, in their terms, to design 
“choice architecture” – in ways that steer citizens’ behaviour “in the right direction (as 
judged by people themselves)” (Sunstein 2014a: 17). Interventions of this kind are 
labelled “nudges”, and are defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behaviour in predictable ways without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their […] incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 6).2 The argument in favour 
of libertarian paternalism has been enthusiastically accepted by policymakers, making 
nudging “one of the hottest ideas in current policy debates” (Hausman and Welch 2010: 
123).  
On coming to power in 2010, for instance, former Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom (UK) David Cameron lost little time in establishing the Behavioural Insights 
Team (BIT) – more commonly known as the “nudge unit” – within the Cabinet Office, 
its mandate being “to help the UK Government develop and apply lessons from 
behavioural economics and behavioural science in policymaking” (O’Donnell 2010). 
Since then, the logic of behavioural insights has been built into the institutional 
framework and bureaucratic mind-sets of “almost every government department” 
(ibid.), with Richard Thaler acting as a principal adviser for this process. Indeed, the 
government’s “preference for non-regulatory interventions” was quite quickly deemed 
                                                          
2 A full account of the argument in favour of this form of paternalism is presented, and engaged with 
critically, in the next chapter (§2.2).  
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strong enough to warrant a House of Lords Select Committee investigation focused on 
assessing the evidence base for this shift, as well as examining some aspects relating to 
the ethics of the techniques used in behaviour change policy (House of Lords 2011). 
The BIT was semi-privatised in early 2014, taking on the form of a mutual joint venture 
or “social purpose company” owned in roughly equal proportions by its employees, the 
UK government, and Nesta (the government-established “innovation charity” where it 
is now housed).3 The privatisation deal was described by The Financial Times as “one of 
the biggest experiments in British public sector reform”, since this is the first time that 
privatisation has reached beyond public services and utilities to include an actual 
government policy team (Plimmer 2014).4 The result has been that the BIT acts not 
only as a “de facto Council of Psychological Advisers” to the UK government (Halpern 
2015b: 768), but also in the capacity of a global behavioural policy consultancy firm for 
foreign governments, private sector clients, and other institutions. Within domestic 
policy, the BIT has overseen a number of changes across a wide range of areas, 
including health care, tax and fraud, personal savings, charitable giving, energy 
consumption and sustainability, and crime reduction (Cabinet Office 2010, 2012, 2013; 
BIT 2015, 2016). It is plausible to think that, unless something significant occurs, this 
influence is set only to grow further. Indeed, as two senior BIT members write, 
“Although the application of behavioural sciences to public policy is in its relative 
infancy, there are signs that this may prove an enduring development” (Hallsworth and 
Sanders 2016: 126).   
 The approach is also beginning to wield a similar level of influence in the United 
States (US). During President Obama’s first term in office, Cass Sunstein served as the 
Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), earning him the title “regulation czar”.5 In late 2015, Obama issued an 
Executive Order entitled “Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the 
                                                          
3 Nesta is an independent foundation, which was established by the last Labour government using £250 
million of National Lottery money. Incidentally, its Chief Executive Officer is Geoff Mulgan, who 
worked closely with David Halpern, the BIT’s CEO, in the UK government’s Strategy Unit when Tony 
Blair was Prime Minister. For more information, see: http://www.nesta.org.uk. 
4 The privatisation was due, at least in part, to a cap on the number of BIT employees and to its 
employees pay being bound to civil service pay grades. It also enabled the BIT to cash in on its 
competitive advantage and set itself up as, in effect, an international consultancy company charging its 
clients “success fees” (i.e., if the advice it provides leads to significant client savings, the company gets a 
share).  
5 Sunstein’s time in office was by no means uncontroversial, however. According to Rena Steinzor, 
president of the Center for Progressive reform and professor at the University of Maryland’s Law School, 
“Cass Sunstein is the most well-connected and smartest guy who’s ever held the job. But he’s also done 
untold damage” (quoted in Broder 2012).   
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American People” (#13707), which directed all federal agencies to incorporate this 
evidence into their policymaking logics and processes. In conjunction with this, the US 
formally established the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST), dedicated to 
supporting the various agencies and departments in crafting policies that are “built for 
people” in light all of their psychological foibles.  
Similar trends have taken place in many other countries, including Germany, 
Australia, Denmark, Singapore, the Netherlands, and Israel, in addition to international 
organisations. The World Bank, for example, devoted its 2015 World Development 
Report (entitled Mind, Society, and Behaviour) to discussing the implications of behavioural 
economics and policy for international development, with an eye to making progress on 
“a new set of development approaches based on a fuller consideration of psychological 
and social influences” (World Bank 2015: 2). Similarly, the United Nations 
Development Programme recently established the UN Behavioural Initiative, charged 
with “translating behavioural science insights into more effective and efficient UN 
programming and operations”, in the hope that this will have a positive impact on its 
efforts to reach the Agenda 2030 sustainable development goals (UN 2016: 3). The 
OECD, too, published a report only in the last few months – Behavioural Insights and 
Public Policy: Lessons from Around the World – that presents the results of “a first-of-its-kind 
survey” of behavioural insights units (OECD 2017). This reach has expanded further 
still: Maya Shankar, the founder of the SBST and the first-ever Behavioural Science 
Advisor to the UN (a role she performed alongside her White House position), became 
Google’s first Head of Behavioral Insights in February 2017, which marks the next 
expansion of behavioural policy.  
It is clear, then, that nudging is “a growing movement” (Sunstein 2016a: 5). But 
what ethical principles, if any, guide and constrain this onward march of the behavioural 
policy agenda? Has there been any serious assessment by nudge advocates of the 
potential normative costs attached to the use of these forms of influence? Have clear 
distinctions been drawn relating to the different ways in which behavioural policies 
might act on their targets, and what this means for their permissible use? Unfortunately 
the answers to these questions reveal a rather worrying gap in current thinking on 
behavioural policymaking. Engagement with these ethical dimensions has often tended 
to be cursory at best, and follows a distinct trend: Thaler and Sunstein offer a “breezy 
discussion of objections” (Anderson 2010: 371), mainly pragmatic rather than 
principled, at the end of the Nudge (2009: 235-252); the World Bank’s report includes a 
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very brief discussion on the question of ‘Why should governments shape individual 
choices?’, more as an afterthought in the final couple of pages it would seem (2015: 202-
203); and even the House of Lords Select Committee relegated its discussion of ethical 
issues to the last of its six Appendices (2011: 105-109).  
The principal advocates of nudging have only very recently joined the debate 
over its potential normative costs (Schubert 2015: 3) – something that it seems they 
were keen to avoid, but which has become necessary in light of sustained criticisms 
presented both in the academic literature (e.g., Hausman and Welch 2010; Rebonato 
2012; Grüne-Yanoff 2012; White 2013) and in the media (Waldron 2015; Shaw 2017). 
There are a plethora of different worries that have been raised; but the two leading 
objections are that the nudge policy programme is a disrespectful form of paternalism 
and thereby an affront to human dignity, and that nudges act on people in a 
manipulative fashion, which undermines their personal autonomy. These concerns are 
captured in extracts from two pieces written for The New York Review of Books: 
 
“Nudging doesn’t teach me not to use inappropriate heuristics or to abandon irrational 
intuitions… I still use the same defective strategies but now things have been arranged to 
make that work out better. Nudging takes advantages of my deficiencies in the way one 
indulges a child.” (Waldron 2015)  
 
“The behavioral techniques that are being employed […] do not appeal to our reason; 
they do not seek to persuade us consciously with information and argument. Rather, these 
techniques change behaviour by appealing to nonrational motivations, our emotional 
triggers and unconscious biases.” (Shaw 2017)  
 
In late 2016 Sunstein published his first sustained attempt to integrate these sorts of 
normative considerations into his pro-nudge argument. Nevertheless, as reviewers of 
The Ethics of Influence have highlighted, while the book offers “an excellent primer of the 
relevant debates on nudges”, it fails to provide “a bona fide philosophical inquiry into 
the underlying ethical issues”, which is precisely “the sort of investigation that is sorely 
needed” (Johnson 2016). This thesis aims to offer this “sorely needed” comprehensive 
normative investigation into this politically pressing issue.     
       
§1.1.2: Scope of Inquiry  
Before setting out my approach to this principled evaluation, which I do in the next 
section, it is instructive to offer some initial remarks about the scope of the inquiry 
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carried out in this thesis. Two main points are worth noting at this stage, for the sake of 
clarity going forward.  
First, we saw above how expansive the reach of behavioural policy has become. 
My inquiry focuses on the use of nudges at the level of national public policymaking. It 
explores the conditions under which it is permissible for a state to influence its citizens’ 
beliefs or behaviour in this way.6 Throughout the thesis, I will often refer to this as public 
nudging or public choice architecture, and it is worth making clear at the outset what these 
mean so as to avert any potential confusion.7 The prefix “public” denotes that the 
nudge is a governmental intervention, designed and delivered by public authorities; it 
does not cover all forms of nudging done in public places. Public authorities can be 
involved in nudging citizens in more and less direct ways. They might design policies 
that influence people directly, such as building prompted choice for organ donation 
registration into the application for vehicle tax. But a government might also intervene 
in a more indirect way vis-à-vis individual citizens. It may direct its actions toward other 
public actors with the aim of guiding the choices of individual citizens, such as when it 
introduces corporate regulation relating to the salient presentation of nutritional 
information on food items or public health warnings on cigarette packets. Both fit with 
the definition of public nudging given above. A final clarificatory point on “public 
choice architecture”: since “public choice” has its own associations, this phrase may be 
ambiguous between two possible locutions, “the architecture of public choice” and 
“choice architecture that is public”; I hope that my stipulation above has made it clear 
that the second of these is what interests us here. 
Behavioural policy has proven attractive to policymakers partly because it offers 
a relatively cheap course of action, both financially8 and politically, at a time when (i) 
government budgets are under pressure, and (ii) it can be difficult to pass stronger 
regulatory measures on account of the logjams resulting from highly politicised divides 
between left- and right-wing positions. These political contextual considerations help us 
                                                          
6 Other actors use these techniques of influence. Nudge-style influences play a key role, for instance, in 
the marketing and advertising activity of many private corporations. Such influences also need to be 
subjected to serious normative attention – which is something that I discuss in more detail in §6.4. There 
are two principled reasons for focusing on the influencing actions of states or political authorities in the 
first instance: the first relates to the general authority that the government of a state claims for itself, 
including the rules governing the activities of other corporations; the second is that a government is 
entitled only to pursue the interest of its subjects, as opposed to private corporations which are entitled to 
pursue, to some extent at least, their own independent interests (Raz 1986: 4-6).  
7 It may be that nudging is only one type of choice architecture. That is, the latter could be understood as 
covering a wider range of possible influences. Here, however, I use the two terms as interchangeable. 
8 Halpern and Sanders claim that the BIT “is delivering monetary benefits in the region of hundreds of 
millions of dollars, if not billions” (2016: 54).  
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to understand why the nudge policy programme has been so enthusiastically adopted at 
this particular point in time, and why this has been so in the case of some governments 
more than others.9 Understanding and critically engaging with these conditions as they 
relate to debates on the nature of contemporary governance is a valuable inquiry; but it 
is the not the type of inquiry carried out in this thesis.10 A second consideration about 
scope, then, concerns the methods I adopt. As is explained in more detail below, my 
inquiry is focused on examining the normative underpinnings of this adoption by 
governments of new behaviour change strategies, with the aim of presenting an account 
of morally permissible nudging.  
 
§1.2: A Principled Evaluation 
I hope so far to have highlighted the political timeliness of this inquiry. It is not only 
that nudging appears to be “here to stay”, as the BIT’s Chief Executive David Halpern 
confidently asserts in this chapter’s opening quotation; he is also quoted as claiming that 
he and his team of policy entrepreneurs “have a sharp sense that we are still just 
scratching the surface” and that there is “so much more we can do” (quoted in Rutter 
2015). I agree that it is difficult to deny that there is a role, perhaps even an important 
one, for public choice architecture within an overall approach to policymaking; 
nonetheless, in order to understand what this role should be, we need an account of the 
political principles that ought to guide behavioural policymaking. And, to put it simply, 
“much work still needs to be done in identifying [these] principles” (Anderson 2010: 
376). This section offers two sets of remarks about the approach I take to this task. The 
first is methodological; it details the nature of the normative investigation that I take to 
be necessary and, in doing so, shows how distinctive this approach is to the one taken 
by nudge advocates, especially Sunstein (§1.2.1). The second is more substantive; it sets 
out some foundational claims concerning the demands of political morality, thereby 
clarifying the theoretical premises on which my extended argument rests (§1.2.2).       
 
§1.2.1: In Praise of Theory 
The question at the heart of the thesis’s investigation, expressed in its general form, is: 
Under what conditions, if any, is it morally permissible for a government to use insights 
from the cognitive and behavioural sciences to design policies with the express aim of 
                                                          
9 For a very interesting, first-hand story about how the BIT came into existence only after earlier political 
hiccups, see Halpern (2015a: 301-303).  
10 For examples of this more sociological approach, see Brown (2012) and Leggett (2014). 
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nudging the behaviour of its citizens in particular directions? Most broadly defined, this 
is a question that belongs to the discipline of practical philosophy, although this 
category can be subdivided into three distinct branches according to the sort of practical 
problems they discuss. The first, value theory, is concerned with investigating the 
goodness or badness of various actual or possible situations and identifying their good- 
or bad-making features. The second, normative theory, is concerned primarily with 
determining what various actors ought to do; it attempts to identify reasons for actions, 
duties, and rights as a way of establishing the moral permissibility or impermissibility of 
certain actions. The third, ascriptive theory, is concerned with analysing the conditions 
for the ascription of blame and praise to various actors (Raz 1999: 11-12). As the 
phrasing of my question suggests, this thesis is an exercise in normative theory, as it is 
concerned with a specific set of normative questions related to the moral permissibility 
of public nudging. In seeking to find principles that explain why the use of choice 
architecture as a policy lever is permissible under certain conditions but not others, the 
thesis sets out primarily to defend an account of the political morality of nudging.     
 This methodological approach is starkly juxtaposed to that taken by advocates 
of nudging in their recent engagement with its normative dimensions. Sunstein 
repeatedly warns of the need to avoid the “trap of abstraction”, which he says can 
“cause serious confusion when we are thinking about public policy” (2016a: 26). This 
charge is based on his longstanding commitment to pragmatic, rather than principled, 
ways of approaching practical questions in law and politics. He was involved in a debate 
in 1990s, for instance, about the appropriate way to reason about the truth claims of 
law. This debate pitched “theory-embedded” views, such as that of Ronald Dworkin 
(1986, 1997), against an “anti-theory army”, led by the Chicago School, and with 
Sunstein (1995, 1996) and Richard Posner (1995) as its leaders (Dworkin 1997: 354, 
361). It is helpful briefly to sketch these two views, as this will shed light on the key 
differences in the approach taken in this thesis, vis-à-vis that taken by nudge advocates, 
and will offer the opportunity to suggest some reasons for favouring the former over 
the latter. 
The general shape of the pragmatic approach to legal reasoning, and by 
extension the “practical approach to government” at the base of the pro-nudge 
argument (Halpern 2015a: 7), is captured in Posner’s own characterisation, presented as 
the following list of adjectives: “practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist, 
empirical, sceptical, anti-dogmatic, experimental” (1995: 11; cited in Dworkin 1997: 
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364). The driving idea is that the central, or perhaps the only, question that needs to be 
addressed is: How can we make things better? Answering this question requires taking 
pragmatic and empirical measures to gauge the comparative consequences of different 
decisions; it does not require abstract philosophical reasoning about complex issues of 
political morality. What matters, in short, is “what works”. By contrast, the “theory-
embedded” view contends that legal reasoning is the application of principles, which are 
embedded in practice, to a particular problem with the aim of showing that this or that 
principle provides a better justification of some part of legal practice (Dworkin 1997). It 
denies that there can be any a priori limit or constraint put on legal reflection “as a 
boundary of abstraction such reflection must not cross”, because it is the character of 
the inquiry itself which will, in each case, dictate the level of theory that needs to be 
explored (ibid.: 371-372). The same can be said of political reasoning. Many practical 
problems in politics require that we engage in abstract, philosophical theorising – and 
the ethics of public influence is one such example, as we will see in subsequent chapters. 
We cannot set an a priori constraint on what level of theoretical reasoning is and is not 
appropriate to resolving this practical problem; rather, it is only in considering it that we 
will discover which general philosophical or theoretical issues need to be confronted to 
resolve the issue of when, if at all, it is permissible for governments to modify citizens’ 
behaviour using psychologically-informed techniques.   
I believe that this theoretical approach is “not only attractive but inevitable” 
(Dworkin 1997: 355). Thaler and Sunstein’s discussion of the normative dimensions of 
nudging is, in contrast, marked by an agile pragmatism that is designed to appeal to our 
common sense intuitions about the “sensible” way of responding politically to the 
scientific evidence of cognitive biases. However, what this approach lacks is sufficient 
attention to the principles underlying these cases. As Anderson highlights:  
 
“It can be an effective rhetorical strategy, for some audiences, to imply that the only 
opposition to your ideas comes from overly abstract theorists who care more about 
consistent principles than about effective policy. But Thaler and Sunstein also claim to be 
introducing a new theoretical underpinning for policy-making, and so the objections 
cannot be so easily dismissed.” (Anderson 2010: 371-372) 
 
It would seem that the pragmatist approach is being used to smuggle in a particular 
conception of moral theory, namely, a welfarist version of consequentialism. We will 
explore this welfarism and the problems with it in more detail in later chapters. Here, I 
simply want to draw attention to the fact that, if the pragmatist approach to assessing 
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the permissibility of nudging is based on some conception of welfare consequentialism, 
then its advocates owe us an argument for why this is the most appropriate political 
principle for this evaluation – or, at the very least, they need to provide some answers 
relating to the many serious objections that it has been charged with. Such an argument 
would need to engage in precisely the kind of theorising that Sunstein had been hoping 
to avoid. In fact, in The Ethics of Influence (2016), Sunstein chooses not to take this route, 
but rather to present a primer of the relevant considerations that has been described as 
“immediately veering onto safe ground” whenever difficult dilemmas arise (Johnson 
2016).  
This pragmatist avoidance of issues of principle leaves us with a troubling lack 
of clarity; in essence, the issue of which nudges can be used under what conditions is 
left chiefly down to the logic of “what works”.11 Interestingly, Sunstein appears 
somewhat to embrace the description of his new movement as representing the rise of 
“the Psychological State” (Jones et al. 2013) – a phrase that conjures up thoughts of 
living in “nudge-world” (Waldron 2015) or “the Republic of Nudge” (Rachlinski 2017: 
1063). In such societies, we might imagine that the landscape in which citizens navigate 
their lives is extensively curated by psychocrats, if you will, based on knowledge of the 
cognitive and affective bases of human behavioural and decision-making processes, and 
with the principal aim of steering these processes in directions that promote individual 
and social welfare.12 Although Sunstein does acknowledge that “the Psychological State” 
is “not the best advertising, because it seems a bit alarming”, he nonetheless maintains 
that “the term has the virtue of spotlighting efforts […] to develop sensible, low-cost 
policies with close reference to how human beings actually think and behave” (Sunstein 
2014a: 13). But what on Sunstein’s pragmatic approach would stop all of the seemingly 
sensible individual policy interventions from creating, over time, the “totality of 
nudging” described above (Rachlinski 2017: 1075)? It is not obvious that, in principle, 
anything would. Given the current pace of the expansion of behavioural policy, it is 
clear that there is a real need to subject this issue to comprehensive and sophisticated 
philosophical analysis, in order to find ethical principles to guide the current practice 
and future development of nudging. This thesis contributes to this effort. 
                                                          
11 The reference to “which nudges” here hints at an important aspect of my own analysis, namely, that 
nudges may be very distinct in their form and impact, and that this may play a role in determining how we 
should approach them from a normative perspective.  
12 Rachlinski gives an excellent and elaborate illustration of what this might look like in practice in the 
first few pages of his recent extended review of The Ethics of Influence (2017: 1061-1063). 
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 The dystopian image evoked above could give an overly negative impression of 
the type of analysis that this thesis is set to offer. I present it, however, to highlight the 
problems attendant on an anti-theoretical approach, rather than as an implicit critique 
of all kinds of public choice architecture. In fact, my extended argument defends a 
particular, fairly extensive account of permissible public nudging – captured by what I 
call the transformative nudge model – which recognises and seeks to justify the agency-
enhancing potential of choice architecture with respect to both self-regarding and other-
regarding behaviour. Importantly, this political-theoretical argument is empirically 
grounded. It takes seriously the discoveries from the cognitive and behavioural sciences 
and examines how they threaten core liberal values and central components of human 
flourishing, before exploring whether public choice architecture holds out any promise 
of counteracting these negative effects. The first part of this subsection has offered an 
argument “in defence of theory” (Dworkin 1997: 375); this second part clarifies what 
type of theory I think it is that we should pursue in answering the question at hand.  
 Some believe that political theory should be situated within the realm of 
idealised abstraction, where its practitioners can conduct principled reflection into the 
fundamental principles of justice, which are taken to be logically independent both of 
issues of feasibility and of questions relating to human nature. This is not the method I 
adopt; I wish to engage in political theory with the express aim of finding principles to 
guide action in our current circumstances.13 And, in my view, if political theory is to be 
action-guiding (which I take to be at least part of its function), theorists can no longer 
pursue their goals with blithe disregard for the empirical findings which raise essential 
questions about human agency (§2.1 presents this research). Since political theory is 
widely accepted as a practical discipline, it is possible to maintain both that empirical 
findings do not have a bearing on deciding upon fundamental political principles and 
that normative theorising should take account of relevant empirical findings when 
seeking to operationalise these fundamental principles for the guidance of action, given 
that the feasibility of implementing the principles alters in light of such facts. On this 
view, then, political theory informed by relevant empirical findings provides the most 
promising approach to producing theory – in this case, a theory of the political morality 
of public nudging – that is able to guide action towards our ideals here and now (Niker 
                                                          
13 For more on this methodological debate between “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory”, as well as a 
helpful discussion of the different kinds of nonideal theory, see Stemplowska and Swift (2012). For 
defences of the non-ideal approach, see Farrelly (2007) and Stears (2005).  
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2013: 22).14 This openness to interdisciplinarity does, at certain points in the thesis at 
least, have important implications for my extended argument, which contributes to its 
distinctiveness relative to traditional autonomy-based liberal views. This point leads us 
into my second set of remarks about the methods I adopt.  
 
§1.2.2: Living Well and the Demands of Political Morality 
There are competing theories of the demands of political morality, and one’s views on 
this set of foundational issues concerning political justification will form the theoretical 
premises from which one develops an account of permissible nudging. One might, for 
example, offer an account based on an acceptance of Rawlsian political liberal premises, 
which would determine the shape of the view in particular ways (e.g., see Moles 2015). 
But, as Moles points out, it is clearly the case that “not all liberals endorse this view” 
(2015: 645, fn. 5). This will be the case for any theory of the permissibility conditions 
for nudging, since normative theory presupposes some theory of value from which it 
derives the requirements that it imposes on the behaviour of individuals and states (Raz 
1999: 11). The aim of this subsection, then, is to set out briefly the theoretical premises 
on which the extended argument of this thesis rests, in particular certain claims about 
what it means to live well and the role that a liberal state might justifiably play in 
supporting its citizens’ in living well. To be sure, this will not amount to a defence of 
this view relative to its alternatives. Nonetheless, it will serve the useful function of 
situating my account within the broader theoretical terrain, as well as provide an 
opportunity to outline some of its attractions.15   
 The debate over the demands of liberal political morality is framed by two 
questions: one concerning theoretical method, and a second relating to political 
substance (Mulhall and Swift 1996: 251-252; Beckman 2001: 4-10; Quong 2010: 15-22). 
The first concerns how we should conceive of the relationship between ethics and 
politics in political theorising, which asks whether liberal political philosophy must be 
grounded in some particular ethical ideal. The key distinction here is between 
comprehensive and purely political conceptions.16 The second relates to what we take to 
be the proper conduct of politics, and asks whether liberalism approves of a state 
promoting certain activities, ideals, or ways of life. Here, the key distinction is between 
perfectionist and anti-perfectionist conceptions.  
                                                          
14 I outline my views on the relationship between political philosophy and public policy in further detail in 
§6.1. 
15 Note that there is a fuller discussion of these issues in Chapter 3.  
16 This terminology is introduced by Rawls (1993: 12-13). 
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With respect to theoretical method, I keep company with theorists like J.S. Mill, 
Ronald Dworkin, and Joseph Raz in assuming a comprehensive conception, which rejects 
the methodological axiom – central to Rawls’s political liberalism – that political 
theorising requires disconnecting ethical ideals from politics.17 In more positive terms, 
comprehensive conceptions maintain that (certain) ethical ideals are relevant to 
theorising about the proper structure and concerns of the sphere of politics. What 
unites them is a commitment to the idea that liberal political morality is grounded in a 
distinctively liberal conception of what constitutes living well. This is commonly based 
on the idea that, whatever else it might include, a liberal ethic assumes personal 
autonomy (or similar concepts, such as individual integrity) as a – if not, the – central 
component. In line with this, autonomy plays this central justificatory role in my 
account of permissible nudging.  
 Comprehensive conceptions can take either perfectionist or anti-perfectionist 
forms, depending on one’s answer to whether it is permissible for states to actively 
promote living well. Perfectionism in politics is based on the idea, which is accepted as 
intuitively compelling even by its critics, that “the aim of the state (or at least one of its 
major aims) should be to improve the lives of citizens” (Quong 2010: 30). As a result, 
and in contrast to its rival position, it holds that “there is no fundamental principled 
inhibition on governments acting for any valid moral reason” when going about seeking 
to achieve this aim (Raz 1989: 1230). My account takes the form of a perfectionist political 
morality, because it accepts the following claim:  
 
The liberal perfectionist thesis: “It is at least sometimes permissible for a liberal state to 
promote or discourage particular activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to 
their inherent or intrinsic value.” (Quong 2010: 27) 
 
In particular, the account I develop argues that public nudging can, under certain 
conditions, be justified by reference to its ability to promote citizens’ autonomy, rightly 
understood, on grounds that this has intrinsic value for their lives. In such cases, this 
political action would represent a form of noncoercive state perfectionism. This general 
idea is described by Steven Wall thus: 
 
“Noncoercive state perfectionist measures may be able to counteract or cancel various 
pressures and influences that would otherwise impede rational decision making by its 
citizens. Designed well, such measures might contribute to an ethical environment in 
                                                          
17 For an account of permissible nudging based on Rawls’ political liberalism, see Moles (2015). 
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which people were best able to respond to the reasons for and against the options that 
they confront. If [so], then they may not invade, but rather protect and promote, 
autonomous decision making.” (Wall 2012) 
 
Those who favour anti-perfectionism might respond by arguing that there is a 
potentially insulting, even manipulative, character to this kind of state involvement in 
promoting well-being. According to comprehensive anti-perfectionists, a commitment 
to an autonomy-based liberal ethic necessitates anti-perfectionism: the idea, in short, is 
that the best way to promote this liberal conception of living well is for the state to 
remain substantively neutral, in aim, between all (reasonable) conceptions of the good.18 
This issue will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters; but for now it is worth 
noticing that noncoercive state perfectionism might take one of two forms. It might be 
designed to protect and promote citizens’ autonomous agency or to help citizens pursue 
or engage with certain worthwhile or valuable options (Wall 1998: 197-198). According 
to the account of the nature and value of autonomy I set out later in the thesis, 
permissible noncoercive (nudge) perfectionism can take only the first of these forms, in 
the prudential realm at least. As I will seek to show, my account is not subject to the 
criticisms often levelled at perfectionist political action by anti-perfectionists: the nudge 
interventions it deems permissible are not insulting, manipulative, or objectionably 
paternalistic. In general, they are motivated by an ambition – which, in light of the 
empirical evidence, is in some cases best characterised as a positive duty of governments 
– to support citizens’ practical reasoning processes.  
 Some of these practical reasoning processes relate to citizens’ self-regarding 
actions, while others relate to their other-regarding action. Accordingly, the normative 
analysis presented in this thesis is divided into two main strands, paralleling the two 
main sets of reasons why the political community might modify citizens’ behaviour. The 
first is to improve the target’s own life (let’s label this prudential nudging), and the second 
is to improve the lives of others, by preventing harm or wrong to others (we can call 
this moral nudging). These two kinds of reasons activate different sets of normative 
concerns, and so it is necessary to assess these issues separately if we are to do justice to 
all of the relevant considerations. As will become more apparent over the course of the 
thesis, simply drawing this distinction and carrying out full examinations of the 
                                                          
18 Since the liberal ethic offers a general philosophical conception of living well – i.e., attributing 
fundamental importance to the human capacity for autonomy – rather than more concrete statements 
about how people should exercise this autonomous choice, the comprehensive anti-perfectionist’s state is 
justified by appeal to a conception of the good life in the first sense only, and is therefore able to remain 
neutral between conceptions of the good in the second sense (Mulhall and Swift 1996: 254). 
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normative dimensions of each type of nudging represents an important contribution to 
the literature in itself. The most novel and ambitious aspect of my analysis, though, is to 
offer a complete account, by which I mean an account that unifies the two strands of 
analysis – prudential and moral – in a coherent overall theory.  
 To understand the basis of this view, it is important to recognise that a moral 
nudge can in principle be done for the sake of another – this is what makes it moral in 
character – while still being partially motivated and/or justified by prudential or ethical 
concerns relating to the target of the nudge.19 On my autonomy-based view of living 
well (outlined in Chapter 3), it matters not only that we discharge our duties and 
responsibilities to others, but that we do so autonomously. That is, there is ethical value 
in fulfilling a duty as a response to recognising the reason(s) for doing so, which is not 
the case when we fulfil a duty because, say, we were hypnotised or forced in some other 
way into doing so. Although these considerations are often outweighed, there is 
something distinctive about the case of public choice architecture and its unique 
promise in the moral realm – namely, its ability to help governments deal with problems 
associated with nonenforceability – that results in these ethical considerations taking on 
a special significance.      
Broadly speaking, then, what drives and unites this normative investigation, in 
all its variety, is a commitment to the value of personal autonomy and its role in living 
well. Within a web of complexities, this simplicity counts as a virtue of the theory I 
defend. This is because it is a desirable feature of a normative theory, to quote Shelly 
Kagan, that “it yields a body of judgments out of a relatively sparse amount of theory, 
deriving the numerous complex variations of the phenomena from a small number of 
basic principles” (1989: 11; cited in Parr 2015: 24-25). To be sure, this can be a virtue of 
my theory only if the analysis it generates is as compelling as any alternative; however, 
he remainder of the thesis seeks to show this to be the case. 
 
§1.3: Preview of the Thesis  
We can now specify the thesis’s central question in more specific terms in light of this 
premise: how, if at all, can governments permissibly apply the psychological evidence to 
                                                          
19 In using “ethical” in this way, I follow Dworkin. There are different ways of understanding this term. 
Some use it in a broad sense, which effectively erases the distinction between “ethical” and “moral” 
(Dworkin 2011: 191). I would suggest that Sunstein understands it in this way when entitling his book The 
Ethics of Influence. In its narrower sense, however, “ethics” concerns how we ought to live our lives. This is 
distinct from “morality” since this prescribes how we ought to treat others. As I suggest here, however, it 
is possible – and indeed, I think it is true to some extent – that “our desire to lead good lives for 
ourselves provides a justifying reason for our concern with what we owe to others” (Dworkin 2011: 191).    
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the design of public policy and social institutions as a means of improving citizens’ 
lives?  
I begin to lay the foundations for answering this question in Chapter 2. Its first 
set of tasks is descriptive. First, it introduces the empirical findings from the cognitive 
and behavioural sciences that have “generated a radical change in the broader 
framework within which human nature is investigated” (Lavazza and De Caro 2010: 
23), and explains how and why these findings have provided the basis for a new 
behavioural insight-led approach to government. Second, it outlines the three-part 
moral argument offered by Thaler and Sunstein (2009) that aims to justify this shift in 
the logic of policymaking. The chapter then engages critically with this argument and, in 
so doing, clarifies the character of nudging, before introducing the range of normative 
concerns that have been raised regarding the permissibility of this means of influence. 
Mapping out this critical terrain not only offers a review of the current literature, but 
allows me to highlight the gap that this thesis’s more nuanced argument intends to fill.  
 What this discussion highlights is the need to critically examine the framework 
within which the current debate over the ethics of nudging is taking place. I do this in 
Chapter 3, where I argue that we should take an autonomy-based, rather than a preference 
satisfaction, approach to assessing whether nudges can improve the lives of citizens. 
The chapter begins by reconstructing the standard used by nudge advocates for 
determining what it is that makes a person’s life go well – one that rests on the 
satisfaction of a person’s rational preferences – and explains why the adoption of this 
standard is taken to be attractive (namely, that it appears to justify only means, and not 
ends, paternalism). It then outlines a competing approach, grounded in a partial account 
of well-being that understands personal autonomy to be a central component of what it 
means to live well. The second part of the chapter explores the theoretical implications 
of taking this approach, partly to diffuse some of the controversiality thought, by some, 
to be attached to the adoption of this standard. It does this in two ways: first, it clarifies 
the moderate character of my liberal perfectionist framework and questions whether, in 
fact, anti-perfectionists would necessarily reject the content of the account it generates; 
second, it highlights serious problems with the consistency of the informed preference 
satisfaction approach, which purports to set itself up in opposition to all forms of 
perfectionism. In this way, Chapters 2 and 3 serve to lay the conceptual and theoretical 
foundations for the normative inquiry that follows. 
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 As already noted, there are two main strands to this normative analysis of public 
nudging, one relating to behaviour change policies designed for the sake of the target 
and the other relating to those designed for the sake of others. These analyses are 
performed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, which comprise the main argumentative 
body of the thesis. Chapter 4 develops and defends a selective account of permissible 
prudential nudging, which it calls autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism. It carries out a full 
examination of the way in which nudges operate on their target, drawing a series of 
important distinctions which enable us better to comprehend and to capture the ethical 
and political complexities involved in the use of this policy tool. As a result, the chapter 
engages in a more nuanced normative analysis than is often usual within the current 
debate, showing that certain types of nudges are manipulative and thus presumptively 
impermissible, while others are able to act as a form of autonomy support in virtue of 
their ability non-manipulatively to mitigate the internal threat to autonomy that comes 
from various cognitive biases. The chapter sets out two categories of choice architecture 
– nudge-autonomy and auto-nudge – that are able to play this autonomy-supporting role.  
 Chapter 5 assesses whether there are conditions under which it is permissible to 
use nudges as a means of moral improvement – something that has not received any 
attention in the debate thus far. After characterising moral improvement and 
considering the different ways we might justify governmental efforts to bring about this 
end, the chapter sets out a two-part account of the conditions under which the use of 
moral nudges, as I call them, is permissible. The first examines the conditions under which 
it would be desirable to use moral nudges – of the kind deemed impermissible in the 
prudential realm – to secure conformity with moral reasons in the case of enforceable 
duties. It sets out a restrictive, conditional view on when nudges might be preferable to 
(additional) coercive measures. The main promise of choice architecture, in my view, is 
to be found in helping governments to deal with problems associated with the 
nonenforceability of certain moral duties. To this end the second, and main, part of this 
investigation develops a detailed account of when moral nudges can be used in this 
capacity. It sets out three kinds of interventions – motivational scaffolding, inducing moral 
deliberation, and public-ecological persuasion – that are deemed permissible in part because 
they support agents in developing and exercising autonomous (and, in this case, morally 
responsible) agency, which has ethical value for them as well as the moral value that 
comes from preventing harm to others. 
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  Chapter 6 aims to translate the lessons from this comprehensive normative 
analysis into an account of permissible public nudging in practice. This engagement 
with the practical concerns and issues relating to the making of behavioural policy 
marks a key contribution of the thesis. The chapter begins by articulating the essential 
form of the thesis’s extended philosophical argument, which it expresses in two ethical 
principles that form of the basis of the transformative nudge model, namely, the nudge-to-
deliberate principle and the nudge-to-motivate principle. Within the context of the UK and its 
Behavioural Insight Team in particular, it then explores the difference that the two 
ethical principles might make to existing governmental approaches to designing choice 
architecture here and now. It sets out an initial ethically-sensitive policy framework to 
guide the design of interventions, and considers some potential issues concerning its 
implementation. The chapter finishes with a discussion of some of the limitations of the 
thesis, picking out some of the main ways in which its analysis could be extended in 
further research. This is followed by a brief conclusion (in Chapter 7), which, rather 
than restating the thesis’s arguments and main conclusions, offers some concluding 
remarks about my hopes for this debate going forward.  
 The thesis aims to offer a distinctive and timely contribution to the literature, as 
well as to the public debate over the ongoing development and use of this policy tool. 
Its main contribution to the literature is to present a complete account of the ethics of 
psychologically-informed public policymaking, which is able both to unmask and, more 
importantly, to solve in a coherent and theoretically attractive fashion a set of deep 
problems in the current debate. This account is distinctive in two significant ways. First, 
it differs from traditional autonomy-based accounts in the political theory literature 
because it takes seriously the empirical evidence from the cognitive and behavioural 
sciences and, in particular, the threat to autonomy associated with our automatic and 
context-dependent mental processes. It claims that those interested in autonomy should 
be interested in and attentive to this evidence, and defends an autonomy-based account 
of the permissibility of nudging that is appropriately updated in light of these findings. 
Second, as already noted, my account is distinctive in virtue of its completeness. Much 
of the critical engagement with nudging has been piecemeal and has often been 
constrained by the (sometimes problematic) contours set by influential early 
contributions. This thesis resists these limitations, which allows it to open up the debate 
in new and underexplored ways. In particular, the thesis presents the first full 
investigation into choice architecture’s potential moralising effects and the role that they 
  
20 
 
might play within a theory of the political morality of public nudging. The account I 
offer is not only distinctive, but politically timely. It represents the first attempt, to the 
best of my knowledge, to integrate serious philosophical assessment into existing 
practices in behavioural policymaking. At a time when the vast expansion of 
behavioural policy is raising questions about its ethical dimensions, even among its 
practitioners, an account that is able to translate its arguments into simple ethical 
principles is precisely the kind of contribution that is called for, and my hope is that it 
will open up a productive, two-way discussion about developing an ethically-sensitive 
framework for designing and implementing public nudges.  
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2. New Models of Agency and Influence 
 
A large and ever-growing body of multidisciplinary research has revealed that classic 
models of human agency are in serious need of revision. Understanding this shift in the 
empirical foundations of human behaviour and decision-making is important for our 
normative inquiry because it has provided the basis for a moral argument in favour of 
changing the way we think about what counts as permissible governmental influence, as 
well as the main practical insights into what form these new behavioural policy levers 
might take. The first aim of this chapter, then, is to outline both the relevant empirical 
evidence (§2.1) and the argument for nudging (§2.2.1). Following this, its second aim is 
to critically engage with this argument in order to clarify the character of nudging as I 
will understand it in the remainder of the thesis (§2.2.2), before mapping the existing 
critical terrain (§2.3).  
 
§2.1: Human Agency and the “Socio-Ecological” Turn 
Despite being a complex and dynamic field of investigation within the cognitive and 
behavioural sciences, there is an “emerging consensus about the fundamental point 
relating to both the scope and limits of human rationality and the cognitive architecture 
that supports it” (Samuels et al. 2012: 192; emphasis in original). As a result of this 
consensus, a new model of human agency, based on dual-process theories of cognition, 
has risen to prominence – one that is able to make sense of the ‘anomalies’ that occur as 
a consequence of our automatic and context-sensitive mental processes, as well as to 
explain how these processes are related to the more familiar deliberative processes that 
have hitherto taken centre-stage in our theories of rational agency.  
This new model has been met with different types of responses in the literature: 
some see it as having highlighted that we are subject to “truly dismaying” limitations as 
thinkers (Levy 2012: 589), while others interpret it as revealing more about how the 
human mind achieves its “unique brilliance” (Haidt 2006: 17). However we might think 
of it, this alternative model has transformed our understanding of the “socio-ecological” 
factors acting on us (Hurley 2011), and has revealed new spaces and modes of influence 
that previously had gone either under-appreciated or unrecognised. This section 
presents an overview of the findings that have led to this new model of agency (§2.1.1), 
and then discusses the transition to thinking about these findings as “behavioural 
insights” with relevance to policymaking (§2.1.2). 
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§2.1.1: Dual-Process Theories of Cognition 
Robust empirical evidence has provided the basis for an “emerging analytics of decision 
making” that diverges from classical accounts of individual rational agency in significant 
ways (Whitehead et al. 2011: 2819-2820). Two key assumptions tend to unite classical 
conceptions: first, that rational agency is marked by a person’s perceptions being 
decoupled from her behaviour, such that the former play “flexible, instrumental roles in 
relation to action, mediated by the individual’s desires and ends”; second, that rational 
agency is domain-general, by which is meant that it is not tied to specific domains or 
environments (Hurley 2011: 194-195). These assumptions have provided the foundation 
for the economic theories and policy recommendations by which we have made sense 
of and governed our social world, almost as if they were basic laws of human nature 
(Ariely 2009). However, evidence relating to the phenomena of automaticity and context-
dependency has called each of these assumptions into question, respectively, and has been 
at the heart of forging an updated conception of human cognition and agency.  
 Cognitive decoupling is taken to be an essential part of the kind of conscious 
process that is necessary for a person to judge which action, from the available set of 
options, is (or is believed to be) in his or her best interest or is (or is believed to be) 
morally appropriate to the situation at hand. If perception and behaviour are decoupled, 
the supposed result is that behaviour is necessarily mediated by conscious processes. An 
action would be the result of a two-stage process: first, a person takes in perceptions 
and, through internal reasoning processes, arrives at beliefs about the world including 
beliefs about the probable results of alternative actions; second, these alternative actions 
are valued instrumentally by reference to the person’s ends, thereby producing a pattern 
of choices that is consistent and instrumentally effective relative to his or her beliefs and 
ends (Hurley 2011: 195). Research into automaticity has challenged the validity of this 
two-stage process as a general assumption about human decision-making. While its early 
beginnings can be found in Williams James’ ideomotor theory (1890), the phenomenon 
of automaticity has more recently been a central feature of the work of social 
psychologist John Bargh and his colleagues, marking out a core research agenda for 
scientists of human behaviour. These researchers have found that decoupling is not 
representative of how behaviour comes about within the social contexts in which we 
live much of our lives. Rather, our behaviour can be triggered automatically by the mere 
presence of relevant situational features in a way that is not mediated by the kinds of 
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conscious perceptual and judgemental processes described in the two-stage process. 
This has been labelled the “perception-behaviour link” (Bargh et al. 1996: 231-233). 
 Consider priming effects as an illustrative example. This refers to the implicit 
memory effects that occur without any awareness, in which exposure to a particular 
stimulus nonconsciously “primes” a response to a later stimulus. In one study, 
participants were asked to unscramble sets of five words and make sentences using four 
of them (e.g., you might make the sentence ‘he finds it instantly’ from the word-set 
‘finds he it yellow instantly’). Half of the participants were given sets that contained 
words associated with the elderly (e.g., ‘wrinkle’, ‘forgetful’, ‘grey’, ‘bingo’, ‘bald’, etc.), 
while the sets for the other half did not contain any of these words. Following 
completion of the task, participants were asked to walk down the corridor to complete a 
second experiment. Unbeknownst to them, the experimenters were recording the time 
it took them to walk to the other room. Those participants who had been exposed to 
words relating to the elderly walked significantly more slowly than the control group 
(Bargh et al. 1996). In a similar experiment, whether a participant unscrambled words 
that had associations with rudeness or politeness was shown to have an effect on how 
she related to the experimenter to whom she had been asked to report, but who was 
engaged in a conversation with someone and was not making any eye contact with her. 
Even more interesting was the finding that these effects are not dependent upon people 
consciously reading the words; the same effects can be shown to occur when the words 
are presented to participants subliminally, i.e., by flashing them on a screen for just a 
few hundredths of a second, thereby ruling out the possibility that they will be 
registered consciously (Haidt 2006: 14). This indicates that some part of the mind 
nevertheless does register the words, and that this sets in motion the behaviours 
measured in the studies, such as walking slowly or interrupting the experimenter from 
her conversation. 
 How should we understand these results, and the many others like them? The 
pervasive response has been for many psychologists and neuroscientists to converge in 
support of dual-process theories of cognition (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Stanovich and West 
2000; Evans 2003; Kahneman 2003: 1450-1452). Such theories rest on the claim that 
human reasoning is comprised of two main types of processes, and they often use the 
generic terms “System 1” and “System 2” to label their distinct sets of properties 
(Stanovich 1999). The attributes of System 1 have been characterised variously as: 
automatic, fast, unintentional, nonconscious, associative, contextualised, intuitive, 
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uncontrolled, implicit, subject to biases, evolutionarily ancient, resistant to interference 
from concurrent processes, and tending to link perception fairly directly to action. By 
contrast, System 2 has been characterised as: reflective, slow, deliberate, intentional, 
conscious, controlled, flexible, explicit, uniquely human, effortful, costly in terms of 
cognitive and attentional resources, analytic and critical, domain-general, subject to 
interference from other cognitive processes and to disruption by time pressure or 
cognitive load, tending to decouple perception from behaviour (Evans and Stanovich 
2013: 225, see Table 1; Hurley 2011: 203). Particular theories may foreground different 
elements of this broad contrast, though these family disputes are not relevant for our 
purposes; what is important is that there is a clear consensus on the dual-process 
account as representative of the nature of the cognitive architecture supporting human 
reasoning.20 
 A number of metaphors have been used to help us think about the divided 
nature of our mind and its reasoning processes.21 Daniel Kahneman, for instance, opens 
Thinking, Fast and Slow by describing the book as a “psychodrama” with two characters – 
the automatic System 1 and the effortful System 2 – whom he invites us to think about 
as agents with “their individual abilities, limitations, and functions” (2011: 21).22 We 
identify ourselves with the conscious and deliberative agent, represented by System 2; 
but Kahneman describes System 1 as the story’s hero, “effortlessly originating 
impressions and feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate 
choices of System 2” (ibid.). Even so, much of the book is devoted to understanding 
the “uneasy interaction” between these two systems and, specifically, the systematic 
errors of intuitive judgement and choice (i.e., the cognitive biases) that he attributes to 
the workings of System 1 (ibid.: 415-416). More creatively, Jonathan Haidt describes 
human reasoning in terms of an elephant and its rider. The rider represents the 
conscious, deliberative processes of System 2; while the elephant represents everything 
else: “the gut feelings, visceral reactions, emotions, and intuitions that comprise much 
of the automatic system” (Haidt 2006: 17). Each has its own kind of intelligence; and 
the unique brilliance of human beings is made possible by these systems, and their 
                                                          
20 For a good overview of the current state of the debate on dual-process theories, see Evans and 
Stanovich (2013).  
21 There is a good psychological reason for this, as Haidt explains: “Human thinking depends on 
metaphor. We understand new or complex things in relation to things we already know” (2006: 2). For 
more on what they call “the neural basis of metaphorical thought”, see Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 257-
261).  
22 He also makes explicit reference, for the sake of clarification, to the metaphorical nature of these 
agents: “I describe mental life by the metaphor of two agents, called System 1 and System 2, which 
respectively produce fast and slow thinking” (Kahneman 2011: 13). 
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respective intelligences, working together in synergy. The problem is that they do not 
always work together in this way: “Like the rider on the back of an elephant, the 
conscious, reasoning part of the mind has only limited control of what the elephant 
does” (ibid.: xi).  
 It is at this point that we can begin to understand why the second assumption of 
classical conceptions of rational agency, domain-generality, is also found to be wanting. 
It is the interplay of nonconscious cognitive heuristics with situational features that ends 
up being “the secret author of many of the choices and judgments [we] make”, despite 
the fact that, from the perspective of classical conceptions of rationality, these often 
very minor contextual details should be irrelevant to the outcome (Kahneman 2011: 13; 
also see Simon 1990: 7). Cognitive and evolutionary psychologists have discovered an 
extensive set of heuristics that operate as mental shortcuts (or information-processing 
rules), while social psychologists and those working in the field of cognitive engineering 
have amassed a vast amount of evidence on how the structure of environments interact 
with and modulate this “fast thinking” (Norman 2013).23 Some choice environments 
work with the grain of these automatic processes, as it were, so as to produce good (or 
good-enough) behavioural outcomes; but others generate cognitive biases, i.e., processes 
that are considered as nonrational on outcome- and process-based views of classical 
rational agency.24  
The study of biases has become an extensive area of research and, increasingly, 
biases are both gathering public attention and having an impact on disciplines outside of 
the cognitive sciences. Within medical practice, there is an ongoing debate about the 
role of framing effects on the decisions of both patients and doctors (Marteau 1989; 
Gigerenzer 2014: 159-224). Patient’s preferences and doctors’ judgements are sensitive 
to the way in which information is framed: “Even experienced medical doctors are 
more likely to choose a treatment when its effects are described as 200 lives saved out 
of 600, as opposed to 400 deaths out of 600” (Moles 2015: 646; Kahneman 2003: 1458). 
Within policy, much attention has been given to the impact of status quo bias or default 
                                                          
23 Tversky and Kahneman are generally considered the fathers of the “heuristics and biases” tradition. In 
a famous paper published in 1974, they argued that three heuristics underlie a wide range of intuitive 
judgements: the representative heuristic (which states that probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which 
X resembles Y); the availability heuristic (which captures the fact that we estimate likelihood by the ease of 
mental association or retrieval); and the anchoring heuristic (which captures the fact that different starting 
points yield different estimates that are biased towards the initial values) (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Blumenthal-Barby 2016: 5). Following decades of research since then, the current set of biases and 
heuristics can no longer fit neatly into these three initial categories. Indeed, in a recent review of 214 
empirical studies of biases and heuristics, 19 different types were identified (Blumenthal-Barby and 
Krieger 2015; for a list and short description of these, see Blumenthal-Barby 2016: 6, Table 1).     
24 For a discussion of these two forms of the classical conception, see Hurley (2011: 193-194).  
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bias. People have a strong tendency, whenever a default is offered, to stick with this. 
This is starkly illustrated, for example, by the difference between two similar European 
countries with respect to organ donation registration: in Germany, which has an opt-in 
system, only 12% of citizens have given consent; whereas in Austria, which uses a 
presumed consent system, 99% of people are on the register. Within the legal and 
criminal justice systems, as well as in philosophy, there is an important discussion about 
implicit stereotype biases. People often manifest implicit attitudes towards members of 
socially stigmatised groups on account of unconscious stereotype associations, and do 
so even when they hold explicit anti-discriminatory or egalitarian beliefs about that 
group (Brownstein 2015). Implicit biases therefore have serious implications for society, 
especially as regards discrimination, prejudice, and structural injustice.25 
Dual-process theories offer a means of explaining the systematic behavioural 
and cognitive anomalies – from the perspective of classical conceptions of individual 
rational agency – that are part and parcel of our everyday experience. Of course, dual-
process theories are also able to explain why we are able effectively to deliberate and 
make decisions in line with our goals, preferences, and values, especially when we are 
not in conditions that put pressure on our System 2 processes. Nevertheless, the 
evidence has revealed that human agency is more of a socio-ecological phenomenon 
than we have traditionally thought; under certain circumstances, our behaviour tends 
towards being “embedded in and dependent upon [features of our] social environment” 
(Hurley 2011: 192). It is this predictability, albeit probabilistic in nature, that has made 
possible (and necessary, according to some) the move towards behavioural theories of 
economics, as well as providing the foundations for an important shift towards the use 
of knowledge of these biases at the level of public policy and governance – the 
particular development that interests us here. Within this domain, these biases have 
become more commonly known as “behavioural insights”.   
 
§2.1.2: Biases as “Behavioural Insights” 
Governments have various tools at their disposal for influencing and intervening in 
citizens’ behaviour in accordance with their legitimate aims (see House of Lords 2011: 
10, Table 1). Knowledge of predictable cognitive biases has revealed the possibility of 
adding another policy lever to this list. The behaviour change agenda is based on the 
                                                          
25 For a discussion of the impact of cognitive biases on criminal justice, see Benforado (2015); and for a 
discussion of the mechanisms available within British law in particular for working against the effects of 
implicit bias, see Hosking and Russell (2016). Also, see Brownstein and Saul (2016) for a collection of 
philosophical contributions concerning the relationship between implicit bias and structural injustice.  
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idea that these lessons from psychology and the cognitive sciences can be applied by 
governments to the design of public policy in ways that can effectively influence and 
modify citizens’ behaviour without coercing, incentivising, or educating them, as such. 
Such efforts have been described using a range of terms: “behavioural policy” (Halpern 
2015), “institutional prosthetics” (Trout 2005: 394), “ecological engineering” (Levy 
2012) and, most commonly, “nudging” or “choice architecture” (Thaler and Sunstein 
2009; Sunstein 2014a).26 
 Two key claims unite these proposals. First, given that human behaviour has 
been shown to be context-sensitive under certain conditions and in certain domains, it 
is possible to design public environments that are more or less conducive to generating 
particular behaviours. This rests on the possibility of making use of behavioural insights 
primarily as a form of “nonargumentative influence”, namely: 
 
“…influence that operates either by bypassing a person’s awareness or by relying on facts 
about the subject’s psychology.... It is in contrast to influence that operates by […] 
offering him reasons and arguments (i.e., rational persuasion), and to influence that 
operates by force or severe threats of harm (i.e., coercion).” (Blumenthal-Barby 2014: 
123) 
 
Second, now that we are aware of this possibility, we ought to design these public 
environments in ways that work with the grain of human psychology, for the purpose 
of making citizens’ lives go better. The first claim is an empirical one, while the second 
is normative and introduces the issue of paternalism to the debate. Indeed, from both a 
policy and a political-theoretical perspective, the main impact of the discoveries in 
cognitive sciences has been to challenge the traditional philosophical animus against 
paternalism, and to argue in favour of a more diversified picture. Those who claim that 
some forms of paternalistic intervention are permissible, and sometimes even morally 
                                                          
26 Some of these terms, especially those making reference to behavioural engineering, may strike one as 
somewhat behaviorist in character (e.g. Skinner 1971). There is an important fundamental sense is which 
these proposals differ from the behaviourist project, however. As Graham (2015) explains, the doctrine 
of behaviourism is committed to two claims: (1) that psychology is the science of behaviour, not the 
science of the mind; and (2) that behaviour “can be described and explained without making ultimate 
reference to mental events or to internal psychological processes”, that is, that the sources of behaviour 
are to be found in the environment, not in the mind. By contrast, the political proposals based on dual-
process theories of cognition reject these claims and instead focus on taking advantage of what we know 
about the relationship between mental processes and environmental factors (for a helpful discussion of 
Skinnerian behavioural control, see Dworkin 1988: 150-160). Even though this critique is misplaced in 
formal terms, it does capture an important worry about these kinds of behaviour change techniques – 
namely, the worry about manipulation and the undermining of autonomy more generally – that are 
discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.   
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required, are no longer rarities.27 These proposals have not been confined only to 
“soft”, understood as noncoercive, forms of paternalism.28 Some have used the 
evidence as a basis for offering a philosophical defence of coercive paternalism, i.e., 
“paternalism of the sort that forces people to act, or refrain from acting, according to 
their best interests” (Conly 2013: 3). These kinds of arguments, especially those 
advocating for soft versions of paternalism, have already had a significant impact on 
policymaking (as we saw in §1.1) – and none more so than Thaler and Sunstein’s case in 
favour of what they call “libertarian paternalism”, which promises not to offend against 
citizens’ freedom of choice.  
  
§2.2: From Cognitive Architecture to Choice Architecture 
Libertarian paternalism is arguably the most theoretically innovative of the proposals in 
this new wave of purportedly permissible paternalistic influence. But before proceeding 
in discussing it further, it is worth noting a terminological point. In his Foreword to 
David Halpern’s book Inside the Nudge Unit, Richard Thaler points out a difference in 
how this proposal is labelled in US and UK contexts. He writes: “We called our 
philosophy libertarian (or liberal in the UK) paternalism” (Thaler 2015: x). In what 
follows, then, I will understand their argument as one seeking to justify a distinctively 
liberal form of paternalism, and will drop the reference to libertarianism. I will instead 
refer to their proposal as nudge paternalism. This section has two tasks: first, it presents 
Thaler and Sunstein’s argument for nudge paternalism (§2.2.1); second, it offers some 
initial critical engagement with this argument, in order to highlight some points that are 
important to understanding the character of nudging (§2.2.2).  
 
§2.2.1: The Argument for Nudge Paternalism 
Thaler and Sunstein’s argument is based on three claims: (1) that the empirical “best 
judge” assumption is false; (2) that paternalism, in some form, is inevitable; and (3) that 
paternalism need not be coercive. The first follows directly from the empirical research 
                                                          
27 For example, in addition to Thaler and Sunstein (2009) on “libertarian paternalism”, see Camerer et al. 
(2003) on “asymmetric paternalism” and Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) on “epistemic paternalism”. 
28 There are two ways in which the distinction between “soft” and “hard” paternalism is used in the 
literature. The first parallels the distinction between noncoercive and coercive paternalism. Thaler and 
Sunstein claim that their proposal is a form of soft paternalism in this sense (although this has sometimes 
been contested, as we will see below). The second, arguably more common, way is outlined by Feinberg 
(1989) and focuses on voluntariness. On this view, soft paternalism maintains that a government has the 
right to intervene “when but only when [a person’s] conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when 
temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not” (Feinberg 1989: 12). It is 
less clear that nudge paternalism is soft in this second sense. We will discuss issues pertaining to this in 
the next chapter. 
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outlined above.29 It is a denial of J.S. Mill’s so-called epistemic argument, which holds 
that individuals are in the best position to identify both their own ends and the best 
means of obtaining them, because they have “means of knowledge immeasurably 
surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else” (Mill 2005: 93; see Sunstein 
2014: 6-7). Thus, if the government’s goal is to ensure that people’s lives go well, 
allowing people to pick out their own paths offers the most effective route.30 Sunstein 
contends that this argument, based on the non-normative best judge assumption, “provides 
the strongest support that the Harm Principle can find” (2014: 7); but, he also argues 
that it is no longer available to anti-paternalists on account of the fact that people 
systematically make nonrational choices in certain contexts that can harm their interests 
in more or less severe ways.  
 The second claim has come to be known as the argument from unavoidability, which 
many view as Thaler and Sunstein’s “most important argument for nudging” (Grill 
2014: 142). It purports to show that the idea that there is an alternative to at least some 
of kind of paternalism, which is a necessary premise or assumption of anti-paternalism, 
is a misconception. The central thought is that the research highlighting the context-
dependency or endogeneity of people’s preferences demonstrates that “Choice architecture 
is inevitable” (Sunstein 2014: 118 and 2016a: 76; emphasis in originals). Thaler and 
Sunstein open Nudge with the motivating illustrative example of Carolyn, the director of 
a school (or university) cafeteria (2009: 1-2).31 Carolyn notices that her arrangement of 
the lunch items in the canteen has a significant determining influence on what students 
choose; in particular, the majority select the option that is presented first. Once noticed, 
this power to influence can be exercised in different ways. She could use it to maximise 
cafeteria profits, or to direct students towards healthier options, or she could use a 
randomising technique in an attempt to neutralise her power. What cannot be changed, 
however, is the fact that the items must be presented in some order, which means that 
                                                          
29 These authors are clear that the “basic source of information” used to formulate and justify nudge 
interventions is the recent evidence about human decision-making outlined in the previous section (2009: 
8). They interpret it as highlighting that decisions that follow from cognitive biases are “flawed” and 
“systematically wrong” judgements, which result from “human frailty” (ibid.: 19, 5, 79). 
30 According to Mill, this is because: “The interference of society to overrule his judgement and purposes 
in what only regards himself must be grounded on general presumptions which may be altogether wrong 
and, even if right, are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted 
with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without” (2005: 93).  
31 Their use of an example that involves children is problematic, because we generally consider there to be 
different principles that apply in the cases of children and adults on account of the former’s lack of 
autonomy (for more on this, see §6.4.1). This rhetorical strategy of Thaler and Sunstein’s has been called 
out in the critical literature. Here, then, I suggest modifying the example so that the students are students 
at a university, rather than at a school.   
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Carolyn assumes the role of “choice architect”.32 If we extend this example more 
generally, it demonstrates that it is impossible for a government to avoid influencing its 
citizens: it is, simply by virtue of its legitimate role and status, inevitably involved in the 
business of structuring the “landscape of choice” in which its citizens are embedded 
and in which they navigate their lives (Ben-Porath 2010). According to Thaler and 
Sunstein, this highlights that there is “no way of avoiding nudging in some direction” 
(2009: 5). Like Carolyn, government actors are choice architects; once we realise this, we 
should accept that these actors have good reasons to design policies and institutions in 
ways that have beneficial effects for citizens. This argument purports to show that 
paternalism, in some form and in some contexts at least, is inevitable. 
 The third claim is opens the door to the possibility of a distinctively liberal type 
of paternalism, which is intended to be acceptable to liberals of all persuasions. This 
involves recognising that coercive paternalism, that is, interventions that regulate the 
landscape of choice in ways that simply remove certain options or significantly increase 
their costs, is not the only route available to us. Choice architecture, it is argued, offers a 
noncoercive form of paternalism. We might purposefully design choice environments in 
ways that utilise what we know about cognitive biases and heuristics to direct people 
towards “welfare-promoting” behaviour (the paternalistic aspect); but, unlike its 
traditional counterpart, this form of governmental intervention is noncoercive in so far 
as it leaves all of the pre-existing options open and does not compromise people’s 
freedom to choose between these options (the liberal aspect). In the cafeteria case, for 
example, lunch items might be arranged with a paternalistic motivation, without forcing 
a particular diet on anyone (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 11). This type of intervention is 
“liberty-preserving”, so the argument goes, because it does not “block, fence off, or 
significantly burden” any of the options (ibid.: 5). Since all of the options are still 
available, it would be easy for someone to resist, or to “opt out” of, the paternalistic 
arrangement. Consequently, nudge paternalism represents “a relatively weak, soft, and 
nonintrusive type of paternalism” that should be acceptable to liberals (ibid.).   
 Taken together, nudge advocates maintain that, in contexts where people are 
prone to error and where paternalistic intervention would improve their welfare, these 
three claims provide us with “a strong and emphatically moral argument on behalf of 
paternalism” (Sunstein 2014: 5; emphasis in original). This paternalism takes the form of 
“initiatives that maintain freedom of choice while also steering people’s decisions in the 
                                                          
32 On Thaler and Sunstein’s view, she assumes this position whether or not she is aware of this power to 
influence. As we will see below, this expansive view should not be part of the characterisation of nudging.  
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right direction (as judged by themselves)” (ibid.: 17). The central idea is that, through 
situational design, nudges can promise an effective way for a government to help its 
citizens access the welfare gains of paternalism without incurring the losses to freedom 
which this usually entails. As already seen, this argument has had a significant impact on 
policymaking and has played an instrumental role in destabilising the philosophical 
animus against paternalism. It is, however, philosophically imprecise in various ways. 
There are problematic aspects about each of its three parts. I outline these below, with 
the purpose of clarifying the characterisation of nudging I will be using in the thesis. In 
some cases, this will also serve to flag issues that will be taken up in greater detail in 
later chapters.   
 
§2.2.2: Clarifying the Character of Nudging     
There are three main points of contention. These relate to: (i) the inevitability of choice 
architecture; (ii) the confounding of nudging and paternalism; and (iii) the purported 
“liberty-preserving” nature of choice architecture.  
The first challenges how we should understand the claim of inevitability, which 
is generally taken to be the “core” of this ethical defence (Johnson 2016). There is a lack 
of clarity in Thaler and Sunstein’s writings about whether intentionality is required for a 
policy design feature to count as an instance of choice architecture. At times, they refer 
to “unintentional nudges”, suggesting that nudging can come in intended or unintended 
forms (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 11). They downplay this distinction, perhaps because 
doing so provides their argument from unavoidability with added force. But choice 
architecture is not inevitable. To see this, we need to recognise an important distinction 
between choice architecture and choice environments. Governments might inevitably be 
involved in structuring the “landscape of choice”; but there is a difference between a 
choice environment being created the way it is (e.g., all public policies affect the choice 
environment in some way), and its being intentionally created the way it is as a choice 
environment. Only the latter can appropriately be called choice architecture, that is, the 
behaviourally-informed “curation” of public choice environments, by a choice architect, 
for the sake of bringing about a particular kind of behaviour change (Jennings et al. 
2016). As a result, governments could inevitably be involved in structuring choice 
environments, without being unavoidably involved in the activity of choice architecture. 
On my characterisation of nudging, then, intentionality is a necessary component of 
choice architecture. This intentionality is at the heart of many of the objections to 
nudging. As one commentator points out, “what critics are concerned with is typically 
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not that people are influenced by their choice contexts, but that their choice contexts 
are designed, by others, with the intention of producing some particular behaviour” 
(Grill 2014: 143). 
However, this type of intentionality need not be morally problematic in itself: 
that depends on the ends toward which this means of influence is directed. A second 
kind of problem, then, arises because Thaler and Sunstein’s argument does not claim 
only that choice architecture is unavoidable, but that, as a result, some form of 
paternalism is inevitable. This confounds nudging, a particular means of influence, with 
nudge paternalism, a particular kind of moral justification for the governmental use of 
this influence. This is partly due to Thaler and Sunstein’s definition of paternalism, 
which is “very weak in the sense that it allows many more acts to count as paternalistic 
than would be under almost all traditional definitions of paternalism” (Dworkin 2017). 
In essence, nudges are paternalistic, on their view, because they seek to promote the 
good of the person who is the target of the intervention.33 Part of the issue of whether 
nudges are paternalistic in a more robust sense rests on a further issue, discussed below, 
concerning nudging’s liberal credentials. The point I want to make here is that, even on 
Thaler and Sunstein’s own definition, there are nonpaternalistic nudges, which shows that 
there is no necessary link between choice architecture and paternalism. Indeed it has 
always been the case that some of the prominent examples of nudge interventions do 
not fit neatly, or at all, into this overarching normative policy programme within which 
nudge advocates have embedded them. For example, charitable giving was one of 
earliest applications in the work of the UK’s Behavioural Insights Team (Cabinet Office 
2013; BIT 2015: 37-39; BIT 2016: 50-54). Another example is nudges that change the 
default rule for organ donation registration to increase the supply of available organs. In 
both cases, it is not the target of the nudge, but rather third-parties, who ultimately 
benefit.34 This shows that there is nothing inherently paternalistic about nudging.35  
                                                          
33 This might, more correctly, be defined as benevolence. Gerald Dworkin (2017), one of the foremost 
scholars of paternalism, defines it as “the interference of a state or an individual with another person, 
against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off 
or protected from harm”.   
34 There is, nonetheless, a difference between these two types of nonpaternalistic nudges. This relates to 
whether or not the individual who is the target of the intervention can reasonably be described as sharing 
in the collective benefit generated by the policy (see Raihani 2013: 2; see Table 1). In the case of nudges 
that seek to increase charitable donations by enrolling employees into an opt-out scheme, the employees 
cannot be said to share in the collective benefit, and there is a cost involved for them. In contrast, efforts 
that aim at increasing population health, such as increased participation in organ donor schemes, come 
with collective payoffs in which the target of the nonpaternalistic nudge might share (e.g., if she needed 
an organ transplant in some years’ time, there would be more of chance that she will have access to this 
life-saving opportunity). 
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For this reason, the discussion of the permissibility of nudging is best conducted 
outside the narrow focus on libertarian paternalism that has characterised much of the 
debate so far (Schubert 2015: 3), which is something that Sunstein now admits (2016a: 
54). Freeing the broader notion of nudge-as-policy-lever from the narrower conception of 
nudge-as-libertarian-paternalism is an important starting point for our investigation, because, 
like other policy levers, it may be permissible to employ choice architecture in the 
pursuit of a number of legitimate governmental goals. This is not yet to say anything 
about the conditions under which some sort of nudge paternalism should count as a 
legitimate aim – we will move on to this question, and other related ones, in subsequent 
chapters. For now, this point simply clarifies that nudging, as it is understood in this 
thesis, is a policy lever that need not necessarily be attached to any particular claims 
about the ends to which it can be used to serve.   
The third issue relates to the claim that nudging is liberty-preserving. The attractive 
aspect of choice architecture for many is the idea that it preserves freedom of choice on 
account of the fact that it is designed to include an acceptably low opt-out cost. But it is 
not clear that all nudges meet this standard, even if some do. Assuming for now that 
freedom of choice is what matters from a liberal perspective (an assumption that is 
challenged below), there is still an important limitation relating to this so-called opt-out 
clause. To see this, we might distinguish between two kinds of freedom to choose: these 
have been described variously as “formal”, “basic”, or “nominal”, on the one hand, and 
“effective”, “substantive” or “real”, on the other (Niker 2013: 40; Saghai 2013: 488; 
Rebonato 2012: 203). The thought is that although nudges preserve freedom of choice 
in a formal sense in virtue of not foreclosing options, it is far less clear that they preserve 
it in a more substantive sense. Thaler and Sunstein gesture towards the need for the latter 
when they state that nudges should be “easy and cheap to avoid”; nonetheless, they also 
confess that they “do not have a clear definition of ‘easily avoided’” (2009: 6, 248-249; 
cited in Saghai 2013: 488). I suspect that this is due to their awareness that the target of 
nudge interventions cannot always opt out of the arrangement easily. Given the extent 
to which these authors are impressed by the empirical evidence about the influence that 
seemingly insignificant situational factors can have on a person’s perception of the 
choice environment and resultant behaviour, it would seem strange for them not to be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
35 Kelly, for instance, has presented two systems on which we might theoretically base the design of 
nonpaternalistic nudges – “utilitarian nudges” and “Rawlsian nudges” – that seek to preserve freedom of 
choice while attempting to steer people’s behaviour towards “morally appealing” choices (2013: 222-225). 
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cognisant that nudges can operate by steering people’s cognitive processes in ways that 
call his or her real freedom of choice into question.  
Some have sought to deal with this problem by seeking to find an adequate 
resistibility criterion for nudges, such that an influence cannot count as a “nudge” unless 
it meets this condition for protecting freedom of choice (e.g., Saghai 2013). This is part 
of a wider discussion in the literature relating to the supposed difficulty over defining 
what does and does not count as an instance of nudging. Like Moles, though, I am “not 
too optimistic about the usefulness of working out a satisfactory definition of nudge” 
(2015: 648). The political morality of nudging rests not on semantic issues, but rather on 
substantive normative arguments. In my view, nudging should be understood as a broad 
category of influence that includes “all measures that involve the (re-)design of people’s 
choice architecture on the basis of psychological insights” (Schubert 2015: 6). As a 
result, “nudging”, “choice architecture”, and “behavioural interventions” can be used as 
synonyms, and will be used as such in this thesis.  
This acknowledges that the general category of influence highlighted by the 
psychological evidence is capacious and complex. It is true that, on a spectrum, nudges 
(based mainly on nonargumentative influence) fall “between reason and coercion” 
(Blumenthal-Barby 2012). Nonetheless, what will become clearer when we start to 
develop a more nuanced normative assessment of this middle category – in Chapters 4 
and 5, in particular – is that the seemingly sharp lines between nonargumentative 
influence, on the one hand, and both rational persuasion and coercion, on the other, are 
in fact blurred in interesting and significant ways. Nominal freedom of choice is not a 
concept that will do much work in such an analysis. Parsing this normative terrain will 
require substantive engagement with concepts such as autonomy, disrespect, manipulation, 
well-being and so on when considering what it means for a nudge intervention to be 
“liberty-preserving” in the appropriate sense.  
 
§2.3: Mapping the Critical Terrain  
This last point leads us into a discussion of the moral constraints on public choice 
architecture, which I will map out briefly by reference to some of the main strands of 
critical discussion in the literature, before offering an indication of the gap that this 
thesis’s argument intends to fill.  
Nudging has been criticised from many different directions. Arguably the main 
strand of critique, comprised of a family of related views, is offered by those offended 
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by its claim to liberal credentials. One such view disputes the grounds for a move 
towards paternalism by challenging the first part of Thaler and Sunstein’s tripartite 
argument. The most compelling case against paternalistic intervention is not reliant on 
people being the best judge of what is in their own interests, as the pro-nudge argument 
contends. Rather, it is grounded in the interest that citizens have in leading their own 
lives and, as a result, on the centrality of the value of autonomy for liberalism. So, while 
we can agree with Thaler and Sunstein that the empirical evidence causes problems for 
anyone who bases their anti-paternalist argument on the best judge assumption, this 
does not harm anti-paternalism based on autonomy.36 This raises the worry that nudge 
paternalism is objectionable on account of the disrespect it shows for people’s 
autonomy.  
This concern with autonomy also highlights another issue, one that relates to 
the manner in which nudges operate when they influence citizens’ behaviour. Nudges 
are the result of a policy design process that is heavily informed by knowledge of our 
cognitive biases, motivational shortfalls, and other causes of predictable irrationality; 
and, although it is this feature that makes it an innovative and potentially very effective 
policy tool, this operational nature makes it vulnerable to several normative concerns. 
The worry that nudge interventions work by exploiting people’s behavioural and 
decisional flaws and foibles in order to promote certain pre-selected outcomes is at the 
heart of three related but analytically distinct objections relating to transparency, the 
harnessing of nonrational tendencies in a way that blocks reasons-responsiveness, and 
manipulation (see, e.g., Hausman and Welch 2010; Wilkinson 2013; Hansen and 
Jespersen 2013; White 2013). What tends to unite these three objections is a concern 
about interference with the autonomy of those being nudged. This seems to be the case 
whether nudging (i) occurs without the target of the intervention being aware they are 
being nudged, (ii) works by harnessing automatic flaws in our thinking, or (iii) acts on us 
in a way that deliberately bypasses or subverts our rational capacities (Dworkin 2017).        
This is related to a further concern. Although nudges can be effective at 
bringing about behavioural change, there is a worry that they are unable to bring about 
the more substantive shifts in people’s beliefs and value structures that are needed to 
bring about more lasting behavioural change. They generate context-dependent changes 
in behaviour, without having an impact on the quality of decision-making. Indeed, some 
worry that this extends beyond the charge of being non-transformative by contending 
                                                          
36 See Husak (1980: 27-28) for a dismissal of the chances of formulating what he calls “utilitarian 
objections to paternalism”. 
  
36 
 
that the likely effect of using this policy tool over time would be that citizens’ rational 
capacities may atrophy. This issue shares a similar character with those outlined above: 
it challenges the strict focus on outcomes by pointing to important process-based 
aspects of permissible and sustainable behaviour change policies. As Moles highlights:   
 
“There are two different ways in which people’s choices can be improved. First, a person 
can make a better choice by improving the process by which she reaches her decision. 
[…] The second way of improving someone’s choice is to make sure that her decision 
aligns with her preferences. This case pays no attention to the process of decision-making: 
it looks only at whether people’s choices correspond to their preferences. Nudging is 
controversial because it employs the second strategy. It enrolls (or exploits) cognitive 
biases in order to improve choice, without enhancing the process of decision-making.” 
(Moles 2015: 647) 
 
In light of these worries (or any particular set of them), many liberal critics have argued 
that we should reject nudging (Goodwin 2012), and some have set out alternative 
proposals for how we should respond politically to the psychological evidence. As one 
might expect, these are focused on the promotion of personal rather than merely 
behavioural change through engagement in deliberative democratic fora (John et al. 
2011) and certain educational reforms (Gigerenzer 2014).37 
 Nudging has also been criticised from the other side, that is, for not being 
paternalistic enough. This second strand of critical reaction comes from those who 
believe that the empirical evidence supports, and sometimes even morally necessitates, a 
much bolder welfare-protecting response from governments. The main proponent of 
this position is Sarah Conly, who argues that the correct response to the behavioural 
science evidence is not to endorse nudging, nor to persuade or educate, since neither 
option is sufficiently effective at promoting welfare; rather, the correct response is “to 
save people from themselves by making certain courses of action illegal” (2013: 1). The 
moral methodology grounding Conly’s analysis is robustly consequentialist. She admits 
that, ideally, the best way to save people from the results of cognitive error would be 
through the type of public education traditionally advocated by liberalism. The problem, 
however, is that in the real world this is an ineffective way of helping citizens to make 
good decisions, and so is not supported by a cost-benefit analysis. Conly offers a 
forceful critique of nudging, criticising it for giving us “the worst of both worlds” (2013: 
8). Interestingly, she agrees with liberal critics that it operates in a manipulative fashion 
                                                          
37 I explain and engage with these alternative proposals in more detail later in the thesis (§6.2.3). 
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and claims that this fails to render it any more palatable to the liberal than coercion; 
and, at the same time, she claims that it fails to “give us the results we want, because 
people still have the options to pursue bad courses of action”, something that is ruled 
out by its “more intrusive” coercive counterpart (2013: 30-32).38 
 Over the course of the thesis I will show that both sets of critique capture 
something important. What we need to recognise at this point, I contend, is that our 
normative analysis is not going to get very far if it addresses nudging in a unitary 
fashion, by taking a wholesale approach to either rejecting or defending its use in 
behavioural policy. It is a broad category comprised of various different mechanisms of 
influence, and it might be used to achieve a variety of different ends. An account of its 
overall permissibility will need to get clearer on both of these factors and, more 
specifically, on the interactions between them, since what counts as a legitimate means 
by which to deliver a particular policy sometimes or often depends on the end that is 
being served. With respect to thinking about nudging as a means, we need to delineate a 
number of relevant questions. Does the nudge direct the individual towards making a 
decision or making a particular choice? If it directs her towards making a particular 
choice, does the nudge get the individual to respond to the reasons that apply to her? 
Does the nudge engage an individual’s deliberative processes or operate via her 
nonconscious cognitive processes? Is the influence endorsed by its target in some 
relevant way? There are a similar set of questions with regards to ends. For instance, is 
the nudge aiming primarily to induce reasoning or to bring about some pre-selected 
behavioural outcome? Is it directed towards changing the individual’s self-regarding 
behaviour or her other-regarding behaviour? If it aims to change her other-regarding 
behaviour, is this for the sake of increasing social welfare or for the sake of moral 
improvement? If the latter, might this be pursued with the aim not only of preventing 
others from being harmed or wronged, but also promoting moral insight, responsibility, 
or virtue in the target herself; and, does this count as supporting her in living well?  
 It is only by getting to grips with the ethical, moral, and political complexities of 
this conceptual and normative terrain that we can offer a complete answer to the 
thesis’s main question. In doing so, the answer defended in these pages aims to take 
account of the problems with nudging while still preserving its promise. Many liberals 
                                                          
38 Two small points on this argument. First, the manipulative quality of nudging is not considered morally 
wrong on this view; but, given that it works in this way, there is no gain (and in fact there is likely to be a 
loss) in leaving open the options to pursue bad courses of action, according to a cost-benefit analysis. 
Second, on my view the assumption that coercive measures are “more intrusive” than nudge 
interventions is not necessarily true. This depends on what type of nudge is at work.   
  
38 
 
have rejected choice architecture as a permissible policy tool; but I will argue that a 
more nuanced analysis allows us to cast to one side those forms of choice architecture 
that are objectionably manipulative or paternalistic, and to highlight and move forward 
with only those forms that are able to support and enhance our agency in various ways. 
Contrary to Moles’s description quoted above, I will argue that nudging can improve 
people’s choices in the first sense, that is, some nudges can play a role in improving the 
process by which an individual reaches her decisions. Despite the focus on individual 
welfare-promotion and paternalism in the literature, this agency-enhancement need not 
be confined to self-regarding behaviour; in fact, much of the promise of choice 
architecture, in my view, comes from its ability to facilitate moral compliance. This is 
something that has received almost no attention in the literature, but is surely an integral 
part of a complete assessment of nudging’s moral permissibility.39      
 
§2.4: Conclusion 
The means of influence that this thesis is investigating is grounded in a new model of 
human agency. This chapter began by outlining the psychological evidence relating to 
dual-process cognition and the impact that this has on our judgements and behaviour 
under certain conditions. It moved on to discussing the general move to thinking about 
these findings as relevant to policymaking, and to laying out the main argument that has 
been offered as a justification of the governmental use of psychologically-informed 
policy tools. This argument in favour of nudge paternalism was shown to be imprecise 
in various ways and the discussion of these points served to clarify the character of 
nudging, as it will be understood in this thesis at least. This is one of two ways in which 
this chapter has laid some of the foundations for the argument to come. The second 
came in the form of setting out the contours of the current debate over the ethics of 
nudging and, more particularly, in providing an insight into how the type of account I 
will defend is both related to and distinct from the positions in the existing debate.  
 
  
                                                          
39 Although not as she intended, this strand of analysis engages with the spirit of Conly’s critique and sets 
out conditions for when it would be morally desirable to use coercive measures rather than nudges (§5.3). 
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3. Nudging Citizens towards Living Well 
 
Our project is to address the question of how, as a means of improving citizens’ lives, 
governments might permissibly apply the recent psychological evidence to the design of 
public policies and social institutions, if at all. Central to our inquiry, then, is the need 
for some standard for determining what it is that makes a person’s life go well; a 
standard, that is, of what it might mean for public choice architecture (hereafter ‘PCA’) 
to be “welfare-promoting”. This chapter outlines a (partial) conception of what it is for 
a person’s life to go well, for the person whose life it is, as being the appropriate one for 
helping us to set out a satisfactory account of the ethics of public nudging. In so doing, 
it clarifies where this approach departs from that taken by Thaler and Sunstein (2009) 
and Sunstein (2014a, 2016a) – a departure that has important implications for the 
normative analysis of nudging as a policy lever, as we will see in later chapters.  
 
§3.1: Making Citizens “Better Off”: Two Views 
PCA is commonly justified on account of its potential non-coercively to steer people’s 
choices in ways that will make them “better off” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 6). To put 
it another way, nudge advocates argue that liberal states should nudge citizens, and that 
they should do so for the purpose of improving those citizens’ lives. The extended 
argument that I present in this thesis agrees with these claims at the general level: under 
certain conditions, it is morally permissible for governments to design PCA so as to 
improve citizens’ lives, and indeed states have good reasons to do so. However, the 
particular view of permissible nudging that I defend diverges from Thaler and Sunstein’s 
in important ways. Our views part ways on account of the different approaches we take 
to defending the general view. Part of this disagreement rests on differences in our 
accounts of what it means for a person’s life to go well and, as a result, what it might 
mean for choice architecture to make her “better off”. Accordingly, the first section of 
this chapter maps out this disagreement by outlining (and where necessary, 
reconstructing) the account of well-being at the base of the standard pro-nudge 
argument (§3.1.1), before setting out the key elements of my own view (§3.1.2). The 
next section (§3.2) follows on from this by addressing certain issues relating to why we 
should favour the latter approach over the former. 
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§3.1.1: Satisfying (Informed) Preferences 
Sunstein does not say much, explicitly, about the conception of well-being that his 
approach adopts. He offers the following stipulative definition, which he admits is very 
broad: “With respect to the chooser, let us understand the term [i.e., welfare] to refer to 
whatever choosers think would make their lives go well” (Sunstein 2014a: 72-73). The 
central thought is the simple and attractive one that interventions should seek to 
improve a person’s life according to her own standards of what makes for a good life 
(we might call this the internalist intuition). This is generally understood in terms of the 
satisfaction of an individual’s preferences or desires, since people tend to form such 
preferences and desires for the things that they think would make their lives go well; 
and there are good reasons to think that this is how Sunstein understands it.40 The 
guiding rationale of preference satisfaction accounts is encapsulated in Harsanyi’s principle of 
“Preference Autonomy”, namely, “[t]he principle that, in deciding what is good and 
what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and 
his own preferences” (Harsanyi 1982: 55; cited in Scanlon 1991: 24). This refers to a 
common division between subjective accounts, which make well-being depend (solely) 
upon a person’s own desires, and objective accounts that make well-being (partially) 
independent of a person’s own tastes and preferences (Griffin 1986: 32). 
 The motivation for adopting a subjective welfare standard is easy to see. In 
particular, it gives maximum recognition to the sovereignty of people’s individualised 
preferences (Scanlon 1975: 656-658) – and an ability to respect, and help better to 
satisfy, people’s own preferences is the key justification of this new form of paternalistic 
intervention. According to Sunstein, choice architecture presents itself as a way – and 
indeed the best way from within a liberal framework – of “correcting mistakes that 
people make in choosing the means to satisfy their own ends” (2014a: 164). This 
highlights a key aspect of the nudge paternalist project as Sunstein understands it: it 
represents a form of means paternalism, because nudges seek not to influence a person’s 
ends (as is the case with ends paternalism), but rather try to influence positively her choice 
of the means so as to help her achieve her self-selected ends. The primary goal of 
nudging, then, is to design PCA in ways that make it more likely that people “will promote 
their own ends, as they themselves understand them” (ibid.: 19; emphasis in original).  
                                                          
40 For one, attached to his broad definition is a note referring to Conly’s “instructive discussion” of this 
issue (Sunstein 2014a: 179), in which she states that: “The standard of welfare is […] what is typically 
termed a subjective one – based on the desires of the subject” (Conly 2013: 102-103). 
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 The key issue with preference satisfaction accounts relates to which kinds of 
preferences are taken to promote a person’s well-being when they are satisfied. The 
simplest version focuses on the satisfaction of a person’s actual desires.41 Historically, 
this type of view is linked with the emergence of welfare economics, which rests on the 
idea that, unlike mental states, a person’s preferences can be observed and measured – 
at least if we rely on a revealed preference framework which posits that a person’s actual 
preferences are revealed in the behavioural choices she makes (Crisp 2013).42 But the 
actual preference satisfaction account, even in its most plausible form, faces an 
“overwhelming” problem (Griffin 1986: 10).43 Such an account could only be plausible 
if the preferences are not mistaken, irrational or malleable (i.e., “endogenous”); yet, we 
recognise numerous ways in which our preferences, as revealed by our behaviour, are 
affected in these ways. Both Elster (1985) and Sen (1987) have discussed the problem of 
“adaptive” preferences for preference satisfaction accounts. Indeed, it is additional 
empirical findings of this kind – such as the evidence of cognitive biases that make us 
susceptible to behaving in predictably irrational ways on the basis of so-called “welfare-
irrelevant” variables – that motivates the nudge paternalism programme in the first 
place.  
 For those wanting to insist on keeping with the preference satisfaction account, 
there is a natural way of responding to this problem. It involves revising the account so 
that a person’s well-being consists in the satisfaction of only those desires and 
preferences she would have if she were (fully) informed or (fully) rational. Although this 
move became even more appealing in light of the more recent findings, it had already 
been made by several economists and philosophers. Harsanyi, for instance, describes 
the modification thus: rather than taking into account a person’s “manifest” 
preferences, i.e., those manifested in his behaviour, we should take into account his 
“true” preferences, i.e., “the preferences he would have if he had all the relevant factual 
information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a state of mind 
most conducive to rational choice” (1982: 55; see also Harsanyi 1977: 29-30). Although 
this conception is not explicitly endorsed, there are a number of references that make it 
                                                          
41 This can take unrestricted and restricted forms, and it seems clear that the latter are more plausible. 
This is because unrestricted versions include all the person’s actual desires in the welfare standard, which 
makes for an “implausibly broad range” that would be forced to include, for instance, a person’s desire 
for there to be conscious life of Mars – and it is difficult to accept that the satisfaction of this desire 
would enhance the quality of this individual’s life (Scanlon 1998: 114). 
42 For a critical review of “revealed preference welfarism”, see Sugden (1993: 1948-1951). 
43 Nothing hangs on claims about what is the most plausible version, since all versions face the serious 
charge that is levelled against it here. Having said this, it seems clear that the most plausible account is a 
global version of the comprehensive preference satisfaction theory (see Parfit 1984 and Crisp 2013).  
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clear that this is the account of welfare at work in the justification of nudge paternalism. 
For instance, Thaler and Sunstein write that: 
 
“…in many cases, individuals make pretty bad decisions – decisions they would not have 
made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited 
cognitive abilities, and complete self-control.” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 6-7; also see 
Sunstein and Thaler 2005: 177).   
 
In order to capture the variance between a person’s actual preferences and her informed 
or rational ones, Thaler and Sunstein advance a distinction between “Humans” and 
“Econs”, the latter being an imaginary species modelled on a fully rational, utility-
maximising agent not susceptible to bounded rationality, cognitive biases, motivational 
shortfalls, or preference malleability (2009: 7-9). One way of thinking about the aim of 
choice architecture, which seems to follow from this, is as a policy tool that seeks to 
make it more likely that Humans’ choices will better track the judgements that Econs 
would make if they were in their place.44 In a similar if not somewhat more measured 
manner, Sunstein contends in his most recent work that, in applying the “as judged by 
themselves” standard (i.e., the liberty-preserving aspect of nudge paternalism), “choice 
architects should be interested in choosers’ informed judgments” only, and that “it is 
fair for choice architects to insist that actual judgments do not reflect informed choices” 
(2016a: 45). Indeed, elsewhere he has called this version of the preference satisfaction 
view, which includes such an “information requirement on desires” (Qizilbash 2012: 
653), the “informed-chooser approach” (Sunstein 2015: 73).  
   Hence, despite the claim that they are “not attempting to say anything 
controversial about welfare” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003: 1163), it would appear that 
there is a good case to be made that these advocates of nudging implicitly adopt, and 
seek to justify their “welfare-promoting” interventions by reference to, an informed 
preference satisfaction account of well-being (see Qizilbash 2012: 651-652, Sugden 2008: 232, 
Rebonato 2013: 193, and Hédoin 2016 for similar assessments). This adherence to the 
                                                          
44 Indeed, Sunstein himself acknowledges as much when he quotes Rebonato’s characterisation of nudge 
paternalism: “Libertarian paternalism is the set of interventions aimed at overcoming the unavoidable 
biases and decisional inadequacies of an individual by exploiting [Sunstein suggests “counteracting” 
instead] them in such a way as to influence her decisions (in an easily reversible manner) towards choices 
that she herself would make if she had at her disposal unlimited time and information, and the analytic 
abilities of a rational decision maker (more precisely, of Homo Economicus)” (Rebonato 2012: 84; cited in 
Sunstein 2013b: 1860). Interestingly, although Sunstein says that this “helpful” definition is nonetheless 
“imprecise” in various ways (one of these is noted above), he does not reject or seek to modify the claim 
that nudge paternalism understands the welfare goal in terms of what a rational decision maker (homo 
economicus) would choose (Hédoin 2016). 
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preference satisfaction account of well-being has problematic implications for their 
views on permissible paternalistic intervention, which we will explore below (§3.2.2). 
For now though, we can call attention to a fundamental tension in the standard nudge 
policy programme. On the one hand, it wants to take seriously people’s assessment of 
their own good; the “as judged by themselves” standard is designed for this purpose. 
On the other hand, the initial justification for nudging is that people’s actual preferences 
and judgements do not track their welfare, and so the welfare-promoting aim of these 
interventions requires choice architects to steer people in the “right direction” (Sunstein 
2014a: 17), namely, the direction they would have judged for themselves if they were 
sufficiently or ideally informed or rational. This has been called the “Soft Paternalist’s 
Paradox” (Grüne-Yanoff 2009). Since this second part seems to involve sacrificing the 
values that the first part is supposed to protect, serious questions are raised about the 
ability of informed preference satisfaction views to deal with the issues relating to 
personal autonomy that are at the core of discussions over (permissible) paternalism.      
 
§3.1.2: Autonomy and Living Well 
It is this point that my view seeks to push back on. I do not offer a full account of the 
good life for the person whose life it is. It may be, as others have argued, that 
“prudential deliberation” would direct us towards accepting that a good life for humans 
would include certain elements or “prudential values”, such as pleasure, deep personal 
relationships, the accomplishment of goals we take to be important, and so on (see, for 
instance, Griffin 1998: 29-30); but I do not take any view on these more expansive 
issues here. Rather, I offer only a partial account of well-being that claims that personal 
autonomy has value for a person’s life that goes beyond the value that it derives from 
other things which it makes possible, such as, for instance, the satisfaction of a person’s 
preferences or desires. The claim that autonomy has this intrinsic, and not only 
instrumental, value for a person’s life thereby makes this partial account of the human 
good objective in nature, understood in the minimal sense outlined above.45  
The main motivation for this sort of view is the simple thought, and one which 
garners broad support, that a central part of what it means for a person’s life to go well 
for her is that she lives it in an active and authentic way, a way that is shaped by her 
own sense of what makes for a good life. There are different ways of capturing and 
expressing this broad ethical ideal. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, maintains that, “We 
                                                          
45 For some, Sunstein included, this objectivity makes this sort of standard a controversial one. These 
issues are discussed in the next section. Here, I focus on presenting the key elements of my (partial) view. 
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cannot explain the importance of a good life except by noticing how creating a good life 
contributes to living well” (2011: 196). As part of his ambitious interpretative project in 
Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues that living well requires “that you live in response to 
[…] your situation and the values you find appropriate”, and that doing so requires 
ethical independence in our relations with others, since: “Authenticity is damaged when 
a person is made to accept someone else’s judgment in place of his own about the 
values or goals his life should display” (2011: 210-212). Dworkin also clearly states the 
objective nature of this ideal: “we think that authenticity is not a taste but a necessary 
virtue, that there is something wrong with an inauthentic life. We think that authenticity 
has objective importance” (2011: 213; emphasis in original). Joseph Raz also contends 
that autonomy is an ethical ideal related to the creation of one’s own life, and that an 
autonomous life is marked “not by what there is in it but by how it came to be” (Raz 
1986: 371). Like Dworkin, he describes it as in part a social ideal which “designates one 
aspect of the proper relations between people” (ibid.: 378). He writes that the ideal of 
autonomy, as a conception of well-being, “transcends the conceptual point that 
personal well-being is partly determined by success in willingly endorsed pursuits and 
holds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of individual well-
being” (1986: 370). James Griffin also includes autonomy within his category of “the 
components of human existence”, which he marks out as one of the core values in his 
prudential list view. He justifies this in the following way:  
 
“Choosing one’s own course through life, making something of it according to one’s own 
lights, is at the heart of what it is to lead a human existence. And we value what makes life 
human over and above what makes it happy. What makes life ‘human’ in the special 
normative sense that the word has here centres on ‘agency’. One component of agency is 
deciding for oneself. Even if I constantly made a mess of my life, even if you could do 
better if you took charge, I would not let you do it. Autonomy has a value of its own.” 
(Griffin 1998: 29-30) 
 
In a similar fashion, John Stuart Mill grounds his liberal theory in the claim that the 
“free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials in well-being” (2005: 
69). Although it is possible that we can be “guided in some good path” in a way that 
does not make use of our distinctively “human faculties of perception, judgement, 
discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference”, the value of such an 
action is greatly reduced because it was not done autonomously. For Mill, it “really is of 
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importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it” 
(2005: 71-72).  
There are numerous conceptualisations of personal autonomy within the 
literature. I leave the fuller presentation of my conception until the next chapter (see 
§4.2.1). Here, I set out two features of the autonomy-based account of well-being that 
characterise my approach to assessing the permissibility of nudge paternalism.  
The first thing to note is that, in the prudential realm, the view of autonomy that 
I defend is procedural or content-neutral, as opposed to substantive. Such accounts deem a 
particular action autonomous if it meets certain procedural criteria, and thereby remain 
neutral with respect to what a person conceives of as worthy of pursuit. As Christman 
explains, “there is no requirement that the autonomous person must pursue the good, 
except in the sense that she pursue things that mesh with her ongoing evaluative 
orientation (so in that sense she must aim at what she herself takes as minimally good)” 
(2017: 13). Autonomy both obtains and has value for a person’s life so long as certain 
authenticity conditions and competency conditions are met: generally speaking, the 
former typically relate to a person’s capacity to reflect on and appropriately respond to 
her desires, values, and so on, while the latter specify that she must have various 
capacities for practical reasoning, self-control, etc., and that she be free to exercise these 
critical capacities without undue internal or external interference (Christman and 
Anderson 2005: 3). To be ourselves is to be committed to a set of pro-attitudes that 
create reasons for us to act in particular ways; and the activity of responding to these 
reasons, and thereby responding to our own reasoning about what is a good life for us, 
has significant value for our lives.  
 This explains why the evidence from the cognitive and behavioural sciences is 
troubling from this perspective on living well. It is not problematic, primarily, because a 
person’s choices are less likely to produce good (i.e., “welfare-promoting”) results, as 
Sunstein contends. On that view, the promise of PCA comes from its ability to change 
the choice environment so that the behaviours that result from automatic and context-
dependent cognitive processes are more aligned with how a person would have chosen 
to act, if she were more like an Econ. Instead, these cognitive processes, and the 
behaviour they generate, are troubling in so far as they pose a threat to our ability to live 
active, authentic lives. On this view, choice architecture holds out a promise, but it also 
introduces an additional concern. Threats to autonomous agency can be internal, as well 
as external; and, in some cases, automaticity and context-dependency render us passive, 
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in an important sense, with respect to our ability to respond to our own reasoning about 
how to act in certain situations. The promise, then, is that there might be ways of 
designing PCA that help citizens to overcome this internal threat to autonomous 
agency, thereby promoting this important constituent of human well-being. But the 
nature and value of autonomy places important constraints on the permissibility of 
nudge paternalism: using choice architecture in ways that exploit what we know about 
our cognitive processes in order to generate particular behavioural outcomes, for 
example, may threaten both the authenticity and competency conditions of autonomy 
(more on this in §4.2.2).   
A second point to clarify is how the value of autonomy, understood as a 
constituent of living well, relates to morality. The relationship between the human good 
(“living well”) and morality (“living right”) is a complex issue, and one of the central 
questions in moral philosophy (Nagel 1986, Ch. 10). Philosophers have set out a 
number of different theories about this relationship (see, e.g., Crisp and Hooker 2000; 
Griffin 1998). Broadly speaking, I side with those philosophers, such as Aristotle (2009) 
and Dworkin (2011), who view “ethics and morality as deeply complementary” (Jolls 
2010: 641), rather than as conflicting with each other in a deep way.46 Specifically, I 
think that an individual’s own well-being can be served by complying with her moral 
reasons, where this is distinguished from mere conformity by the fact that it requires 
performing the morally required or desirable action in direct response to the reason 
(Raz 2000: 216; for more this distinction and for a full account of this view, see §5.2.2). 
When an individual treats others as she ought to treat them, there is ethical value for 
that individual, on my view, when she does this autonomously – as a response to her 
own reasoning about how to act in that situation, rather than, e.g., because she has been 
forced into conforming behaviour. This is not the same as the value of acting 
autonomously in the prudential realm, because its value is not content-independent.    
We can distinguish between two broad views on the value of autonomy: the 
unconditional view and the conditional view. The former claims that personal autonomy is 
always pro tanto good for the person (even if it is ultimately outweighed by other 
reasons). By contrast, the conditional view contends that autonomy is not valuable to a 
person’s life when it is used in selecting an immoral option.47 There are two possible 
                                                          
46 Recall that the term ethics is used to designate how we should live if we want to live well (Dworkin 
2011).  
47 Some also include “worthless” options in this category alongside morally repugnant ones (e.g., Raz 
1986). In my view, Raz problematically runs together ethically (or prudentially) worthless and morally 
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versions of this view. The first, stronger version claims that when an individual 
autonomously acts in an immoral way, this is worse than if she did so nonautonomously. 
Raz, for instance, takes this route when he claims that the “wrongdoing casts a darker 
shadow on its perpetrator if it is autonomously done by him” (1986: 380). The second 
version claims that when a person autonomously chooses an immoral option, this cancels 
out the value that would have otherwise attached to acting autonomously (Dworkin 
1990). My account subscribes to the conditional view on autonomy’s value, though I 
remain agnostic about which of its two versions better tracks the truth. In the moral 
realm, then, what counts towards living well is morally responsible agency, i.e., autonomous 
agency constrained by a more stringent reasons-responsiveness requirement. 
Clarifying these two features has helped to see the general shape of the 
autonomy-based approach that I take towards assessing the permissibility conditions for 
nudging, when done for the sake of promoting the target’s well-being. Some might 
question whether taking this approach, as compared to Thaler and Sunstein’s, would 
make much of a difference to the overall normative assessment of PCA. As we will see 
in the remainder of the thesis, this worry is shown to be groundless, because it does 
have significant implications for the analysis. Thaler and Sunstein (i) accept only a very 
“thin” sense of autonomy, essentially equivalent to having the freedom to choose, as 
having relevance for the ethical assessment of nudging, and (ii) do not count (even this 
conception of) autonomy as an intrinsically valuable consideration. On their view, the 
value of freedom of choice is “doubly contingent”, since it depends both on whether a 
person has a preference to make a choice themselves (if so, then freedom of choice is 
“an ingredient in welfare”, as the act of choosing would count in the welfare calculus48), 
and on whether her use of the freedom to choose actually does promote her welfare, as 
these authors understand it (Thaler and Sunstein 2003: 1198).  
There are clear points at which our analyses will diverge. For example, the 
welfarist approach can care that people’s informed preferences are satisfied, but it 
cannot care about whether or not people deliberate and reason well in coming to that 
outcome, unless a person’s preference for autonomy is strong enough to outweigh the 
welfare gain that is taken to be attached to the particular outcome. In short, it separates 
the outcome from the process of getting to that outcome, and places value nearly 
                                                                                                                                                                    
repugnant options in his discussion, thereby making his view too substantive in the prudential realm (see 
Christman 2017 for a fuller discussion of this issue).   
48 Sunstein writes: “Perhaps welfare is what really matters, and perhaps autonomy is important […] not 
because it is a genuinely independent value but because people sometimes become frustrated and angry if 
they cannot get their own way – a point about welfare” (2014a: 22). 
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exclusively on the former. As a result, it does not have any concern for whether an 
individual deliberates about her actions, acts in ways she accepts as acting on the basis 
of her own reasons, responds sensitively to moral reasons, and so on, so long as her 
welfare (that is, the satisfaction of the preferences she would have if she were an Econ) 
is promoted. An account of well-being that includes autonomy as a central component, 
by contrast, holds that a person’s well-being is advanced by measures that support her 
in attaining the competency and authenticity conditions for autonomy. It recognises that 
our autonomous decision can be more or less welfare-promoting in the broader sense, 
but it is committed to the view that there is ethical value to the practical reasoning and 
decision-making processes involved in autonomous and morally responsible agency. 
And, just to be clear, this view is not committed to the implausible view that personal 
autonomy is all that matters. It is a partial account of living well, which recognises that 
autonomy is one, but only one, component of human well-being and that, as a result, 
“sometimes reasons to promote autonomy should give way to reasons to promote other 
ideals” (Wall 1998: 185).             
  
§3.2: Autonomy, Perfectionism, and Anti-Perfectionism 
Moral theories can recognise the value of autonomy in different ways. By basing this on 
a partial account of living well, the thesis’s approach to assessing the permissibility of 
nudge paternalism admittedly rests on a potentially controversial claim about well-being. 
This raises questions about the reasons that move states to act. This section specifies in 
more detail the theoretical premises of my approach and how these relate to alternative 
views (§3.2.1), and offers some support for my approach by highlighting a series of 
problems that bear on the consistency of Sunstein’s alternative approach (§3.2.2).   
 
§3.2.1: Autonomy, Advantage, and Moderate Liberal Perfectionism 
Some people worry about the state acting on some types of valid reasons when 
justifying political action. One way of mapping out this issue involves distinguishing 
between two ways in which the question ‘What does human well-being consist in?’ can 
be interpreted and answered. In the first instance, when we ask this question we often 
mean to ask ‘What fundamentally makes one’s life go well?’ The term “well-being” is 
commonly used in philosophy to describe what is “non-instrumentally or ultimately 
good for a person” (Crisp 2013; emphasis in original). As such, it attaches pre-eminently 
to the lives of individuals and is understood as being more or less the same as his or her 
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interest or (non-moral) good. A second approach, by contrast, means to ask: ‘What 
should we take as our metric for making intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons of 
well-being for the purposes of making distributive and policy decisions?’ If our aim is to 
reduce inequality, to give priority in decision-making to the worst off, or to attend to 
the claims of an individual, for example, it is necessary that we have some appropriate 
way of comparing the situations of individuals, so that we can identify the advantage of 
different individuals and how much more or less they would be advantaged by a 
particular policy. To capture this difference, we might call the first the well-being question 
and the second the advantage-for-policy question. 
In these terms, we can see that what is needed with respect to our assessment of 
nudge policies is an answer to the advantage-for-policy question. Nevertheless, there is 
also an important issue about how one understands the relationship between these two 
questions. It might seem natural, for instance, to think that the criteria for making 
policy decisions is provided by one’s answer to the well-being question; and indeed 
some do take this view. But others believe that when identifying levels of advantage for 
the purpose of making policy, it would be wrong simply to adopt the best conception of 
what makes an individual’s life go well. A common basis for why this might be 
considered wrong is that it would be a disrespectful response to ethical pluralism, since 
it is a fact that, in heterogeneous societies like ours, people disagree about whether 
hedonism, honouring a particular deity, or success in various kinds of valuable 
relationships and projects, is constitutive of one’s life going well. The central claim is 
that if our metric for identifying advantage for policy were to rest on a controversial 
view of well-being, such as one of these, it would be rejected by some or perhaps even 
many citizens (Rawls 1993).   
 This disagreement is at the heart of the debate between the two camps of 
theorists referred to as perfectionists and anti-perfectionists. Broadly speaking, theorists 
in the first camp “advance an objective account of the good and then develop an 
account of ethics and/or politics that is informed by this account of the good” (Wall 
2012). In the terms introduced above, perfectionists rely on (some part of) their answer 
to the well-being question to direct, to some extent at least, their conception of 
advantage for political purposes. Anti-perfectionists, by contrast, maintain that the state 
should not promote ways of life that are valuable; rather, it should adhere to the principle 
of state neutrality when making policy. There are different ways of formulating this 
neutrality constraint, though arguably the most forceful is when it is done by appeal to 
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the ideal of public reason. Here, the key thought is that the state ought to justify the 
exercise of political power by appeal only to reasons that all free and equal individuals 
“may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
to their common human reason” (Rawls 1993: 137; see also Nagel 1991). This 
requirement for shareable reasons excludes appeal to controversial ideals of the good, 
and instructs that we bracket our full understanding of the human good when 
advocating for and justifying political action.49 As a result, it requires that we answer the 
advantage-for-policy question in a way that not only does not rely on, but is also neutral 
between, any (reasonable) answer to the well-being question.50  
 As already noted, according to these common formulations, the theory of the 
political morality of nudging I defend is a liberal perfectionist one. It assumes a 
conception of advantage for assessing nudge interventions that is based on a claim 
about the objective value of leading an autonomous life for living well. It is beyond the 
scope of the thesis to defend this claim in detail and so, in this respect, it operates more 
in the role of a premise for my extended argument, rather than as the conclusion of any 
argument that has been provided.51 But it is worth making some comments about the 
character of this claim that lessen its controversiality. In particular, this claim represents 
a moderate liberal perfectionism. It is moderate for a number of reasons: first, it promotes 
only a certain category of goods, namely, agency goods, and so supports particular ways of 
life only in so far as they involve these goods relative to others which do not; second, it 
uses noncoercive means, and even its use of these noncoercive nudge mechanisms is 
restricted to those able to create a social environment that is conducive to the 
promotion of valuable agency goods; and third, it insists that the pursuit of these agency 
goods is “tempered by other values”, rather than being considered the only intrinsic 
value, thereby making it a form of what Chan calls mixed perfectionism (Chan 2000: 14-
                                                          
49 Wall refers to this version of anti-perfectionist political morality as the “bracketing strategy” (1998; see 
Ch. 3). One of the main problems with this strategy is raised by the asymmetry objection. This objection 
highlights what some take to be a “serious internal challenge” to the anti-perfectionist position by asking: 
“Why does the state’s pursuit of controversial conceptions of the good life alone, but not of controversial 
conceptions of other matters [e.g., social justice, criminal justice, education, and national defence], lead to 
instability and illegitimacy?” (Chan 2000: 9). This same objection has been set out in numerous ways. For 
some of these, see Mulhall and Swift (1992: 234); Sandel (1994: 1782-1789); Waldron (1994); Caney 
(1995: 257-258); Chan (2000: 20-42); and Fowler and Stemplowska (2015). For attempts to respond to the 
asymmetry objection, see Clayton (2006: 19-27) and Quong (2010, Ch. 7).  
50 For Rawls (1999), this requires a particular “resourcist” answer based on “primary goods”, which are 
goods that are supposed to be desirable for every human being and useful in their pursuit of their 
conception of the good.   
51 Pursuing this type of argument would be the subject of a thesis in itself. A number of theorists have 
offered book-length defences of liberal perfectionist accounts of political morality. For example, see Raz 
(1986); Wall (1998); Sher (1997); Kramer (2017).   
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15). This moderate perfectionism, I argue, is a natural response for those who value 
autonomy to the evidence that the liberal state is unavoidably involved in structuring the 
landscape of choice. In other words, I argue that – knowing this – it should do so in a 
way that creates and sustains the conditions that enable people to live autonomous lives, 
while remaining ecumenical on specific matters relating to prudential goods.52    
It is worth noting that my approach is not necessarily perfectionist on account 
of claiming that (1) a liberal state ought to nudge, (2) when it can do so for the sake of 
promoting autonomous agency, (3) since if it does not do so, it leaves citizens subject to 
unnecessary disadvantage. What makes it perfectionist is the way in which I defend (1)-
(3) by tying this set of claims to living well. It might be possible for this set of claims 
also to be defended by tying them to something else, such as citizens’ interests in 
exercising their moral powers, for instance (Rawls 1999). In other words, “Some liberal 
neutralists might argue that they can justify the policies favoured by perfectionists by 
nonperfectionist arguments” (Chan 2000: 19). Indeed, there has been a renewed interest 
in recent years in (re)considering the relationship between anti-perfectionism and 
autonomy – or, more precisely, the state’s role in promoting citizens’ personal 
autonomy (Colburn 2010; Christman 2017; Nye 2012; Porter 2011; Quong 2010). Some 
argue that the view that autonomy is valuable and should be promoted by the state –a 
view described as “autonomy-minded liberalism” (Colburn 2010) – is the paradigmatic 
example of a liberal perfectionist political morality and so is necessarily opposed to anti-
perfectionism (Quong 2010: 45-72). In contrast, others have argued that there is no 
necessary tension in liberals holding commitments to both autonomy-mindedness and 
anti-perfectionism (Colburn 2010: 43-68). It remains an open question, therefore, 
whether anti-perfectionists would reject the (substance of the) autonomy-based view of 
permissible nudging that I defend in this thesis.53 To put it in more positive terms, there 
is a separate, further question about whether the account I present could be nested 
within an anti-perfectionist framework.54 For the purposes of the thesis, however, I 
                                                          
52 For a full defence of moderate perfectionism, which makes the strong claim that this type of state 
perfectionism is “desirable, unavoidable, and legitimate”, see Chan (2000).  
53 For example, Moles’s anti-perfectionist account of permissible nudging defends a weak form of nudge 
paternalism directed at promoting (a particular Frankfurtian conception of) autonomy, which he grounds 
in Rawls’s idea in A Theory of Justice that in the original position “it is rational for (the parties) to protect 
themselves against their own irrational inclinations by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give 
them a sufficient motive to avoid foolish actions and by accepting certain impositions designed to undo 
the unfortunate consequences of their imprudent behavior” (1999: 219; cited at Moles 2015: 664 and 
Husak 1980: 39). For the discussion of this “autonomy-friendly” nudge paternalism and its compatibility 
with Rawlsian political liberalism, see Moles (2015: 664-667).  
54 As Wall (2012) states, although much of the debate over state neutrality “assumes that there is a strict 
incompatibility between state neutrality and perfectionist politics”, the reality is that the relationship 
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leave this issue to one side and accept the liberal perfectionist foundation of my 
account.55  
 
§3.2.2: Facing Up: Problems with Sunstein’s Approach 
One way of offering support to my approach is to reveal problems with its main rival in 
this debate, namely, with the preference satisfaction approach outlined in §3.1.1. To this 
end, this subsection briefly outlines three kinds of related yet distinct problems, all of 
which call into question the consistency of Sunstein’s approach. Since this alternative 
approach explicitly expresses the aim of standing opposed to perfectionism, this 
negative argument serves to provide support for the approach I take (at least vis-à-vis 
Sunstein’s).  
Now that we have made the distinction between the two questions above, we 
can see more clearly that nudge advocates offer a particular, welfarist answer to the 
advantage-for-policy question. This seeks to justify nudge paternalism along the 
following lines: (1) a liberal state ought to nudge, (2) when it can promote welfare, 
understood as the satisfaction of citizens’ informed or rational preferences, (3) since not 
doing so leaves citizens unnecessarily disadvantaged. One of Sunstein’s main 
motivations for holding a preference satisfaction view of advantage comes from an 
ambition to avoid perfectionism. He is explicit that he is interested in defending 
nudging only as a form of means paternalism; and the thought is that interventions 
would not be means paternalist if the welfare standard one adopts is objective, since 
such interventions would have the aim of directing a person’s actions towards certain 
ends that are taken to be valuable, regardless of whether the person has a preference for 
them. The “as judged by themselves” (hereafter ‘AJBT’) standard is the main way in 
which the welfarist conception of advantage retains the subjectivity required for 
nudging, as an all-purpose policy tool, to be considered means paternalist. Sunstein does 
not offer any arguments against perfectionism, but emphasises that in so far as choice 
architects adopt the AJBT standard, “they reject perfectionism, and they do so on 
principle” (2016a: 51).56 The rationale for this principled rejection of perfectionism 
                                                                                                                                                                    
between them “is much more complex”, especially in the case of those views that embrace the fact of 
ethical pluralism, as mine does.  
55 Parts of my discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 might be viewed as having some bearing on this question, 
given their ambition to show that some of the worries that anti-perfectionists often have about 
perfectionist political action are unwarranted in this case. 
56 Although he does make reference to the objection(s) to the AJBT standard that might be offered by 
some perfectionists (namely, that it is “too subjective”), Sunstein states only that: “These questions raise 
serious questions within political philosophy, which I cannot adequately answer here” (2016a: 51). 
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seems to be: public policy ought to be done on the basis of preference satisfaction 
because we (i.e., advocates of nudging) do not want to gainsay people’s views about 
what makes for a good life, and the best way of avoiding this is to operate with a 
conception of satisfaction that makes reference to people’s own preferences as 
indicators of whether they are more or less advantaged. This involves making a value 
judgement, as all conceptions of advantage must, but resists appealing to any particular 
view about what makes someone’s life go well. Let us suppose, then, that we accept this 
ambition to avoid perfectionism. Would such an ambition lead us to accepting 
Sunstein’s view?  
The first issue is grounded in the observation that it is not at all obvious that 
preference satisfaction is the neutral, subjectivist welfare standard that it is assumed to 
be. Indeed, it is odd that Sunstein seems to assume its neutrality, especially when the 
leading liberal theorists who care about avoiding perfectionism reject welfarist views of 
advantage-for-policy (e.g., Nagel 1986; Dworkin 1990; Rawls 1993). Although the aim 
of adopting a preference satisfaction view is to avoid gainsaying people’s views about 
what makes for a good life, and thus to eschew controversial claims about well-being, its 
adoption by the state would, in the words of Dworkin, “necessarily be imposing on 
everyone its collective judgment of what lives are good and how to live well” (2011: 
355). We can see this by noticing that it is possible that some, perhaps several, citizens 
might judge their own well-being in ways that make no essential reference to the 
satisfaction of their (rational) preferences at all. Consequently, one might question why 
the adoption of informed preference satisfaction as the welfare standard should be seen 
as any less controversial than the adoption of opportunity for autonomous agency as a 
form of advantage for policy.  
Even if this were not so, and we accepted for the sake of argument that this 
type of welfarism can be neutral in the appropriate sense, there are questions over 
translating this neutrality into practice. This second issue challenges the extent to which, 
in practice, Sunstein’s view is able to remain true to its initial motivation. According to 
Rebonato, nudge advocates “find themselves in a singularly difficult position” because 
they are “faced with an enormous problem of intelligibility of preferences” (2012: 195-
196). Sunstein acknowledges himself that the “real danger” for his view is that, when we 
move away from people’s actual preferences to asking what people would want if they 
were adequately informed, rational, self-controlled, and so on, choice architects will be 
relying on their own values and beliefs when designing nudges (2016a: 45). At the very 
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least, they will be relying on their judgements about what it would be rational for 
someone to do in a particular situation in order to design PCA that steers citizens in the 
“right direction”. This drives a wedge between the informed preference satisfaction 
welfare standard and the AJBT standard. Indeed, some might argue that it appears to 
defeat the whole purpose of adopting the AJBT standard in the first place, which 
seriously calls into question Sunstein’s claim to be defending (only) means paternalism.  
One might respond to this by saying that nudges leave open the option to opt 
out if a citizen believes that it has not, in fact, nudged her in the right direction 
according to her own conception of the good. This is true, at least in principle. But once 
we delve a little deeper, this defence begins to look shaky. The third issue I wish to 
highlight, then, relates to the fact that there are different interpretations of what is 
required for the AJBT standard, and within this set some interpretations are more 
attractive than others. What counts as judging (according to the AJBT standard) in the 
case of nudges that operate by taking advantage of our automatic cognitive processes in 
their efforts to steer behaviour? Thaler and Sunstein work on the assumption that, so 
long as an individual does not opt out, the intervention can be understood as having 
promoted her welfare by satisfying some informed preference. In other words, the 
AJBT standard relies on a revealed preference framework. These authors admit as much 
when they acknowledge that: “Some readers might think that our reliance on behaviour 
as an indication of welfare is inconsistent with one of our central claims – that choices 
do not necessarily coincide with welfare” (Thaler and Sunstein 2006: 254).  
This raises a serious concern. The inconsistency that they reference comes to 
fore because some nudges act on us in ways that may undermine the idea that any 
judgement has been made by the target at all, never mind the kind of judgement that 
one might expect the AJBT standard to protect. In fact: 
  
“if the nudges of the libertarian paternalists – such as changing the default option – are 
effective, and exploit the decisional inertia of the choosers, then it makes little difference 
that there is a nominal right to opt out. And if their nudge is very effective, then having the 
nominal right to reverse the nudge makes very little difference.” (Rebonato 2012: 203; 
emphasis in original) 
 
If the AJBT standard, as Sunstein uses it, can be expanded so far as to include instances 
of this kind, then this is surely not an attractive interpretation. An attractive version 
would need to have a more convincing condition of what it takes for an individual to 
judge for herself what does and does not count as a welfare-promoting influence. One 
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interpretation of the standard that does not fall foul of the problem of interpersonal 
intelligibility of preferences is an autonomy-based one. Again, this could take on 
different particular features; but taking seriously the AJBT standard may commit us to 
using PCA to promote autonomous agency: for example, “a social planner could try to 
favour those social conditions that facilitate the formation of an informed and well-
considered choice, and then let individuals get on with freely choosing” (Rebonato 
2012: 194). If so, then accepting the AJBT standard does not, as Sunstein claims, 
require that choice architects necessarily reject perfectionism, at least the moderate 
liberal perfectionism described above.               
As a result of these three issues it has become clear that, despite trying to take 
the ecumenical high ground against accounts like mine, Sunstein’s approach is not as 
ecumenical as he would think. But if his approach cannot lay claim to the neutrality that 
it hoped it could, then my moderate liberal perfectionist approach does not look to be 
as controversial as nudge advocates might like to think. There may be grounds, in fact, 
to claim that the account of permissible nudge paternalism I develop is more ecumenical 
than Sunstein’s, given its focus on procedural agency-based features rather than the 
rational outcomes that his approach focuses on. Regardless of whether this is true or 
not, this subsection has highlighted three problems that seriously call into question the 
coherence and neutrality of the informed preference satisfaction approach.      
 
§3.3: Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined a partial, autonomy-based conception of what it is for a 
person’s life to go well as being the appropriate standard in setting out an account of 
permissible public nudging. In doing so, it rejects the (implicit) informed preference 
satisfaction view adopted by Sunstein, and has argued that – even if it were an attractive 
view – it suffers from a set of problems that call into question its consistency. These 
problems have not been adequately acknowledged by its advocates, but they do 
potentially undercut the whole analysis of the ethics of nudging that follows from 
adopting this welfare standard. The conceptual and theoretical work carried out in this 
chapter and the previous one have laid the foundations for the full normative 
investigation that follows in Chapters 4 and 5, on prudential and moral nudging 
respectively.     
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4. Nudging as a Means of Autonomy Support  
 
This chapter examines whether the political community can ever permissibly use choice 
architecture for the sake of improving citizens’ own well-being and, if so, under what 
conditions. Its principal aim is to defend the view that public nudging, when done for 
the target’s own sake, is morally permissible only if it is both non-manipulative and 
autonomy-supporting, where this means that it provides an opportunity for people to 
be better able to act on their own reasons. This selective account – which I call 
autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism – represents a subtle, middle-ground view between 
advocates and critics of paternalistically-motivated nudging. In doing so, it sets out the 
specific and limited role that public choice architecture (PCA) permissibly might play in 
(supporting) citizens’ prudential practical reasoning.  
 The chapter begins by outlining different types of claim that might be made 
regarding the relationship between autonomy and PCA, which serves both to set out 
the main views in the literature and to provide a sense of the general shape of the view I 
will be defending (§4.1). It then offers a more detailed account of the concept of 
personal autonomy, and explains the two kinds of relevant threat to this ethical ideal – 
an internal threat from automaticity, and an external threat from manipulation (§4.2). 
This raises the question of whether some types of PCA can mitigate the former threat 
while not falling foul of the latter, and thereby act as a form of autonomy support. To 
assess this, a full examination of the charge of manipulation is carried out, which shows 
that certain nudges are objectionably manipulative and thus presumptively 
impermissible, but that others do not operate on their target in a psychologically 
manipulative fashion (§4.3). The chapter then outlines two categories of PCA – nudge-
autonomy and auto-nudge – that are able to play an autonomy-supporting role, and defends 
these as permissible forms of nudge paternalism (§4.4).  
 
§4.1: Nudging and Autonomy: Three Types of Compatibility Claim   
Traditionally, liberals such as J.S. Mill have used the value of autonomy to a human life 
to ground the anti-paternalism principle. The psychological evidence canvassed in 
earlier chapters appears, however, to have provided a justification for a means by which 
to integrate a new form of paternalism into liberal political theory without offending 
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against this central value.57 Nudges claim to represent a “liberty-preserving” mode of 
promoting well-being, which “should be acceptable to those firmly committed to 
freedom of choice on grounds of […] autonomy” (Sunstein and Thaler 2006: 233). Yet 
much of the debate over the ethics of nudging has been infused with a condemnatory 
attitude, grounded in the idea that public nudges interfere with citizens’ autonomy in 
some objectionable way. This first section seeks to clarify the issues at stake in this 
debate by distinguishing between three possible views that one might take about the 
relationship between PCA and autonomy. Doing so offers a way of introducing and 
problematising the main conceptual and normative considerations that the chapter will 
need to address, as well as making clear at the outset how the view that I will be 
developing and defending is situated relative to others in the literature.     
 
§4.1.1: Compatibility and Incompatibility Views 
A good way of introducing the first two kinds of view is offered by Hausman and 
Welch’s definition of choice architecture, since one view emphasises its first part and 
the other its second part:  
 
“Nudges are ways of influencing choice without limiting the choice set or making 
alternatives appreciably more costly in terms of time, trouble, social sanctions, and so 
forth. They are called for because of flaws in individual decision-making, and they work 
by making use of those flaws.” (Hausman and Welch 2010: 126)  
 
Let’s begin with the first part and with what we might call the compatibility view. 
Advocates have defended nudging as a permissible means of governmental influence 
according to the normative standard of liberty-preservation. The fundamental claim, as 
we saw in Chapter 2, is that these choice-influencing interventions preserve citizens’ 
freedom since they do not coercively restrict or alter choice-sets (Thaler and Sunstein 
2009: 6). We might agree, at least for the sake of argument, with this claim about the 
noncoercive nature of nudging.58 For Sunstein and Thaler, this is enough to ground a 
                                                          
57 Note that certain forms of paternalism have always been justified on the classic anti-paternalist view. 
Mill, for instance, allowed that, in cases of involuntariness like his rotten bridge example, paternalistic 
intervention is justified because it does not represent “any real infringement of [the individual’s] liberty” 
(2005: 117).  
58 Goodwin challenges this view by arguing that the truth of this noncoerciveness claim hinges on Thaler 
and Sunstein’s particular libertarian account of freedom and so does not hold across other (arguably more 
attractive) conceptions of freedom (2012: 88). Although I make a similar distinction between conceptions 
of freedom (and the problematic consequences of this for Thaler and Sunstein’s arguments) in what 
follows, I do so principally for the sake of pursuing a different line of critique which causes problems for 
the compatibility view even if we accept that nudges are noncoercive (for a similar approach, see Mills 
2015).   
  
58 
 
version of the compatibility claim: “we think that respect for autonomy is adequately 
accommodated within the [liberal] aspect of [liberal] paternalism” (2003: 1167 fn. 22). 
Thaler and Sunstein’s “liberal” account is concerned primarily with coerciveness 
because it understands (and seeks to preserve) freedom in its negative sense, namely, the 
sense of being “free to choose” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 5; Friedman and Friedman 
1980). According to this negative conception, freedom consists in “not being prevented 
from choosing as I do by other men” (Berlin 2002: 131). It is true that coercion invades 
autonomy; and so, the (stipulated) fact that nudging does not diminish an individual’s 
options means that it does not fall foul of one of the possible ways in which her 
autonomy might be threatened. On this view, then, the compatibility claim amounts to a 
statement that choice architecture is compatible with autonomy in virtue of the fact that 
it preserves citizens’ freedom of choice.  
But there are a number of issues with this claim, of which I’ll briefly outline two 
for the sake of laying the groundwork for the opposite view. The first has already been 
discussed in clarifying the character of nudging (§2.2.2). Thaler and Sunstein’s claim can 
be challenged on its own terms by contending that nudges do not even necessarily 
preserve freedom of choice. To see this, we distinguished between two senses in which 
nudges might be said to preserve freedom of choice – a basic sense and a substantive 
sense. Although it is clear that nudges preserve freedom of choice in the basic sense in 
virtue of not formally foreclosing options, it is far less clear that they do so in the more 
substantive sense, since some nudges appear to operate by steering agents’ cognitive 
processes in ways that call his or her actual freedom of choice into question. Leading on 
from this, the second issue challenges the account of autonomy adopted by Thaler and 
Sunstein in a more wholesale fashion. Autonomy is generally viewed as equivalent, or 
certainly very similar, to Berlin’s positive conception of freedom (2002: 131-134); not, as 
the view above suggests, equivalent or analogous to negative freedom. Those who are 
concerned with autonomy maintain that we ought to be concerned with more than the 
options available for people to choose between (i.e., noncoerciveness). We need to 
attend also to their capacities for self-direction. (I develop this view of the nature of 
autonomy and, by extension, this second line of critique of Thaler and Sunstein’s 
version of the compatibility claim in much more detail in the next section).  
 For some, these points provide the basis for the incompatibility view. Emphasising 
the second part of the definition above – i.e., that nudges operate by making use of 
knowledge relating to the automaticity and context-dependency that affect human 
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behaviour and decision-making – critics contend that PCA is not compatible with the 
respect for individual autonomy that is due to citizens by their governments. This 
objection can take one of two different forms. The first (and most common) is the 
objectionably manipulative critique. As Mills writes:  
 
“Critics may suggest that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous because it seeks 
to exploit heuristics and cognitive biases in our reasoning. Accordingly, choice architects 
pursue a programme of manipulation that undermines the independence of an 
autonomous agent’s will by subverting the flaws in her decision-making competency to 
bring about particular ends.” (Mills 2015: 498) 
 
Choice architecture is, in the minds of these critics, a subtle and objectionable form of 
manipulation because it intentionally bypasses people’s rational and deliberating 
faculties (i.e., their “System 2” thinking) in order to influence their choices by exploiting 
the various biases to which they are susceptible (Grüne-Yanoff 2012: 636; Hausman 
and Welch 2010: 128-129; Bovens 2009: 209; White 2013: 95; Wilkinson 2013: 347). 
The central thought is that it would be inconsistent to care about coercion but not 
about other kinds of treatment that share its worrisome properties. We care about 
coercion, when we care about autonomy, because coercion interferes with a person’s 
independence. This being so, it would be “odd to care about coercion but not about 
manipulation”, given that both kinds of treatment are objectionable on the grounds that 
they interfere with citizens’ independence (Moles 2015: 654). Manipulation does this via 
a different means: it does not, like coercion, interfere with a person’s options, but rather 
it “perverts the way that a person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals” 
(Raz 1986: 377-378). In so far as nudges operate by manipulating citizens’ psychological 
processes without the consent of their target, they too offend against ethical 
independence. If, by its very nature, PCA falls foul of this objectionably manipulative 
critique, as many of these critics argue, it cannot be compatible with autonomy. 
 The second version of the incompatibility claim, which is related to yet distinct 
from the first, is based on what we might call the objectionably paternalistic critique, which 
charges PCA with being a disrespectful form of influence. Standardly, the key elements 
of paternalism are taken to be: “that an individual is prevented from, or manipulated 
into, performing an action or making a choice, on the basis that this will be in their own 
best interests, and usually the associated assumption that they are not the best judge of 
their interests” (Begon 2016: 356). The discussion above addresses the first element: 
though nudging is not coercive, i.e., does not prevent people from performing an 
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action, it is possible that it manipulates them into not doing so. For many, though, the 
distinctive wrong of paternalism is to be found in its motive, in particular, it is taken to 
involve a negative judgement about people’s abilities to lead their own lives.59 Jonathan 
Quong, for instance, defines paternalistic acts as those where (1) “An agent A attempts 
to improve the welfare […] of agent B with regard to a particular decision or situation 
that B faces”, and (2) “A’s act is motivated by a negative judgement about B’s ability […] to 
make the right decision or manage the particular situation in a way that will effectively 
advance B’s welfare” (2010: 80, emphasis in original; cited in Moles 2015: 651). On 
Thaler and Sunstein’s view, nudging is motivated by an acknowledgement of the 
evidence that appears to show that people are not the best judges of their interests (or at 
least of the means by which to achieve these interests). It is often the case that this has 
been expressed in negative terms, referring to nudges as interventions designed to help 
us overcome the welfare losses produced by “predictable irrationalities”, “blunders”, 
“bad decisions”, and by the “flawed” and “systematically wrong” judgements that result 
from “human frailty” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 19, 5, 79). As a result, some have 
argued that, in so far as they are motivated by such negative judgements about citizens’ 
abilities to lead their own lives, nudges are objectionably paternalistic and so are 
incompatible with respect for autonomy.60    
 
§4.1.2: Conditional Compatibility Views 
Neither the compatibility view nor the incompatibility view, as they are presented 
above, is fully correct; rather, both capture elements of the truth, while simultaneously 
missing important insights. A third kind of view seeks to occupy the conceptual and 
normative space between these first two views in order to combine the insights, and 
avoid the problems, of each. The central thought is that different types of compatibility 
claim can be made. In the version above, it is claimed that nudges are always compatible 
with autonomy (or at least that they always adequately accommodate respect for 
                                                          
59 For some examples of the motive-based characterisation of paternalism, see Shiffrin (2000), Quong 
(2010), and Tsai (2014). Begon (2016: §3) offers a good overview of motivational accounts.   
60 Building on fn. 58, it is worth noting at this point that there is a broad consensus in the literature that a 
“limited, carefully defined range” of paternalism is potentially justifiable (Husak 1980: 27), and that often 
included within this range is a form that “preserves and enhances for the individual his ability to rationally 
carry out his own decisions” (Dworkin 1971: 125). Arguably such policies would not be motivated by the 
types of negative judgements that anti-paternalists find disrespectful and, if so, they would not fall foul of 
the objectionably paternalistic critique. They would not only be compatible with autonomy, they would 
supports its development and exercise. This is one strand of the conditional compatibility view that I 
briefly sketch in the next subsection. This issue is discussed in full in §4.4.4, when defending the 
permissibility of autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism. 
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autonomy).61 But we might also claim that PCA is only compatible with autonomy 
under certain conditions. As a general category, claims of this sort represent the 
conditional compatibility view. There are several ways in which this view might be specified. 
The aim of this chapter is to outline what I take to be the most attractive version of this 
selective view.  
The general contours of the view that I’ll be defending are as follows. It agrees 
with nudge advocates that certain types of PCA can be compatible with autonomy and, 
in fact, can act as a means of autonomy support. Nevertheless, it offers a much more 
discriminating view of this compatibility, which picks out only certain kinds of good as 
permissible for nudges to serve – goods that are specified by engaging fully with the 
autonomy-based concerns raised by critics. In doing so, it agrees with these critics that 
certain forms of choice architecture are impermissible on account of their effects on 
(i.e., their incompatibility with) citizens’ autonomy. This marks the conditionality aspect 
of the view: nudges are morally permissible only in so far as they meet the conditions of 
operating in non-manipulative and autonomy-supporting ways or, in negative terms, in 
so far as they are neither manipulative nor objectionably paternalistic. The remainder of 
the chapter outlines and defends this view.  
Its first task is to discuss the nature of autonomy in more detail, and to present 
an account of autonomy that adequately captures and explains both the internal and 
external threats to this ethical ideal. This is pursued in the next section. This account 
will provide the basis on which to assess the extent to which PCA is manipulative or 
not (§4.3) and, as a result, whether there are types of nudges that are able to support 
citizens’ autonomy (§4.4).  
 
§4.2: Autonomy, Automaticity, and Policy Interventions 
The first important issue raised by this discussion is that there are different conceptions 
of autonomy at work in the debate over nudging, and that this is a source not only of 
conceptual confusion but, in the case of Thaler and Sunstein, of problematic normative 
argumentation too. The literature on autonomy is both vast and complex, comprised as 
it is of many competing accounts of how this concept ought properly to be understood 
(e.g., Arpaly 2002). At the broadest level, we might distinguish between two types of 
                                                          
61 As Riley writes, Thaler and Sunstein “do not simply hold that nudging is in some circumstances morally 
permitted and practically called for. Rather, they favour and would have us foster [their] broad adoption 
[…], to be deployed as a general purpose tool for good, across the institutional milieu of contemporary 
social life” (2017: 2).  
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conception – sometimes referred to as “choice autonomy” and “agent autonomy” 
(Lillehammer 2012: 196-204) – that parallel the distinction mentioned above between 
negative and positive freedom (Berlin 2002).62 Our focus here is on agent autonomy – 
more commonly known in the literature as personal autonomy or self-governance.63 This is the 
case for three reasons. The first, and most obvious, is that this is the kind of conception 
that was defended in the previous chapter as being a component of living well and 
which, as a result, plays a central role in our normative analysis of PCA. This reason in 
itself is sufficient justification, but two others add further weight. The second is that the 
majority of contemporary philosophical work has centred on analyses of the nature and 
normativity of this conception of autonomy. The third is that agent autonomy does not 
fall foul of the issues briefly outlined above that showed the choice autonomy view to 
be inadequate for the purposes of assessing PCA.  
 
§4.2.1: An Account of Personal Autonomy 
For our purposes it is not necessary to flesh out and defend a full theory of autonomy 
and, in any case, such a task would go beyond what is possible within the limitations of 
this thesis.64 However, to make this concept – and this ethical ideal – more determinate, 
as is required for our normative analysis, we need to identify its constituent elements. 
One way of doing this, in the first instance, is to delineate three of its key intuitive 
features: 
 
(1) Capacity: Discussions of personal autonomy take their lead from the idea that 
people have a capacity for self-directing activity, and that they exercise this to 
some degree.65  
                                                          
62 Lillehammer defines these conceptions thus: “On my first interpretation [choice autonomy], ‘being 
autonomous’ means not being subject to coercive interference. […] On my second interpretation [agent 
autonomy], ‘being autonomous’ means being a self-governing agent” (2012: 196-197). If it were not for 
Thaler and Sunstein’s adoption of the former view, and their referring to this as “autonomy”, it may not 
have been necessary to draw attention to this distinction; but, as it is, it is important to do so for the sake 
of clarity.  
63 In what follows, I will use the term autonomy to refer to personal autonomy, and will use the terms 
“(personal) autonomy” and “self-governance” interchangeably. 
64 This task is taken up in numerous book-length contributions to the literature, including Dworkin 
(1988); Mele (1995); and Christman (2009b). 
65 There are some cases in which individuals do not have this capacity, such as when a person is in a coma 
or has a very severe case of intellectual disability. Many other cases are not so clear, such as in cases of 
“mental disorder” (Radoilska 2012). There are important questions about mental (in)capacity and its 
relation to the concept of personal autonomy. In this thesis, I am focused only on a central range of 
cases, namely, those concerning adult citizens assumed to be above a minimum threshold of autonomy. 
(Capacity also raises an interesting question about the possibility of autonomy in light of the empirical 
psychological evidence outlined in Chapter 2. I address this later in this section.)       
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(2) Respect: The possession of this capacity is thought to demand respect, such that 
there should be a presumption that an autonomous individual be allowed to 
exercise his or her autonomy and not be coerced or manipulated into serving 
another’s projects. 
(3) Value: Developing or applying this capacity further is considered to be a good 
thing.  
  
Our first task in this section is to give an account of Capacity. Broadly speaking, personal 
autonomy refers to the capacity, usually considered to be special to humans, the 
possession and exercise of which enables an individual to be a self-governing agent. 
There are many different (though often “overlapping”) accounts of what is required for 
self-governance. The issue at stake concerns how we should understand the 
autonomous agent’s special relation to her own motives. Sarah Buss (2013: §2) 
distinguishes between three main types of account in the literature: (i) coherentist accounts 
maintain that an agent is self-governing if and only if “she is motivated to act as she 
does because this motivation coheres with some mental state that represents her point 
of view on the action” (e.g., Frankfurt 1971; Watson 1975; Bratman 2005); (ii) reasons-
responsiveness accounts hold that an agent is self-governing if and only if “her motives, or 
the mental processes that produce them, are responsive to a sufficiently wide range of 
reasons for and against behaving as she does” (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998); and (iii) 
responsiveness-to-reasoning accounts, the type of view that I favour and outline in more 
detail below, emphasise the importance of the reasoning process itself to self-governing 
agency (e.g., Christman 1991, 1993, 2017; Mele 1995).  
According to the view I favour, then, the relationship between an individual and 
her motivational states is characterised, most broadly, as her ability to decide (or to have 
the appropriate control over, in some other way) which of them to follow (Arpaly 2002: 
118-9). We might introduce some of the aspects of this view by referring to Berlin’s 
characterisation of positive freedom, which derives from the capacity and the wish of an 
individual:  
  
“…to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which 
are my own, not by causes that affect me, as it were, from the outside. I wish to be […] a 
doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external 
nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave, incapable of playing a 
human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them.” 
(Berlin 2002: 178)  
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The essential claim is that self-governing agency rests on the capacity of an individual to 
evaluate her motives on the basis of her own beliefs and desires, and to adjust these 
motives in response to these evaluations (Buss 2013). In Berlin’s terms, it is the capacity 
to be moved by her own reasons and conscious purposes, so as to be able to conceive 
goals and policies of her own and to realise them in action. It is clear that, on this view, 
it is the autonomous agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning that matters centrally.  
The repetition of “my own” in the phrases “moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes, which are my own” and “conceiving of goals and policies of my own” highlights 
two important aspects of this view. The first is that, unlike reasons-responsiveness 
accounts, a person can exercise this capacity for self-governance even though her own 
reasons and purposes may include false beliefs about what she has reason to do. 
Personal autonomy, as an ethical ideal, “refers to a life of partial self-creation” (Wall 
2012: 101; see also Dworkin 2011 and Raz 1986: 369), and one way of thinking about 
what this means is for an individual’s attitudes, beliefs, values, goals, etc. to be “at least 
in part up to her”, such that she is able to have a say in creating or inventing the kind of 
person it is worth her being (Helm 2001: 12). In conceiving certain “goals and policies”, 
then, a person determines for herself many of the prudential reasons that apply to her. 
Raz calls this process, which marks a distinctively human kind of freedom, the “self-
creation of value” (1986: 389). I take it that this ideal of self-authorship is, in one sense 
at least, what Berlin means when he makes reference to being moved by reasons “which 
are my own”.  
The second aspect is that responsiveness-to-reasoning views, unlike both 
coherentist and reasons-responsiveness accounts, are inherently sensitive to the 
intuition that certain external influences undermine our autonomy. In the case where a 
person’s practical reasoning is directly manipulated by others (“being acted upon […] by 
other men”), this person would not govern herself by means of this reasoning and so 
she would have no power over the motives that this distorted reasoning produced (Buss 
2013). This attests to the important idea that autonomy “is in part a social ideal” (Raz 
1986: 378). It is not only the consequences of coercive and manipulative treatment that 
matter, i.e., the distortions that they cause in terms of achieving coherence with higher-
order attitudes or being sufficiently responsive to what one (really) has reason to do. 
Violations of the independence condition matter also “because of the kind of treatment 
of others that they are” (ibid.). Treatments such as manipulation are fundamentally 
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“designed to restrict rather than enlarge conscious deliberation” (Barber 1971: 66), by 
short-circuiting people’s own critical and practical reasoning processes.         
 There are, therefore, several reasons to favour responsiveness-to-reasoning 
accounts, and more specifically what we might call autonomy-as-self-authorship, over 
competing accounts. I will outline two now, and a third in the next section. First, at a 
general level, this conception is able to capture a fundamental element of the nature of 
personal autonomy which eludes coherentist and reasons-responsiveness accounts. 
These two accounts both conceive of self-governance as a kind of “constraint”: to be 
autonomous on the former, one’s motivations must be organised in a certain way; to be 
autonomous on the latter, one must act only on certain reasons (Colburn 2010: 13). By 
contrast, in the case of autonomy-as-self-authorship, there is an important sense in 
which the particular conditions that determine whether or not a person is autonomous 
are, at least in part, decided by the agent herself.  
Second, a further advantage is that this conception offers an attractive 
combination of internalism and externalism (Mele 1995: 146-149), which remedies the 
issues caused by accounts that are either too internalist (i.e., coherentism) or too 
externalist (i.e., reasons-responsiveness) in character. Like coherentism, autonomy-as-
self-authorship maintains that autonomous agency requires the ability to take a more 
reflective standpoint on one’s motives, and that motives authorised from this 
standpoint are internal to the agent herself in a way that other motives are not. But 
autonomy-as-self-authorship provides a more plausible account than coherentism of 
this capacity for self-reflection. In the case of the latter, this capacity is comprised of the 
ability to hold higher-order attitudes; but this, in itself, fails to explain the authority of 
such attitudes in grounding self-governing agency, which, it is argued, comes from the 
practical reasoning that supports these higher-order attitudes. Identifying with a motive 
is important to autonomy in so far as “identification” is representative of implicit claims 
about which motives are supported by the agent’s reasoning. On the other hand, like 
reasons-responsiveness theorists (and unlike strict coherentists), the reasoning-
responsive view contains an important externalist element. Namely, it recognises that 
whether or not an individual’s actual practical reasoning counts towards self-governing 
agency is dependent upon “which forces exert a nonrational influence on this 
reasoning” (Buss 2013).66 An attractive feature of autonomy-as-self-authorship, though, 
                                                          
66 It is therefore similar to (one reading of) Gerald Dworkin’s account, which adds a “procedural 
independence” condition to his otherwise internalist view. He writes, “Second-order reflection cannot be 
the whole story of autonomy. For those reflections […] may be influenced by other persons or 
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is able to build in an external condition without requiring that autonomy involves an 
epistemically demanding relation between the agent’s attitudes and external reality (i.e., 
an understanding of what she (really) has reason to do), as is the case in reasons-
responsiveness accounts.  
I take it that these reasons are sufficient, if not separately then together, to 
ground the adoption of autonomy-as-self-authorship as the conception of personal 
autonomy that will be used in the normative analysis of nudging. Hence, any reference 
to “autonomy” in the rest of the chapter can be assumed to refer to this conception, 
unless otherwise specified.    
 
§4.2.2: Two Kinds of Threat to Autonomy 
We are now in a better position to begin assessing the different types of compatibility 
claims outlined in §4.1. It is clear that, on this view of personal autonomy, nudging as a 
general purpose tool would be incompatible with autonomy in so far as it operates on 
its target in a manipulative fashion. It would fail the independence condition (and 
Respect, more generally) because, in disregarding an individual’s reasoning capacity by 
seeking to pervert the way that she comes to make choices, it would bypass the central 
part of what makes the resultant choice her own. The next section is devoted to assessing 
fully this charge of manipulation and the extent to which it applies to PCA (§4.3). The 
focus here is to draw out in further detail why it is that Thaler and Sunstein’s 
compatibility view is mistaken. 
 As Sunstein admits in an interview with The New Statesman, “There’s a discussion 
of the ethical issues in Nudge, but we certainly didn’t think about the issue of 
manipulation in any detail” (quoted in Lewis 2016).67 We can see now that this is due to 
Thaler and Sunstein’s “refusal to engage at any great length with autonomy as an 
intrinsically valuable consideration” (Mills 2015: 497, fn. 3). To unpack this, we need to 
understand the implications of their problematically thin conception of Capacity for both 
Respect and Value. Sunstein is aware that his view of autonomy (as freedom of choice) 
differs from other, more standard views in the literature. He draws a distinction 
between what he calls “thin” and “thick” conceptions, which differ primarily with 
                                                                                                                                                                    
circumstances in such a fashion that we do not view those evaluations as being the person’s own” 
(Dworkin 1988: 18).  
67 The only reference is in a brief discussion of possible objections at the end of the book, where they ask 
“What limits should be placed on […] public manipulation as such?” and answer by endorsing Rawls’s 
“publicity principle” which amounts, essentially (and unsatisfactorily), to the view that a government 
“should not be secretive about what it is doing” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 244-245). More is said about 
this response in §4.3.3. 
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respect to the value they assign to autonomy. The thin conception, which he favours 
and wishes to defend, is “welfarist” (Sunstein 2014a: 126). This has two important 
aspects. The first is that the association between freedom of choice and well-being is 
taken to be contingent. As we mentioned above, Thaler and Sunstein present a fairly 
pessimistic view of human beings’ capacity for practical reasoning and self-direction. 
They take the central lesson of the evidence from the cognitive and behavioural 
sciences to be that when we are free to choose, we do not always choose in ways that 
promote our well-being (Sunstein and Thaler 2003: 1198, fn. 143). Consequently, 
freedom of choice is valued only instrumentally, i.e., in so far as it promotes our well-
being. The second aspect is that “freedom of choice is an ingredient of welfare, and when 
we decide what government ought to do [including whether it is permissible to nudge or 
not], we need to take account of the harmful effect, on welfare, of interfering with that 
freedom” (Sunstein 2014a: 124; emphasis in original). The key thought is that it simply 
is a fact that people generally have a preference to choose for themselves when it comes 
to how to lead their own lives.68 Thus, on the thin conception, freedom of choice is 
valuable only in so far as it counts in a person’s “welfare calculus” (Sunstein 2014a: 124-
126).69 
  It is now possible to see what holding this thin conception of autonomy means 
for Thaler and Sunstein’s normative analysis of manipulation (and, by extension, their 
account of the permissibility of nudging), and how this differs from the account of the 
wrongness of manipulation defended here. While manipulation generally tends to be 
ruled out by Respect, Sunstein acknowledges that the ethical analysis of manipulation is 
“much less straightforward” on his welfarist account (2016a: 85). For welfarists, what 
matters is how people’s lives are going; and since manipulation might in fact promote 
people’s well-being, understood in terms of informed preference satisfaction, they have 
no in-principle opposition to manipulation. This leaves it as an open question whether 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., Sunstein’s experimental work on public attitudes towards nudges (Sunstein 2016a, Ch. 6; 
2016b).  
69 For Sunstein and others, such as Sarah Conly, “taking a welfare loss into account” means accounting 
for it within a cost-benefit analysis, because they adopt a broadly consequentialist approach to political 
morality. Sunstein, for instance, claims that “Social welfare […] is the master concept… If [interventions] 
are well justified on cost-benefit grounds, they should count as acceptable forms of paternalism” (2014a: 
18-19). And, in a similar vein, Conly states that “Where choices should be left to the chooser, and where 
intervention is permissible, will be a function of what is best described as a cost-benefit analysis, rather 
than a decision a priori that certain personal decisions should be sacrosanct” (2013: 17). In principle, this 
analysis would permit keeping welfare-ptomoting manipulation hidden according to a “what people don’t 
know won’t harm them” rationale. In discussing this possibility, Sunstein mentions the risk of this type of 
strategy, namely, if hidden manipulation is disclosed then this may result in added welfare loss (relative to 
unhidden manipulation). 
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manipulation is wrong. Everything rests on the empirical consideration of whether a 
manipulative action in fact promotes or harms people’s well-being thus understood 
(Sunstein 2016a: 99-100). As a result, such a position maintains that we can draw a 
distinction between harmful manipulation, on the one hand, and benign (or even 
beneficial) manipulation, on the other (Baron 2016: 283). This is summed up by 
Sunstein thus: “if manipulation really does increase welfare, then it would seem to be 
justified and even mandatory on ethical grounds” (2016a: 100).    
 By contrast, holding as I do the view that personal autonomy is intrinsically 
valuable, my view falls more into the category of what Sunstein calls the “thick” 
conception of autonomy. It is worth noting that, as Sunstein describes it, the thick 
conception differs slightly from the account that I have defended. To see this, we need 
to recognise that there are two senses in which intrinsic value might be understood, 
namely, either as valuable for its own sake or valuable in itself. As Steven Wall explains: 
 
“these two locutions are not equivalent: the latter refers to the source of value, implying 
that an intrinsically valuable thing gets its value from itself, not from something else; the 
former refers to the way in which a thing is valued, implying that an intrinsically valuable 
thing is valued for its own sake and not for the sake of something else.” (Wall 1998: 145; 
for a similar point, see Korsgaard 1983)       
 
According to Sunstein, the thick conception claims not that autonomy is “part of 
welfare but that it is an end in itself” (2014a: 127). Sunstein may or may not be aware of 
these two different locutions of intrinsic value; but, if he is, it would appear that he 
specifies the thick conception as conceiving of autonomy as valuable in itself.70 By 
contrast, I have been careful both to describe personal autonomy as a constituent of a 
larger whole and to claim that its value derives from its contribution to this larger 
whole, namely, living well. Hence, in my view, autonomy does not have value in itself, 
but is valuable for its own sake, where the ultimate source of its value comes from its 
(significant) contribution to human well-being.  
Nothing important hangs on Sunstein’s view of the “thick” conception. I 
highlight this point to clarify the crux of the dispute between views like Sunstein’s and 
views like the one I’m defending in this thesis. Manipulation is impermissible for Thaler 
and Sunstein if (and only if) it sets back a person’s welfare interests, while, on my view, 
manipulation (at least that which is not consented to) is always harmful to a person’s 
                                                          
70 For more on the distinction between autonomy as right (or “demand”) and autonomy as part of a 
person’s good (or “benefit”), see Darwall (2006: 265) and Groll (2012: 706). 
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welfare interests, given the intrinsic value of autonomous agency. Like coercion, 
manipulative influences represent “an invasion of autonomy whose severity exceeds the 
importance of the distortion it causes” (Raz 1986: 378). Certain (i.e., manipulative) 
nudges are therefore morally impermissible even where they correctly identify (some of) 
the reasons that apply to their target and, as a result, in some respects would make their 
lives go better. This is because these nudges are set-backs to welfare interests that are 
also wrongs.  
Sunstein makes reference to this type of view in a footnote in which he 
acknowledges that he is “bracketing here various questions about how welfarism is best 
understood. It is possible to have a conception of welfare that includes consideration of 
autonomy and dignity” (2016a: 98 fn. 47). Given that he does not offer any arguments 
against such a view, and given the arguments that I have presented in its favour, the 
remainder of the chapter assumes that autonomy is valuable for its own sake – i.e., not 
in a way that overrides well-being considerations, but in a way that it is fundamentally 
connected with these considerations about how well a person’s life is going. Accordingly, 
to the extent that living well matters, any nudges that are shown to operate in an 
objectionably manipulative fashion are impermissible. In so far as this is shown to be 
the case, nudging is incompatible with autonomy because it undermines its externalist 
condition.    
What the incompatibility view misses, however, is that there is a second relevant 
threat to autonomy, and that it might be possible for nudges to play some positive role 
in overcoming this threat. Clearly, the empirical evidence relating to automaticity and 
context-dependency poses a threat to the realisation of the ideal of autonomy-as-self-
authorship: fast thinking and unreflective motivation may generally challenge a person’s 
capacity to engage in practical reasoning or to realise the “goals and policies”, to refer 
back to Berlin’s words, conceived via such reasoning processes.71 This fact is important 
and will be treated as such in my normative analysis.72 But it is important to be clear 
about what the evidence has shown. Although it has highlighted the extent of these 
                                                          
71 See Blumenthal-Barby (2016: 9-13) for an instructive discussion on the impact of biases on autonomy. 
72 Not all automatically activated behaviour needs to threaten autonomy. As Bargh and Chartrand 
highlight, part of the way in which we acquire skills is to gradually automatise certain “intentional, goal-
directed processes” so that they become more efficient over time and can, in the end, operate “without 
conscious guidance” (1999: 463). This process is conditioned by the “frequent and consistent pairing of 
internal responses with external events” (ibid.: 464). There is some discussion of whether such 
automatically activated behaviours can count as autonomous agency or not (e.g., Fenton 2014; Felsen and 
Reiner 2011); and much rests in this discussion on one’s conception of autonomy. On my view, which is 
developed below (§4.4), conscious involvement is not always necessary at the point of behaviour. On a 
temporally extended view of autonomous agency, one can be responsive (at time t) to reasoning that has 
occurred at a previous point in time (at time t-1).  
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potentially autonomy-threatening cognitive processes, it is certainly not the case that it 
has revealed that autonomy is impossible (see Felsen and Reiner 2011). As Jennings et 
al. recognise,  
 
“it is a mistake to assume that just because contextual factors shape all of us all the time, 
and we all use cognitive and emotional short-cuts and make mistakes, it follows that the 
traditional [liberal] goal of becoming more reflectively self-aware [and self-governing] has 
been shown to be moot or an illusion by behavioural research.” (Jennings et al. 2016: 90).  
 
As a result, I take the central – and in many ways, commonsensical – lesson of the 
evidence from the cognitive and behavioural sciences to be that the capacities required 
by autonomy-as-self-authorship do not necessarily come as the default setting for 
humans. In response, and in contrast to the perspective taken by Thaler and Sunstein, it 
is possible to recognise that by diagnosing the various cognitive and motivational 
constraints that challenge the realisation of autonomy, the cognitive and behavioural 
sciences in fact provide a way of helping us better to combat and control them. In other 
words, an awareness of how these constraints systematically affect our practical 
reasoning creates an opportunity to mitigate them (see, e.g., Gigerenzer 2014). Given 
autonomy’s intrinsic value, we ought to respond to the evidence by using the policy 
levers available to us to support and promote it. And one of the ways that this might 
happen is through the use of PCA.  
This brings us to the third advantage of the conception of autonomy-as-self-
authorship, promised above. This conception is, as Colburn also recognises, “clearly an 
ideal with political relevance” (2010: 19), and so it enables those who hold it to use 
autonomy as the foundation for a liberal political philosophy committed not only to its 
protection, but also its promotion. Autonomy-as-self-authorship thus also captures the 
third of the intuitive features outlined above, namely, that developing or applying this 
capacity further is considered a good thing. The confluence of the discussions relating 
to the two threats to autonomy (the threat from manipulation and the threat from 
automaticity) therefore raises the interesting question of whether some kinds of PCA 
are able to mitigate these autonomy-undermining factors, while at the same time 
meeting the independence condition for autonomy. Answering this question is the 
focus of the next two sections.  
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§4.3: Assessing the Charge of Manipulation 
The first part of this task is to assess to what extent, if at all, PCA operates on citizens 
in an objectionably manipulative manner. This section briefly clarifies some issues 
relating to the nature of manipulation (§4.3.1), ahead of engaging in the chapter’s core 
critical assessment (§4.3.2 and §4.3.3), which generates the main arguments in favour of 
the conditional compatibility view and, in turn, provides the basis for developing my 
account of autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism in the following section (§4.4).  
 
§4.3.1: Clarifying the Nature of Manipulation  
Up until now we have discussed manipulation without specifying its nature in any real 
detail beyond the idea that it is independence-undermining on account of the perverting 
effects it wields on a person’s practical reasoning and decision-making processes. This 
view intuitively captures the core of the concept, but it leaves a number of issues to be 
clarified, which are relevant to our inquiry into PCA.73  
 Three points are important. The first relates to a distinction between two types 
of manipulation, namely, situational manipulation and psychological manipulation (Faden and 
Beauchamp 1986: 362-368).74 This parallels the two ways in which the term is used in 
common language: (i) changing, altering, or editing something so that it is perceived 
differently, or (ii) covertly controlling or exerting influence on a person’s psychological 
processes (where the former tends to be non-moralised and the latter moralised).75 PCA 
is, by its very nature, a form of situational manipulation, since nudges are designed to 
modify in some sense their target’s perception of a given situation. For example, the use 
of social norms in official letters – such as the inclusion of a local comparison statement 
in letters from the UK’s HMRC (e.g., “The great majority of people in [the taxpayer’s 
local area] pay their tax on time”) – is designed to affect the receiver’s perception or 
                                                          
73 There has been a surprising lack of sustained philosophical analysis on the topic (Noggle 1996: 43; 
Sunstein 2016a: 79). This is now being addressed, given that psychological discoveries and technological 
developments bringing questions about the ethics of influence to the fore (e.g., Coons and Weber 2014).  
74 This takes its lead from Faden and Beauchamp’s discussion, but differs from it in two important ways. 
First, Faden and Beauchamp identify three distinct categories of manipulative influence, but I am here 
discounting the first of these – which they call “manipulation of options” – because nudging (by 
definition) leaves options unaltered. These authors include in this category the modification of options 
through the offering of rewards or by threatening punishment, giving the example of “the manager who 
gets an employee to transfer to a new position by increasing the person’s salary” thereby offering her an 
attractive new offer (1986: 355). Plainly, this would not count as a nudge. Second, they draw the 
distinction between “manipulation of information” and “psychological manipulation”; and although the 
former shares some characteristics with what I’m calling situational manipulation, it differs from it in so 
far as it is principally concerned with deception, whereas situational manipulation may or may not use 
deceptive means.   
75 See the OED entry, available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/manipulate. 
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understanding of the situation. Similarly, reducing the size of plates in a canteen changes 
people’s perceptions about how much they need or want to consume (Wansink and van 
Ittersum 2013). But altering how an individual perceives a situation is not necessarily the 
same thing as psychologically manipulating her. These categories are analytically distinct 
because, even though situational manipulation can sometimes count as a form of 
psychological manipulation, it need not pervert the way in which people come to their 
choices – and it is possible, at least in principle, that it could support people’s practical 
reasoning in various ways. According to Faden and Beauchamp, psychological 
manipulation occurs when an individual is “influenced by causing changes in mental 
processes other than those involved in understanding” (1986: 366).76 For our purposes, 
and more generally, we might think of psychological manipulation as those kinds of 
influences that operate, to use Noggle’s metaphor, by deliberately “adjusting someone’s 
internal or psychological levers” in certain ways (1996: 47), thereby affecting the levers 
that guide our deliberation and practical reasoning.  
It is psychological manipulation that concerns us normatively, on account of its 
autonomy-undermining effects on a person’s reasoning. As noted above, situational 
manipulation as a means of influence may or may not operate also as a form of 
psychological manipulation; and it is precisely this hybrid category that we are interested 
in. Although he does not acknowledge this important distinction, we can see from 
Waldron’s critical statement about the nature of nudging that this category is the object 
of our concern. On his characterisation, governmental choice architects “should 
manipulate the choice architecture so that those who are less likely to perceive what is good 
for them can be induced to choose the options that [the choice architects] have decided are 
in their best interest” (Waldron 2015; emphasis added). Thus, we can characterise the 
general category of “objectionably manipulative” that concerns us as psychologically 
manipulative situational manipulation.  
 A second point of clarification concerns intentionality. One issue in the debate 
over the nature of manipulation is whether it is a necessary condition of manipulative 
influence that it is done intentionally (see, especially, Baron 2014). My main reaction to 
this is simply to observe that I do not need to argue either for or against this position 
for manipulation generally, because the question we are interested in – whether choice 
architecture is manipulative – concerns a set of policy interventions that are by their 
                                                          
76 The primary concern of these authors is informed consent, which explains why they define this form of 
influence in terms of its effects on “understanding”. 
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very nature intentional, namely, paternalistically-motivated nudges.77 Nonetheless, this 
response does not capture some of the more subtle aspects of this issue. To see this, we 
can notice that there is a difference between the two types of intention: ‘A intends B to 
do X’ and ‘A intends B to do X unless B wants to opt out’ (Wilkinson 2013: 352), 
where, in this case, A is the government (or, more precisely, a choice architect), B is a 
citizen, and X is a pre-determined behavioural outcome. It could be argued that public 
nudges fall into the second category of intention and that, if so, the government does 
not intend to manipulate its citizens, when it does (which, on accounts that assume 
intentionality as a necessary condition, would discount them as cases of manipulation). 
This might be correct, in principle. But this would require that the government sincerely 
wanted, and also sufficiently allowed for, people to opt out. In turn, this requires 
allowing people to have a genuine choice, which would require that the government 
avoid methods that bypass the deliberative processes that are connected to decision-
making. Hence, if we find that certain forms of nudging operate by bypassing these 
processes, then they would count as sufficiently intentional and so governments would 
not have available to them this type of defence against such interventions being 
described as a form of objectionable psychological manipulation.  
 A third point relates to consent and, in particular, the possibility of consensual 
manipulation. We have specified above that psychological manipulation is generally 
impermissible on account of its effects on autonomy. But I have been careful to specify 
this claim with an element of conditionality, because, if psychologically manipulative 
nudges could be consented to in the appropriate way, they would not fall into the 
category of objectionably manipulative influence.78 This raises the further question of what 
sort of consent would be required for this to be the case. This issue will be addressed in 
                                                          
77 This does, nonetheless, point us in the direction of an interesting separate question relating to 
foreseeability. Does it matter morally whether an individual is nudged intentionally (for paternalistic 
reasons) or that their being nudged (in a paternalistic way) is a foreseeable side-effect of a policy that is 
pursued for other reasons? Take, for example, the difference between a choice architect reducing the size 
of plates in school cafeterias in order to reduce calorie intake, versus her buying smaller plates because 
they are cheaper (and the money that is saved can be spent on some other educational need), but 
knowing that this would have the effect of reducing calorie intake. The permissibility of foreseeably, but 
not intentionally, influencing people’s behaviour requires further reflection, and is an issue that has, to the 
best of my knowledge, so far been neglected in the literature. I thank Kimberley Brownlee for drawing 
my attention to this issue. 
78 Wilkinson highlights that there is a question about “whether we should think of consenting as making a 
manipulative act not wrongful or making the act not manipulative at all” (2013: 353). Across all potential 
forms of manipulation, it seems possible – if not probable – that consent would prevent manipulation in 
some cases, while in others it would still count as manipulation but would not be objectionably 
manipulative. I need not take a stand on this issue, for our purposes. I simply accept what I take to be the 
less controversial of the two positions, namely, that any nudges that fall into the category of 
“appropriately consented-to manipulation” are not objectionably manipulative.    
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more detail below; but it is possible to outline two central aspects of the answer at this 
stage, given the nature of autonomy and its value to a human life defended above. First, 
there is no inconsistency in holding that a person’s autonomy entitles her knowingly to 
limit her own agency in certain ways and to some extent, and that this can be done for 
the sake of protecting or supporting her autonomy. Second, manipulative public nudges 
can be made consistent with autonomy only when the individual herself consents, and 
“not when other people do, in a democratic majority or not” (Wilkinson 2013: 354; see 
also Sunstein 2016a: 105-107).   
 
§4.3.2: (When) Is Choice Architecture Manipulative? 
We are now in a position to tackle the chapter’s central question head on: When are 
public nudges objectionably manipulative? Thus far we have established that nudges are 
impermissible in so far as they operate via psychological manipulative mechanisms. 
Critics object that nudging as a general purpose policy lever falls foul of this problem. A 
common characterisation of how nudges operate in the critical literature is that they 
“deliberately circumvent people’s rational and deliberating faculties, and instead seek to 
influence their choice through knowledge of the biases to which they are susceptible” 
(Grüne-Yanoff 2012: 636; emphasis added). The first part of the argument in favour of 
the conditional compatibility view rests on noticing an important ambiguity in this 
characterisation’s use of the term choice. On the one hand, it is common to regard a 
“choice” as the particular behaviour, among the set of the behaviour-options available 
to her, that a person in fact undertakes, regardless of the process by which this came 
about. On the other hand, “choice” is commonly used, especially within philosophical 
discussion, to refer to the behavioural outcome that follows from the deliberative 
process of a person making a decision, which requires some active deliberation on the 
options. We can call these two senses choice-as-behaviour and choice-as-decision, respectively. 
This draws on the two-system approach to understanding human cognition outlined in 
Chapter 2: the former, but not the latter, would include behavioural outcomes that 
result from the automatic processes of System 1 as choices. 
 It is clear from the way in which this common characterisation is formulated 
that critics mean choice-as-behaviour when they refer to “choice” because they depict 
nudges as interventions that necessarily and deliberately “circumvent people’s rational 
and deliberating faculties”. The core of the objectionably manipulative critique is that nudges 
are designed to push people in ways that “bypass [their] reasoning” (Conly 2013: 30). 
There are good grounds for raising this worry. PCA is designed specifically to affect our 
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automatic modes of thinking (i.e., System 1 processes). Nonetheless, our normative 
assessment needs to ensure that it does not adopt an overly simplistic view of the 
empirical research. To this end, it is crucial to recognise the interaction between the two 
cognitive systems. Kahneman is clear that his research is focused on “the workings of 
System 1 and the mutual influences between it and System 2” (2011: 13). While System 
1 can operate independently (which accounts for the evidence of automaticity), System 
2 operates on premises and in a context provided by System 1 thinking. So, even though 
nudges do not work directly on System 2 processes, it is possible to design choice 
architecture with the aim of engaging and/or influencing our more deliberative 
processes.79 Some accounts that share the main thrust of the common characterisation 
may be able to capture this subtler view. Hausman and Welch, for instance, describe 
nudging as “the use of flaws in human judgement and choice to influence behaviour” 
(2010: 124). On the distinction sketched above, the “flaws in human judgement” are 
biases that affect System 1 thinking, and we might specify the “flaws in […] choice” as 
those that affect System 2 processes. In both cases, behaviour can be influenced or 
manipulated; but there is a difference between doing this at the level of conscious 
deliberation and decision-making, and doing so at the level of automatic judgements.  
 This first distinction, then, allows us to distinguish between choice architecture 
designs that aim at influencing choice-as-behaviour, which we can call System 1 nudges, 
and those that aim at influencing choice-as-decision, System 2 nudges.80 An example of the 
former is reducing calorie intake, and thereby seeking to fight one of the main causes of 
obesity and its associated health risks, by decreasing portion sizes, packaging, and 
crockery. This change in the choice environment has been shown to affect people’s 
behaviour – i.e., their choice-as-behaviour about how much to consume at a particular 
sitting – but it does not do so by engaging any deliberative processes. Instead it brings 
about this behavioural change by enlisting or exploiting automatic cognitive processes. 
Consequently, when people reduce their calorie intake, it is as a result not of their 
responding to their own reasoning relating to consumption choices, but rather their 
responding behaviourally to the choice architect’s reasoning about how much they 
                                                          
79 There is an important distinction here, which will be drawn in more detail below, about the difference 
between seeking to engage deliberation and seeking to influence it. For now, the main point is that, in 
such cases, nudges could use insights from the cognitive and behavioural sciences to affect choice-as-
decision, and that this is something that does not fit with the idea that they seek intentionally to circumvent 
or bypass people’s rational or deliberative faculties. 
80 For a similar distinction between type 1 and type 2 nudges, see Hansen and Jespersen (2013). Sunstein 
also makes a distinction between System 1 and System 2 nudges in his experimental work (though, as is 
explained below, we understand it differently). 
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should be consuming. Another example would be the use of knowledge of the so-called 
middle-choice bias to direct people towards the option that the choice architect 
considers to be the best one. There is evidence that people tend to avoid the highest 
and lowest priced of a set of options; and a government could use this to design choice 
architecture that positions, e.g., the choice architect’s favoured health insurance option 
between a higher and a lower option as a means of taking advantage of this bias. Like 
the calorie-reduction technique above, this intervention seeks underhandedly to direct 
people’s practical reasoning. A third example of a System 1 nudge is the use of default 
rules. The principle upon which defaults work is that, since people often do not think 
enough about certain important issues such as saving for their pension or registering as 
an organ donor (or, if they do, sometimes fail to put this into action), it is good practice 
for policymakers to set a default option that will direct people’s behaviour in the way 
that is considered to be welfare-promoting. This decides on behalf of citizens how they 
will behave if or when they do not deliberate themselves. We see this in the case of 
efforts to change pension schemes from opt-in to automatic enrolment. The latter 
default is designed to take advantage of people’s inertia and status quo bias, meaning 
that outcomes are often not the result of any deliberative process by the target of the 
intervention. 
By contrast, an example (or, rather, a general category) of System 2 nudges is 
“active choosing” policies. Instead of automatically enrolling citizens into being organ 
donors, it is possible to design PCA that prompts citizens into considering whether or 
not to register as a donor at all and, if so, which organs they are willing to donate.81 This 
provides people with the opportunity to respond to their own reasoning on this issue, 
rather than offering a “one-size-fits-all” default. Another type of example is presenting 
nutritional information on food items using the “traffic light system”. This provides the 
same information as before, but does so in an accessible and noticeable way. This make 
it possible that this information will influence “the attention and premises of – and 
hence the behaviour anchored in – reflective thinking (i.e., choices), via influencing the 
automatic system” (Hansen and Jespersen 2013: 14).                      
This distinction allows us to make an initial point about what a concern for 
autonomy implies for choice architecture policy. At a broad level, autonomy supports 
                                                          
81 For a full discussion of the different types of nudging in the organ donor registration case, see MacKay 
and Robinson (2016). This is a nonpaternalistic nudge. I make reference to it here simply to provide an 
example of a System 2 nudge, since this general distinction (between System 1 and System 2 nudges) is 
relevant to both strands of the normative analysis. 
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nudges that improve people’s opportunity to make conscious and informed decisions, 
and it is hostile to nudges that merely aim to improve people’s behaviour by bypassing 
their deliberative capacities. This captures an important part of the truth; but in itself it 
is too simplistic, because it is possible, in principle at least, for System 1 nudges to take 
on an autonomy-supporting form and for System 2 nudges to take on an autonomy-
threatening form. First, a System 1 nudge could support an individual’s autonomy if she 
consents to it as a means of constraining her future behaviour in ways that ensure that it 
aligns with her considered judgements. This can support her autonomy by improving 
her responsiveness to her own reasoning. Second, although generally designed to 
support or increase a citizen’s capacity to exercise her own agency (Sunstein 2016b: 
129), there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of System 2 nudge – one of 
which is not supportive of autonomous agency. To see this, we might draw upon a 
distinction between directive and nondirective forms of influence.82 The relevant 
difference is between interventions that are designed with the intention of steering a 
person’s conscious deliberations in particular, content-dependent ways (we can call 
these directive System 2 nudges), and those that steer an individual towards deliberating 
on and choosing between options in a content-independent manner, that is, where no 
option is actively promoted (nondirective System 2 nudges). The latter category clearly 
provides an opportunity for, and indeed encourages, a person to be responsive to her 
own reasoning, since it does not take a stand on which putative reasons are sound.  
By contrast, there are concerns attendant on the use of their directive 
counterpart in public policy. The deliberate framing of information in certain ways, for 
the sake of steering a person’s conscious deliberations in a content-dependent direction, 
can be psychologically manipulative. Not all framed information provision is necessarily 
manipulative. An example of when it is involves the framing of cancer risks in relative, 
rather than absolute terms. A government might directively steer the deliberations of its 
(female) citizens about whether or not to have a mammogram by telling them that 
participating in screening reduces their risk of dying from breast cancer by 20%. The 
absolute figures tell a different story, however: screening reduces a person’s chance of 
dying from 5 in 1000 women without screening to 4 in 1000 with screening (Gigerenzer 
2015: 362). And, given that screening also comes with risks of false alarms and 
                                                          
82 I borrow this distinction from the literature on the philosophy of education. There is is used there to 
distinguish between teaching methods and practices that have the intention of persuading students about 
the truth or falsity of particular beliefs and disbeliefs and those with the intention of encouraging critical 
abilities and understanding (Hand 2008). 
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unnecessary biopsies (such that screening may be all things considered more risky than 
refraining from screening), the 20% figure manipulates the input into a person’s 
conscious deliberations and adversely affects her ability to discern the reasons that apply 
to her. Using behavioural insights to direct a person’s deliberation in a way that 
intentionally biases it in favour of a particular pre-defined option selected by the choice 
architect is manipulative. Such interventions share similar characteristics with not-
consented-to System 1 nudges (consider subliminal messaging as an extreme example). 
In both cases, the influence (i) is the intentional action of an external actor; (ii) 
outcome-focused, or directive, in nature; and (iii) acts on people in a way that means 
that outcomes are subject to having a (partially) covert explanation, because the true 
third-person explanation for a given choice, or at least a significant part of such an 
explanation, is hidden from the first-person perspective (Colburn 2011). 
 
§4.3.3: Two Kinds of (Presumptively) Impermissible Nudges 
Consequently, on my view, there are two main groups of PCA that are considered to be 
presumptively impermissible, where this means that there are weighty reasons to avoid 
these types of interventions.  
Most obviously, there should be a presumption against the use of System 1 
nudges in public policy, unless the appropriate consent has been given by the individual 
herself. This is because these interventions undermine a person’s independence in a way 
that fails to improve her capacity to appreciate and act on reasons that she identifies as 
her own. To clarify how expansive (or not) this presumption is, we need to return to the 
complex issue of what counts as appropriate consent in the case of consensual 
manipulation. Consent justifies certain instances of manipulation by allowing that these 
interferences do not involve a violation of personal autonomy. From this perspective, 
we can see that non-explicit forms of consent are problematic. Hypothetical consent, 
for instance, involves the judgement of another agent, a choice architect in this case, 
about when it is reasonable to believe that an individual would have consented had the 
opportunity to consent been present. One way in which this might be done is through a 
related type of consent called “collective consent”, which assumes that manipulative 
interventions might be democratically authorised in some way (Sunstein 2016a: 106). An 
example might come from citizens’ juries, which are a type of public consultation that 
bring together a hundred or so members of the public for a day with the purpose of 
briefing them in detail about a particular issue and asking this sample of the population 
for their views on how they think the government should proceed. It might be assumed 
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from this process that, if a majority of the citizens’ jury would consent to manipulative 
interventions, there is hypothetical consent (or “public permission”) from a majority of 
the population at large (Halpern 2015a: 330-331). There is, of course, value to such 
democratic practices; but it would be incorrect to think that an act of manipulation, i.e., 
manipulative PCA, can be made compatible with personal autonomy in this way. In 
order for System 1 nudges to be made compatible with autonomy, they would need to 
be explicitly consented to by individuals. In other words, they would need to be 
personalisable.  
The problem is that it is not clear how this could actually be achieved at the 
public policy level, at least without introducing other weighty problems. At the personal 
level, it is quite common for people to predict future irrationalities and motivational 
shortfalls, and to put irrationality- and temptation-defeating tools in place. Under 
certain conditions, this might be supported by PCA (more on this below, §4.4.2 on 
“auto-nudges”). Nonetheless, there is an important difference between these 
personalisable nudges and the personalised default rules that Sunstein claims are the “the 
wave of the future” (Sunstein 2013a: 10, 57). The latter are decided upon by choice 
architects, rather than being shaped by individuals. And this process of personalising 
default rules to different groups of people (“smart defaults”) or potentially even to each 
individual citizen (“persistent defaults” and “adaptive defaults”) raises serious concerns, 
which are separate from the problem of manipulation.83 These more extreme, 
individualised techniques are becoming increasingly feasible due to technological 
developments that have made it possible, and indeed now common, not only to collect 
huge amounts of data but to “mine” this data to ascertain personality traits 
(Chittaranjan et al. 2013). They would work by tracking a person’s past choices and 
creating default rules for her that are either based directly on those choices, or that 
involve a degree of extrapolation from those choices to other domains. If sufficient data 
is not available, it is still possible to use demographic and geographic data to create 
personalised defaults, whereby “[t]he general idea is that your default rules would track 
what would be best for ‘people like you’” (Sunstein 2013a: 55). There are further 
autonomy-based problems with these proposals (e.g., the Millian idea that the creation 
of what we might call personalised echo chambers undermines learning and 
development processes that are associated with being exposed to different possible 
options), as well as weighty independent concerns relating to information acquisition 
                                                          
83 For explanations of the three different kinds of personalised defaults, see Goldstein et al. 2008. 
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and privacy (especially in the case of the individualised defaults) and discrimination 
(especially in the case of the demographically-defined defaults). I take it that these 
points highlight that any such efforts to try to make default rules compatible with 
personal autonomy are not only likely to fail, but will also introduce additional reasons 
not to adopt System 1 nudges.  
The second kind of presumptively impermissible nudge is the category of 
directive System 2 nudge that seeks deliberately to present information in a way that 
undermines the conditions for informed decision-making and responsiveness to one’s 
own reasoning – as in the mammography example above. Like non-consented-to 
System 1 nudges, this category of influence objectionably manipulates people’s practical 
reasoning processes. There are two main aspects to this objectionableness. The first is 
that these interventions take a stand on people’s behalf about which specific putative 
reasons are sound or should be considered as weightiest in their deliberations. This is 
problematic within the prudential domain (or in the realm of what Halpern (2015a: 332) 
calls “lifestyle policy”). It means that they fall foul of the objectionably paternalistic critique 
due to their expression of a negative judgement about an individual’s ability to make the 
“right decision” or to manage the particular situation in a way that will effectively 
advance her own well-being. The second, compounding aspect is that they express this 
stand in an underhand manner. Whereas traditional paternalistic interventions have 
taken on the form of mandates and other types of coercive policies, the two sub-
categories of System 1 and System 2 nudges identified as presumptively impermissible 
fall foul of the objectionably manipulative critique, because they represent clear “risks to an 
agent’s control over her own deliberation” (Hausman and Welch 2010: 136).84 
                                                          
84 Can these nudges properly be said to threaten autonomy? One might argue that small denials of 
specific actions that are not attached to one’s central goals and relationships may not affect one’s 
autonomy at all (Raz 1986: 409-10). This may be true; in fact, it probably is. But psychologically 
manipulative nudges do not work by denying specific actions, i.e., by eliminating one option from the 
available option-set from which someone is able to choose. Rather, they adjust a person’s internal, 
psychological levers in order to steer their behaviour in a particular pre-selected direction. Sometimes this 
will be in ways that do not relate to a person’s central goals and relationships; many nudges, for instance, 
are directed towards influencing people’s everyday behaviours. But many nudges do in fact affect 
important life decisions that might have considerable effects for people’s central goals and relationships. 
For example, we have been (or will be) discussing nudge interventions that refer to cancer screening, 
health insurance schemes (particularly significant in the US context), pension plans, decisions about 
whether to have surgery, gambling addictions, whether or not one commits fraud, and so on. 
Manipulative nudges used in these domains cannot appeal to the idea that these are insignificant, everyday 
issues. But, to be clear, even in cases where the nudges affect more iterative, everyday decisions, such as 
food consumption choices, driving speeds, and so on, it would still affect people’s autonomy if these were 
designed in psychologically manipulative ways – especially if these kinds of interventions are pervasive 
throughout society, as is increasingly becoming the case. 
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Some might respond by questioning why, especially in the case of health policy 
for example, we should insist on autonomy as our main guiding value. They might say 
that health is a case which shows the limits of autonomy as a value, because, simply put, 
it is more important to live longer than it is to have an informed and reflective choice 
about one’s medical treatment. Isn’t it better for people overall, for instance, that they 
are manipulated into being screened for breast cancer, than possibly dying from it due 
to missing out on the opportunity for early detection (because of, e.g., inertia)? My main 
type of response to this question is to challenge the way that it sets up the problem. It is 
true that autonomy is only one value among many, and that it is possible that it could be 
defeated in certain cases – and perhaps in cases involving health care – because its value 
does not override all other well-being considerations. Assessing this issue properly 
would require a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of manipulative and non-
manipulative nudges (and other policy tools), and a value judgement on whether any 
additional effectiveness on the part of the former (if this is indeed shown to be the case) 
defeats the autonomy considerations. This judgement will rest on empirical information. 
But, given both that autonomy is a weighty value and that there will often be autonomy-
supporting nudge alternatives that are likely not to be considerably less effective than 
their manipulative counterparts (if at all), we might assume that such cases will be quite 
rare and, hence, that public policy ought not as a general rule to sacrifice autonomy.   
Another possible response, and one that has been offered by some in the 
literature, is that a transparency condition might alleviate the autonomy-threatening 
nature of these sorts of interventions. Thaler and Sunstein toy with this idea themselves 
as a response to the problem of manipulation (2009: 243-246). However, it is evident 
from both their brief discussion and the debate that has taken place since (e.g., Bovens 
2009; Wilkinson 2013; Blumenthal-Barby 2013; Hansen and Jespersen 2013) that 
whichever way one specifies this transparency condition it is not sufficient to address 
the autonomy-based concerns we have been discussing. Blumenthal-Barby makes this 
point in the following way: “disclosure and transparency is not enough to preserve 
[autonomy] since manipulation […] occurs not just when a person is influenced without 
knowing it, but when they are influenced via exploitation of the non-rational elements 
of their psychological makeup” (2013: 191). So, even if we would expect a transparency 
condition to accompany any use of nudging, such a condition clearly is not sufficient to 
justify manipulation – a point that Sunstein now explicitly recognises (2016a: 104).    
  
82 
 
We can think of this subsection as the negative statement of the conditional 
compatibility view that I am defending. The next section clarifies the contours of the view 
more precisely by stating it in positive terms.      
   
§4.4: Autonomy-Supporting Public Choice Architecture 
Contra the incompatibility claim, our inquiry has found that PCA is not necessarily 
problematic from the point of view of autonomy. In fact, it is possible that it might, in 
certain cases, be able to work as a form of autonomy support.85 There are two categories of 
PCA that may be able to play this autonomy-supporting role: the main one is 
nondirective System 2 nudges and the second is consented-to System 1 nudges. This 
section outlines both types of permissible choice architecture (in §4.4.2 and §4.4.3, 
respectively) and addresses the concern relating to the paternalistic nature of autonomy-
supporting choice architecture (§4.4.4). Before this, though, I wish to spell out in 
further detail the ethical rationale for interventions of this kind.  
   
§4.4.1: Justifying Autonomy Support 
Recall that we delineated two relevant threats to autonomy: the external threat from 
manipulation and the internal threat from cognitive bias that affect our reasoning 
processes. If there were a means of reducing the internal threat, we can assume that the 
political community would have normative reasons to support these kinds of policies. 
The hasty shift towards a wholesale acceptance (or rejection) of “liberal paternalist” 
policies has meant that policymakers have failed to recognise the opportunity presented 
by the empirical research, namely, the possibility of using these cognitive and 
behavioural insights to enhance the conditions necessary for autonomous decision-
making (Mitchell 2005: 1254-1257) and, as a result, for (one of) the conditions required 
for living well. As Rowson puts it: 
 
“The purpose of engaging with neural and behavioural sciences is to move away from a 
naïve perspective of freedom as unfettered individualism, towards an autonomy that is 
                                                          
85 Nagel and Reiner (2013) also use this term, but not necessarily in relation to nudging. For them, 
autonomy support refers to “a form of decisional enhancement – manipulations akin to traditional 
cognitive enhancement with the objective of improving the outcome of decisions – but one in which the 
improvement is more unambiguously aligned with the wants, needs, and desires of the decision makers 
themselves” (2013: 36-37). The way I use the term is similar, but is focused primarily on supporting the 
procedural aspects of autonomy, in particular, practical reasoning. For other views of how PCA might 
support autonomy, see Mills (2015) and Binder and Lades (2015).   
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grounded in informed self-awareness, including a deeper recognition of the social and 
biological conditions that define our actions.” (Rowson 2011: 19) 
 
Such a view needs to recognise that “[t]here is more one can do to help another person 
have an autonomous life than stand off and refrain from coercing or manipulating him” 
(Raz 1986: 407). Of course, these negative duties of non-interference are important; this 
is why the first part of the normative analysis has determined which forms of choice 
architecture are manipulative, so as to rule these nudges out as (presumptively) 
impermissible. But such an account tells us only what we ought not to do if we wish to 
respect people’s autonomy. As we recognised above, autonomy-as-self-authorship also 
provides a basis from which to justify the creation of the conditions for autonomous 
agency. Such agency is dependent on having certain cognitive and motivational 
capacities, and being able to exercise them. Although we do have Capacity, the empirical 
evidence (and the inclusion of Value) highlights that its development and exercise is not 
simply a given for humans. Riley recognises this when he states that: 
 
“We neither arrive in the world with this capacity, nor do we simply receive it as a 
constituent or effect of sheer physiological maturity. Its development in one of us is, 
rather, a contingent culturally-mediated social and individual accomplishment. Further, it 
also appears that reasoning capacities of this sort need the right kind of setting, stimulus 
and ongoing support in order both to develop and to stay in good working order.” (Riley 
2017: 8)  
 
This idea that autonomy is a (partly) social achievement is an important one. Perhaps 
the role for PCA in the development of personal autonomy is likely to be fairly minimal, 
relative to other kinds of interventions. But the point that I wish to defend is that PCA 
can have a role to play in providing the “right kind of setting, stimulus and ongoing 
support” for citizens’ exercise of their capacities for self-direction. It can do so by using 
the knowledge of cognitive bias and motivational shortfalls to design PCA that negates 
these internal threats to autonomy.  
This is all the more important within a context that has, in recent years, made 
this kind of supportive intervention more urgently needed. The same psychological 
evidence is being used by others within the political community to optimise their ability 
to capture our attention and to influence our beliefs and behaviour – the most 
problematic group of which Halpern refers to as “behavioural predators” (2015a: 312-
313). In addition, the general proliferation of information and media has “made it 
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harder for people to be intentional or reflective about their goals and priorities in life” – 
a phenomenon that has been referred to as a “crisis of distraction” (Williams 2013). 
Given that these conditions threaten the development and exercise of autonomy, 
adequately satisfying Respect requires first recognising that autonomy has “social and 
political conditions”, and then providing ways of designing (and regulating) these social 
and political conditions in ways that support it.  
This is importantly distinct from traditional autonomy-based liberal views. Most 
liberal thinkers tend either to assume that (adult) citizens are sufficiently able to reason 
and to translate this reasoning into action in the way required for autonomous agency, 
or they claim that the government should treat them as if they are able to do these 
things, regardless of whether this reflects the reality of the situation or not. However, 
the cognitive science literature implies that these hands-off versions of autonomy-based 
liberalism need either to be updated so that they treat seriously the threat of 
automaticity to the realisation of personal autonomy, or to be replaced by a conception 
that is able to do this. Some have indeed taken the second, more extreme route. Susan 
Hurley, for instance, argues in favour of moving towards “an ecological conception of 
liberalism”, contending that:  
 
“we should not try to shore up a traditional liberalism […] against the winds of 
empirically based change in our understanding of human minds. This nostalgic strategy 
does not provide much guidance to hopes for a liberal future, as the cognitive sciences 
continue to advance.” (Hurley 2011: 215) 
  
By contrast, this thesis takes the less (theoretically) ambitious first route. The remainder 
of this section outlines an account of autonomy-supporting PCA that treats seriously 
the threat of automaticity, arguing that, given the value of autonomy to a human life, 
the political community has normative reasons to support these kinds of nudge policies. 
That is, it argues both that state autonomy-supporting nudging does not wrong its 
target, and that there are pro tanto reasons for the state to engage in it. There is a separate 
question about whether or not there is a moral requirement that the state engage in 
autonomy-supporting nudging.86 Such a requirement is possible in principle, on my 
view, but, in line with the thesis’s principal aim, I focus on providing an account of 
                                                          
86 Some have argued that not providing these enabling conditions would, in some cases at least, be unjust. 
According to Riley, it would count as a particular type of epistemic justice, which he labels “reflective 
incapacitational injustice” (2017: 9). I do not make this type of stronger claim.   
  
85 
 
permissible PCA, since the assessment of moral requirement is partially dependent on 
further facts.    
 
§4.4.2 “Nudge-Autonomy” 
The first, and the main, component of the conditional compatibility view is those 
System 2 nudges that fall into the category of what I will call the nudge-autonomy 
mechanism. We can imagine a range of nudges whose explicit purpose is to promote 
self-conscious deliberation. The aim of such interventions is to enable people to make 
their own (sometimes more informed) decisions by activating the cognitive resources of 
System 2 thinking. The impetus for this type of intervention is captured by Waldron’s 
(2015) sentiment: “I wish […] that I could be made a better chooser rather than having 
someone on high take advantage (even for my own benefit) of my current 
thoughtlessness and my shabby intuitions”. There are two distinct but related ways in 
which PCA might support this process.  
 The first is via the use of active choosing policy designs, which nudge an individual 
towards deliberating on and choosing between options in a way that does not actively 
promote any particular option. It is possible to set up “choice prompts” (Mills 2015: 
502) in policy areas where it is thought that people are likely to suffer from cognitive 
biases or motivational shortfalls, or where other influences may be exerting (potentially) 
unwanted pressure on their choices. Instead of using choice architecture to control 
people’s automatic responses, therefore, active choosing employs it for the purpose of 
enabling citizens to regain control over their own practical reasoning processes and its 
resultant behaviour. Instead of automatically enrolling people into a health insurance 
plan, for instance, a public university might ask people when they start their contract to 
indicate whether they want health insurance and, if so, which plan they want – the 
default one or a plan that is more specific to their own needs and circumstances.  
The second is via salient information provision, which works by presenting relevant 
fact-based information in a salient form with the aim of triggering deliberation and 
making a person’s reasoning and resultant decisions more informed. In other words, 
information can be provided so that it is noticed and absorbed by System 1 in a way 
that directly engages or activates System 2 thinking. In such cases, our System 1 “calls 
on System 2 to support more detailed and specific processing that may solve the 
problem of the moment” (Kahneman 2011: 24), essentially asking it what should be 
done in light of this information. Consider again the example of the traffic light system 
for displaying nutritional information on food items. This works by presenting health 
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information in a format that makes it both easier to notice and evaluate. As a result, it 
can both improve people’s comprehension and increase decision-making opportunities 
by activating people’s deliberation about their food choices.87 By engaging people’s 
conscious processes, these System 2 nudges can help people better to recognise and 
consider the reasons that they believe apply to them and to translate these reasons into 
suitable behaviour. Contrary to a common criticism, such processes need not be 
cognitively burdensome. 
The “Ambient Orb” also works in a similar way. This is a technology that 
utilises the ability of the brain to perceive information without any apparent cognitive 
load. It works by providing feedback on energy consumption by glowing red when lots 
of energy is being used and green when energy use is modest, where this range is set by 
the user herself (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 206). The Orb creatively makes users aware 
of information that is otherwise invisible to them. This does not bring about any 
automatic behavioural changes, but rather provides System 1 with information that 
causes it to activate System 2 (in the case of it glowing red, at least). The user can then 
‘check’ whether this data is problematic or whether there are good reasons behind it. In 
the case where the user deems that energy use is unnecessarily high, she is able to take 
measures to reduce consumption, perhaps by unplugging devices that are fully charged, 
turning off lights in rooms that are empty, switching off computers or other devices 
that are not currently, and so on. This has been shown to be effective at reducing 
energy consumption by 40% in peak periods.    
 
§4.4.3 “Auto-Nudge” 
The second component of the conditional compatibility view is the category of 
appropriately consented-to System 1 nudges, which I call the auto-nudge mechanism 
(shorthand for “autonomous-nudge”). Auto-nudges reverse the sequence outlined 
above: rather than using System 1 processes to engage System 2 thinking, the auto-
                                                          
87 Within obesogenic environments, there are good reasons to make nutritional information salient as a 
means of counteracting the fact that unhealthy choices are easier to make than healthy ones in these 
contexts. In 2009, “almost a quarter of adults in England were classified as obese and three in ten 
children aged between two and 15 were classified as either obese or overweight”. As one expert 
(Professor Baldwin) puts it, “the explanation for [this rise in obesity] is plainly not to be found in a 
collapse of personal responsibility” (House of Lords 2011: 52-53). All of the witnesses asked by the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Behaviour Change agreed that “the evidence demonstrated that 
those labels which included traffic light colours were better understood by consumers than those 
without” (ibid.: 55). And this increased comprehension has been shown to affect consumer behaviour: 
two large supermarket chains, Asda and Sainsbury’s, provided the Committee with evidence that the 
introduction of traffic light labelling had led to a decrease in sales of those products with red (denoting 
“unhealthy”) on the label.   
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nudge mechanism uses System 2 thinking to predict future irrationalities and 
motivational shortfalls in order to put System 1-based nudges in place to ensure that 
behaviour is responsive to one’s reasoning about a particular issue. The central idea is 
that an individual, by cultivating an “informed self-awareness, including a deeper 
recognition of the social and biological conditions that define our actions” (to recall 
Rowson’s words), might be able to regain control over or reconfigure her automatic 
behaviour, thereby effectively training her automatic responses to come more in to line 
with her own reflective reasoning about how she wants to live. This process has been 
referred to as “proactive habituation” (Rowson 2011: 26). We do this in our personal 
lives, and now increasingly so with the help of technology; but it is also possible for 
PCA to provide ways of supporting this process.88  
There are two distinct but related (and potentially overlapping) ways in which 
the auto-nudge mechanism might work in practice. The first, which we have touched on 
briefly already, is via personalisable default rules. Such tools are only now starting to be 
developed, but BI Ventures – a part of the BIT – has recently launched a service that 
fits into this category. “Promptable” is a behaviourally-informed texting platform that 
has been designed with the aim of boosting attendance and grades at further education 
colleges (within the UK educational context in particular). One function of Promptable 
is that it allows the students themselves to decide whether or not they want to nominate 
two ‘Study Supporters’, and who they would like these people to be. If they do so, these 
elected supporters – be they a parent, older sibling, other relative, a friend, and so on –
receive personalised text messages from the college at regular intervals, which allows 
them to initiate conversations with the student about their studies. The additional social 
support triggered by these text messages has been shown to have a significant positive 
effect on both attendance and exam performance (Groot et al. 2017).89 Importantly, it is 
a type of PCA that the person themselves can opt into and can personalise.   
The second is institutional commitment devices. Commitment devices provide a 
means by which an individual can lock herself into a course of action which (she 
foresees or fears) she might not otherwise choose, but which aligns with her reasoning 
                                                          
88 Institutional support may be helpful because it is often difficult to sustain this re-habituation process 
ourselves. Recent research has shown that there is a neurological basis for this. It is difficult for people to 
sustain enthusiasm for behaviour changes they initiate, such as a new diet or exercise regime, because the 
rapid-firing of the two groups of neurons (in the ‘ventral tegmental’ and ‘substantia nigra pars compacta’ 
areas of the brain) that are critical for reinforcing the formation of new kinds of behaviour on account of 
the dopamine they release, gradually fall back to baseline after a certain number of iterations. So although 
we initially get “dopamine rewards that reinforce the forming of a novel habit”, after a short time this 
reward wanes, leaving us reliant on our “scarce and depletable” willpower (Rowson 2011: 26).  
89 See Appendix F for a list of example text messages to supporters (Groot et al. 2017: 36).  
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about how she would like to act in this given circumstance (Offer 2006). One example 
of this type of PCA already in use as an institutional commitment device is that of 
voluntary gambling self-exclusion. In the UK, this programme is called “Opt-in to Self-
Exclude”. This offers a simple-to-use multi-operator self-exclusion scheme for those 
“who think they have a problem with gambling and want help to stop”.90 It provides a 
means by which such individuals can take back control of their lives through the re-
habituation of their automatic cognitive processes. It lasts a minimum of six months, 
which ensures sufficient time for this reprogramming process to occur. It is possible to 
opt-in to this scheme online, which reduces the various costs attached to doing so, and 
it can be personalised depending on the type of gambling activities one is wanting to 
control.91 This type of policy offers a promising template from which to formulate other 
kinds of pre-commitment-based auto-nudges.  
 Auto-nudges, in one way at least, seem at odds with the responsiveness-to-
reasoning conception of autonomy, given that this conception emphasises the 
importance of the reasoning process to autonomous agency. This conception does not, 
however, require that an individual is continually choosing in a reflective way. As long 
as an individual is consensually nudged into acting in a way that conforms with the 
outcome of an earlier reasoning process, it is consistent with their autonomy to be 
nudged merely to behave (a System 1 nudge) rather than being nudged into deliberative 
choosing (the nudge-autonomy System 2 nudges). To clarify and to relate back to the 
earlier point on transparency, mere knowledge of the fact that this is occurring is not 
sufficient. In the cases that I am describing here, an individual has herself acted in some 
way – by actively personalising a default rule or establishing some other kind of pre-
commitment – so as to steer or constrain her own (future) behaviour. As Hurley puts it, 
informed or self-aware agents “can accept and use lower level rational influences as 
ways of acting on their own reasons, deliberately delegating control to handy automatic 
processes in ways that further their goals” (2011: 214). This recognises the fact that 
being responsive to reasoning requires not only exercising the capacity to reason, but 
also exercising “self-control to hold to his deliberate decision” (Mill 2005: 71). This 
form of “motivational scaffolding”, if you will, works in the same way as “Ulysses 
                                                          
90 This quotation is taken from the programme’s website, http://optintoselfexclude.info. 
91 For example, one is able to find on one webpage the opt-in details for self-excluding from arcades, 
betting shops, bingo venues, casinos, and online (remote) gambling. (One problem is that if an individual 
has a general gambling addiction, there would be quite a lot of administration involved in joining all of 
these separately-run self-exclusion schemes.)  
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contracts”, which are widely recognised as being compatible with autonomy (for 
discussion of this, see Elster 2000 and Radoilska 2012).  
 
§4.4.4: Autonomy-Supporting Nudge Paternalism 
The central aim of both nudge-autonomy and auto-nudge is to correct or eliminate 
some kind of cognitive bias or motivational shortfall so as to enable people to act in 
ways that are more responsive to their own reasoning, and therefore more autonomous, 
than they would have otherwise been. In contrast to the two impermissible forms of 
nudging, it is the agent, and not the choice architect, who is ultimately guiding her 
behaviour in both cases. Consequently, these forms of PCA are compatible with 
autonomy and secure the main thrust of the argument for the conditional compatibility 
view.  
Recall, nevertheless, that there were two kinds of incompatibility view – one 
based on the objectionably manipulative critique and another on the objectionably paternalistic 
critique. In order to complete the argument in favour of my conditional compatibility 
view, it is necessary to demonstrate that the account of autonomy-supporting choice 
architecture that I have set out does not fall foul of either kind of critique. Evidently, 
the main focus here will be on the second critique, from objectionable paternalism, 
given both: (i) that we have assessed the charge of manipulation in some detail and did 
not find anything there to concern us with respect to what we are now calling the 
nudge-autonomy and auto-nudge mechanisms of influence, and (ii) that I am referring 
to my account as a form of nudge paternalism, which draws the question about whether 
or not it is paternalistic in an objectionable sense. It will come as no surprise that I will 
be arguing that autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism is neither objectively 
manipulative nor objectively paternalistic. Nonetheless, arguing against the potential 
criticisms that could be levelled at my account helps to clarify some of its more subtle 
details and to give the fullest statement of the view possible. 
 Let’s address the concern from manipulation first. Situational manipulation in 
itself is not objectionable manipulation; it becomes objectionable if it includes elements 
of psychological manipulation (which have not been actively consented to). Some might 
worry that the nudge-autonomy mechanism (but not the auto-nudge mechanism) 
crosses this boundary by attempting to intervene with the way in which people arrive at 
choices. More explicitly, the concern is that it essentially tricks people into thinking 
harder about their behaviour. The thought here is that these types of nudges deliberately 
act on System 1 thinking in a way that manipulatively steers people’s practical reasoning 
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processes towards reflecting on a given issue. After all, these interventions have been 
designed to be processed by filters in certain ways and not others (Levy 2017). There 
are two kinds of responses to this concern. The first is to highlight that, even if we 
accept that this is a kind of psychological manipulation, albeit in an attenuated form, it 
does not offend against, but rather is supportive of, autonomy – which is the value that 
provides the normative foundations for the concern about psychological manipulation 
in the first place. The second response, however, shows that we do not need to accept 
this charge: once one has an empirically sensitive understanding of the reasoning 
processes that autonomy-as-self-authorship seeks to protect and promote, it becomes 
clear that influencing the attention and premises of reflective thinking via influencing 
our automatic processes does not count as an instance of bypassing the deliberative 
capacities of agents in any way. As Levy highlights, these “filters” are not an obstacle to 
reasoning, but are “partially constitutive of reasoning in normal functioning adults”, which 
means that “designing arguments to appeal to them is not bypassing reasoning, but 
appealing directly to it” (2017: 4). 
 This deals with the objectionably manipulative critique. But, in doing so, it may 
have clarified that the real problem is not to do with how the nudge-autonomy 
mechanism operates, but rather with the attitude towards people’s agency that it 
represents. We have already noted that autonomy is compatible with certain forms of 
paternalism, and we can assume that autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism fits into 
this category (see fn. 58 and 61 above). What those who are concerned with paternalism 
tend to worry about is that paternalistic interventions, even when they are autonomy-
enhancing, issue from a negative judgement on the part of the paternalist about the 
target’s ability to exercise her own agency (e.g., Quong 2010; Shiffrin 2000: 214). 
Interventions based on such judgements, then, necessarily involve a disrespectful 
attitude and set up a relationship of superior (i.e., the paternalist, and in this case, the 
choice architect) to inferior (i.e., the target of the intervention). It is this distrust of an 
individual’s agency combined with the assumption that their own judgement is superior 
that makes the paternalist’s actions wrong. Do the nudges included in the account of 
autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism express this motivational wrong?  
 Some might worry that they do, arguing that the main motivation for this 
version of nudge paternalism is that, in some situations, people make poor choices and 
that, with the help of choice architects guiding them in various ways, they will be able to 
make better (viz. more autonomous) decisions. It is worth noting that there is an 
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ambiguity here between two versions of this challenge, in particular, between a 
comparative and a noncomparative reading (Moles 2015: 652). On the former, nudge 
paternalism would be considered a comparative wrong because it treats some people as 
having less ability to exercise their autonomous agency, due to their cognitive biases and 
so on, than someone else. This version of the objection can be addressed by noticing 
that there need be nothing in the choice architect’s motivation that involves the claim 
that she is better than the intervention’s target population in any respect. As Moles 
highlights, her alleged superiority “is fully explained by the (cognitive) situation in which 
she finds herself” (2015: 653). Her actions are motivated by the recognition that the 
targets of the intervention are “currently in a context or state where people (including 
[the choice architect herself]) happen to make frequent mistakes in instrumental 
reasoning” (Coons and Weber 2013: 13).  
The noncomparative reading, in contrast, views nudge paternalism as wrong 
because it is motivated by the claim that a person simply lacks the relevant capacities of 
autonomous agency, without any further claim about other people’s superior abilities in 
this regard (e.g., Carter 2011). This version is less forceful than its comparative 
counterpart, it seems to me. It can be addressed by noticing that Capacity does not 
specify the extent to which citizens are able to exercise the capacities required for 
autonomous agency – only that they can and sometimes do. It does not, for instance, 
specify that people are always, in every occasion, able to exercise the capacities of 
reasoning and self-control. If we accept a less demanding version, which takes into 
account the empirical evidence about the kinds of particular contexts in which people in 
general are likely to be subject to, e.g., a cognitive bias that makes it more difficult for 
them to be responsive to their own reasoning, then it seems that any negative 
judgement that may be made by the paternalist would not be a judgement about any 
particular agent but would be located, rather, “at the level of human cognitive 
architecture” (Moles 2015: 653-654).92  
 Accordingly, autonomy-supporting PCA is paternalistic, but not objectionably 
so. It does not express disrespect for people’s ability to run their own lives; rather, it 
takes account of human cognitive limitations in a way that respects the value that comes 
with further developing and exercising the capacities relating to autonomy-as-self-
authorship. As Begon highlights, in the wake of recent developments and trends in the 
literature on paternalism (including, but not limited to, arguments justifying nudge 
                                                          
92 Arneson makes the same point: “The negative judgement involved in paternalistic action may be due to 
deficiencies acknowledged to be common to all of us” (2016: 609).  
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paternalism), there is no longer any straightforward debate to be had between the 
traditional rivalling factions of “paternalists” and “anti-paternalists” (2016: 355). The 
account I have developed is an example of this more complex conceptual landscape.93  
The essence of paternalism is that “(1) it aims to close an option or make a 
choice for a person and (2) it is intended for the person’s own good” (Clarke 2006: 
117). Clearly, autonomy-supporting nudges are intended for the person’s own good. 
They are grounded in, and justified by, the view that part of living well is to live one’s 
life in an active sense, and that support for autonomous agency is valuable because it 
secures this good, as well as valuable in the instrumental sense that people are more 
likely to decide and act in ways that align with other elements of their well-being. So the 
issue that needs addressing concerns (1); let’s see how the two mechanisms fare in this 
respect. Auto-nudges do close options, but do so as a form of voluntarily consented-to 
self-paternalism (or what Husak (1980: 43) calls “paternalism towards oneself”).94 And 
nudge-autonomy does, in a minimal sense at least, make a choice for an individual. The 
important point here is that the choice about how to act in a given situation is not made 
on behalf of this individual. Nudge-autonomy interventions do not involve, as Gerald 
Dworkin’s definition of paternalism specifies, “a usurpation of decision-making”, even 
though they might count as, in one sense, “interfering with the way in which they arrive 
at their decisions” (1988: 123). The choice that is made for an individual is the one that 
it would be better to engage in some sort of conscious deliberation about how she 
might want to act in this given situation. The interference, therefore, comes in the form 
of nudging the person towards active decision-making, rather than usurping her 
decision-making.95 Within the standard conceptual framework, this makes my account a 
form of soft paternalism (Feinberg 1989).          
                                                          
93 It is possible that this traditional paternalist framework is not the best way to describe the dynamics at 
work here. There is conceptual work being carried out that seeks to think through the implications of 
adopting a more socio-ecological approach to the conditions of personal autonomy, given that the classic 
paternalist/anti-paternalist framework seems unable to capture some of the more subtle complexities in 
these discussions. One suggestion has been to introduce the concept of maternalism (Specker Sullivan and 
Niker 2017). I do not pursue this any further here, but raise it to note that conceptual work is being done 
which may, in time, begin better to capture these more nuanced dynamics. 
94 Auto-nudges aim to do precisely the opposite of “preventing people from doing what they have 
decided”, which is the relevant aspect of Dworkin’s definition of paternalism (1988: 123; more on this 
below). 
95 Active choosing policies that require decision-making (rather than simply prompting it) are the most 
paternalistic in this sense, because they also rule out the option of “choosing not to choose” (Sunstein 
2015). Sunstein calls this “choice-requiring paternalism” (Sunstein 2017: 12). Some might think that this 
stronger version of the nudge-autonomy mechanism has a hint of the “forced-to-be-free” paradox about 
it. This may give us a reason to favour weaker, prompted choice versions of active choosing. But, in 
certain circumstances, prompted choice designs may not be possible or feasible, and required choice 
designs would be desirable. In such cases, it is not clear that autonomy is undermined at all.  
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Someone might accept the foregoing analysis, agreeing that there are non-
manipulative forms of choice architecture, that these might be used to support personal 
autonomy in certain circumstances, and that this would be a good thing; but they might, 
nonetheless, hold the view that it would be wrong for the state to play any active role in 
creating and maintaining the social conditions that help citizens better to exercise 
autonomous agency. This is the challenge from anti-perfectionism: it charges my view with 
stepping over the line of what it is appropriate for the state to do by acting on reasons 
that have to do with promoting particular activities or ways of life on grounds relating 
to their intrinsic value (Quong 2011: 27). It is true, and not a regrettable feature in my 
view, that it does this with respect to its aim to support personal autonomy.  
It is important to recognise, nonetheless, that my account represents a kind of 
procedural liberal perfectionism, if you will – a view that is elsewhere described by anti-
perfectionists as “restricted neutrality” (Clayton 1993: 105).96 The interventions that it 
recommends do not rest on the idea that it is the government’s responsibility to steer 
people in any particular content-dependent way. It recommends that interventions (and 
here the focus is on nudge-autonomy interventions) should be designed as forms of 
content-independent influence, which refrain from taking a stand on which putative 
reasons are sound. By this I mean that the government should not be motivated to 
establish something like the traffic light system to steer people towards making particular 
reflective and informed choices; rather, the autonomy-based reason in favour of this 
nudge is that it gets individuals to make more reflective and informed choices that are 
more likely to align with their own preferences and goals, regardless of whether it 
improves their chances of choosing healthy food.97 It maintains that the ability and 
opportunity to choose for oneself “is a good that is independent of the wisdom of what 
is chosen” (Dworkin 1971: 117), and it is this good that nudge-autonomy seeks to 
promote. The identification of autonomy with responsiveness to one’s own reasoning is 
therefore compatible with the idea that different ways of life are rational and valuable 
for different people, so that, as Swift points out, “a state helps its members towards 
                                                          
96 On Clayton’s view, restricted neutrality prohibits the state from promoting, on the basis of certain 
reasons, ideals of living well that involve a more determinate content than that they are chosen and 
pursued autonomously (1993, 2006). On this kind of view, it would be possible to understand my account 
as anti-perfectionist, because it seeks only to promote what Colburn terms the “second-order” value of 
autonomy (2010: 50).   
97 Of course, these may overlap (and it may even be likely that they will do so).   
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freedom […] by doing what it can to help them to live in ways that are rational for 
them, as the individuals they are” (2006: 84).98  
 
§4.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an answer to the question: If we care about autonomy, is 
nudging for the sake of improving the target’s well-being ever permissible? It has argued 
that nudges motivated by this concern are permissible, but only when they meet certain 
autonomy-based conditions: first, that they activate deliberative choosing without 
steering it in particular, content-dependent ways (the nudge-autonomy mechanism); and, 
second, if they work at the non-deliberative level, that they are accepted by the agent as 
a way of acting on her own reasons (the auto-nudge mechanism). These conditions rule 
out several forms of nudge paternalism that are accepted as permissible on the standard 
account offered by nudge advocates.  
This account of autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism provides an answer to 
only one part of the thesis’s overall question, however, because it concerns a specifically 
motivated subset of choice architecture, namely, that aimed (only) at the promotion of 
its target’s well-being. There is another main motivation for PCA that requires our 
consideration if we are to provide a full answer to the thesis’s question. This relates to 
the issue of modifying the behaviour of an individual for the sake of others. This second 
strand of analysis is the focus of the next chapter. 
  
                                                          
98 I take it that these claims are supported by the fact that Moles’s normative analysis of nudging includes 
autonomy-promotion as “justified within an anti-perfectionist framework” (2015: 645; see pp. 664-667 
for the full relevant discussion).    
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5. Nudging as a Means of Moral Improvement  
 
This chapter explores whether the political community can ever permissibly use choice 
architecture as a means of moral improvement and, if so, under what conditions. Its 
principal aim is to defend the view that there are a number of ways – including but by 
no means confined to those that aid the fulfilment of enforceable duties – in which 
choice architecture might permissibly be used to support the moral improvement of 
citizens. Systematic normative assessment of this moralising potential has been 
neglected in the literature. Thus, this chapter offers, to the best of my knowledge, the 
first full examination of nudging’s moralising effects and the role that such effects might 
play within a theory of the political morality of public choice architecture (PCA).  
It begins by showing how the normative analysis carried out in this chapter goes 
beyond the contours both of the standard accounts of nudging and of the existing 
debates over moral improvement (§5.1). After characterising moral improvement and 
considering how we might justify governmental efforts at bringing it about (§5.2), the 
chapter sets out an account of the conditions under which nudging for this purpose is 
morally permissible. This investigation is comprised of two parts. The first (and shorter) 
part examines the conditions under which it would be desirable to use moral nudges, of 
the kind deemed impermissible in the previous chapter, to secure conformity with 
enforceable duties (§5.3). The second (and main) part develops a detailed account of 
when moral nudges, principally of the kind deemed permissible in the previous chapter, 
might be used as a means of solving problems associated with nonenforceability. It sets 
out three kinds of interventions that are permissible, in part because they support agents 
in developing and exercising morally responsible agency (§5.4).   
 
§5.1: Introducing Moral Nudges 
Earlier in the thesis we drew an important distinction between two different kinds of 
motivation for using public nudges and their associated grounds of justification. In 
essence, the political community might seek to change an individual’s behaviour either 
for the sake of improving her own well-being or for the sake of protecting the interests 
of others. The analysis carried out so far has focused on the former only. The 
motivation that interests us here concerns the use of nudge interventions to influence 
an individual’s beliefs or behaviour in ways that aim to bring it into compliance or 
  
96 
 
conformity with moral reasons and norms – an aim I will label moral improvement.99 As 
you would expect, this shift in the motivation for intervening activates a different set of 
normative concerns – or, more precisely, adds further considerations into the analysis 
that we have carried out already – which require careful, separate examination. In 
particular, efforts at moral improvement might be carried out for the sake of preventing 
harm to others (which raises questions about what is meant by harm-prevention), or 
they might be directed towards helping the target of these efforts to live well (which 
raises questions about the ways in which this might be so), or both (which raises 
questions about how to weigh the two considerations). This complex issue is the focus 
of the present chapter.  
Before embarking on this inquiry, it is worth noting its novelty within the 
relevant philosophical literatures. Surprisingly, there has been very little discussion of 
how the permissibility of nudge interventions is affected by the different reasons that 
the state may have to intervene. That is, despite sustained empirical interest in whether 
and to what extent other-regarding nudges can bring about the desired behaviour 
change (e.g., increases in organ donation registration, charitable giving, pro-
environmental behaviour, and so on), there has been very little discussion of whether 
and why we should employ these techniques, as distinct from the debate concerning 
their paternalistically-motivated counterpart.100 This oversight is largely due, it would 
seem, to the fact that the most prominent nudge proponents, Sunstein and Thaler, have 
assumed a particular theory of political morality in their arguments which fails to 
discriminate satisfactorily between moral and nonmoral (i.e., prudential) reasons for 
intervention. According to their account nudges are justified when they increase social 
welfare, as determined by a more or less sophisticated cost-benefit analysis (Sunstein 
2014a, 2016a). The first task of this section is to briefly outline this view and to explain 
why it is unable adequately to account for the normative concerns raised by the 
distinction between the self- and other-regarding considerations (§5.1.1). Seeing this 
opens up the possibility of a distinct category of PCA motivated not by improving 
                                                          
99 There is a burgeoning debate in the literature about “moral enhancement”. I elect not to use this term 
because it is now associated with a specific means, namely, moral bioenhancement (see §5.1.2 for more 
on this; Raus et al. 2014: 265). For this reason, the broader term, “moral improvement”, is better able to 
capture a range of potential means with moralising effects without biasing the debate at all. (There 
remain, of course, important questions about what precisely constitutes moral improvement. These are 
addressed in §5.2.1.)    
100 Notable exceptions include Moles (2015) and Krishnamurthy (2015). The former offers an argument 
about when nudging is permissible within an anti-perfectionist framework, which includes using nudges 
for the purpose of increasing conformity with the principles of justice; the latter offers a more focused 
argument about whether we should employ nudges for the sake of global poverty alleviation. 
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social welfare as such, but by improving people’s moral attitudes and conduct. 
Interestingly, this potential has been neglected in the debates over moral enhancement, 
as well as those about nudging. Hence, the section’s second task is to briefly detail how 
the burgeoning literatures relating to moral improvement, most notably the debates 
over moral enhancement, have also overlooked the role that choice architecture might 
play (§5.1.2). The main aim of this section, then, is to highlight how this chapter both 
extends the nudge debate and brings it into innovative and productive contact with 
other burgeoning literatures.  
   
§5.1.1: Moving Beyond Social Welfarism 
As many have noted, including Sunstein and Thaler themselves (2003), several of the 
classic examples of nudges, to name a few – such as those related to tax fraud, organ 
donation, and pro-environmental behaviour – do not fit easily in the overarching 
normative policy programme of nudge paternalism into which they were originally 
embedded. This is because these interventions are not “motivated by the claim that the 
person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm”, which is a central part of 
classic definitions of paternalistic intervention (Dworkin 2017; emphasis added).101 
Despite acknowledging this tension, nudge proponents have failed to offer any explicit 
account of how we should think about these kinds of cases. We can nonetheless 
reconstruct the type of account that underpins their views from the little they do say 
relating to their underlying theory of political morality. 
 On what grounds should we assess whether the political community is 
permitted to design PCA in ways that, say, discourage tax fraud or ensure that hiring 
decisions are not made on the basis of racial or sexist biases? Similarly, on what should 
we base our claims about whether states can permissibly nudge their citizens into 
registering as organ donors, giving to international aid charities to alleviate severe 
poverty, or reducing their carbon emissions and energy use to combat climate change? 
One view (and the view that we are reconstructing here) is that interventions of this 
kind are justified when – and because – they increase social welfare.  
                                                          
101 As one commentator writes, “This ambiguity regarding just whose lives and interests are at stake in 
libertarian paternalism goes to the heart of Sunstein’s project and raises deep questions about his 
proposal” (Kelly 2014: 180). Like Kelly, I think that this ambiguity represents a “fundamental lack of 
clarity” in the philosophical basis of the project. In their earliest work, Sunstein and Thaler very briefly 
distinguish “libertarian benevolence” from their main “libertarian paternalist” project, stating that it could 
be a complement to this project (2003: 1162). But this idea is not developed, or even mentioned in any 
detail, in their later co-authored work (Thaler and Sunstein 2009), or in Sunstein’s more recent work 
(2014a, 2016a).  
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Clearly, people’s actions sometimes have adverse third-party effects. On an 
economistic view, these negative “externalities” are considered to be a type of market 
failure (Bator 1958), namely, a situation in which an individual’s pursuit of her self-
interest leads to results that are inefficient from the societal point of view. Sunstein’s 
more developed work relating to the permissibility of choice architecture makes explicit 
use of this market-failure framework (see, e.g., Sunstein 2014a: 16-17; Sunstein 2016a: 
19-20, 31-32). It is as a result of this that he calls the category of nudges that are 
“designed to prevent people from harming others” externality-reducing nudges (2016a: 159). 
The central claim of this view is: If we take social welfare to be “the master concept” 
(Sunstein 2014a: 18) and accept that “it is perfectly legitimate for government to 
respond to market failures” (Sunstein 2016a: 32), then externality-reducing nudges 
should not be especially controversial in principle. The only issue to which we need to 
attend is whether or not such interventions would increase social welfare more 
effectively than alternative policy levers, according to a cost-benefit analysis.102 We 
might call the justificatory framework for policies of this sort nudge social welfarism (see 
Korobkin 2009 for a similar view).  
 In the first instance, it is not clear why we should take an economistic approach 
to this political-philosophical issue regarding the permissibility of government 
intervention. But we might put this critique aside for now and try to engage with the 
underlying philosophical premises of the view. The thought seems to be a familiar one 
that it is permissible to interfere with a citizen’s behaviour, and to do so against his will, 
in order to prevent harm to others (Mill 2005: 13) – where, in this case, the harmful 
effects on others are understood as those wrought by negative externalities. However, 
we need to recognise an important distinction relating to ways of understanding harm. 
Feinberg distinguishes between two notions of harm: (i) the broader, non-normative 
notion understands it in terms of setbacks to interests, while (ii) the narrower, 
                                                          
102 It is for this reason that Sunstein focuses his attention on paternalistic cases, since these are the ones 
that he believes pose the hardest and most interesting normative questions (2016a: 54). The ultimate goal 
is the same in these cases: social welfare. In actions that affect only the person himself, social welfare is 
increased when his welfare is promoted. But, in these types of cases, considerations about welfare-
promotion are more complicated than in cases of externality-reducing nudges, according to Sunstein, for 
two main reasons. First, an individual’s well-being is promoted when it is steered in the direction that she 
would want to go, rather than in directions that reduce externalities. Second, whether or not an 
individual’s well-being is promoted depends in part on the way in which the intervention affects her and 
whether or not it offends against her subjective desire for freedom of choice in that domain, since there 
will often be a welfare loss attached to manipulative means of welfare-promotion (though this is not 
necessarily decisive). In paternalistic cases, interventions are justified by the presence of a so-called 
“behavioural market failure” (Sunstein 2014a: 16 and 2016a: 19-20; emphasis added). Sunstein uses this 
analogy with market failure to identify the instances of cognitively-biased self-regarding behaviour that 
ought to concern us politically (Kelly 2014: 186).  
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normative notion views harm as a wrong (1987: 31-36). Nudge social welfarism, as we 
called it above, is based on the first notion; as with other consequentialist approaches, it 
thinks of harm as having to do with welfare (Woodward 1986: 818). The problem it 
faces, though, is that the harm principle is not directed towards prohibiting all kinds of 
harms to welfare interests – “only setbacks of interests that are wrongs” count as harms 
in the appropriate sense (Feinberg 1987: 36). Hence, justifying the permissibility of 
other-regarding nudges is not as simple as showing that the interventions would prevent 
people from harming others in the sense that they would prevent a setback to 
(individual third-party or social) welfare.103 Social welfarism is not the right conception 
for dealing with other-regarding nudge proposals because: (a) it is sometimes not 
morally wrong to act in ways that diminish other people’s welfare, and (b) there may be 
other kinds of wrong that do not refer to welfare losses.104  
Rather, the fundamental category that we should be interested in is whether it is 
morally permissible to nudge people to do what they morally ought to do. If we return 
to the examples above with this in mind, we can see that what matters for the 
assessment of the nudge aimed at discouraging tax fraud, for example, is the fact that 
citizens are under a moral obligation to the political community to pay their fair share in 
taxes. These kinds of examples differ from those examined in the previous chapter in so 
far as they share a moral component. In other words, they all relate in some way to how 
we ought to respond to the claims that the moral status and rights of others make on us. 
The issue that grounds our evaluation of them is whether they can help us to better 
understand and fulfil our moral duties. It is moral goodness or rightness, not social 
welfare, which is the ultimate aim of these kinds of interventions. For rhetorical 
convenience, we can call the category of interventions that aim at moral improvement 
moral nudges or moralising choice architecture.105  
                                                          
103 To do so, it would need to show that these setbacks to welfare are wrongs. A social welfarist may 
argue that we should specify the moral rightness and wrongness of acts in terms of their consequences 
and, specifically, consequences as they relate to the welfare of society. Yet no such arguments have been 
offered to this end (by, e.g., Sunstein or other nudge proponents). Nonetheless, even those who have 
explicitly defended social welfarist (or utilitarian) views – such as J.S. Mill – argue that harm to others’ 
interests is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of justified interference.    
104 For an example of (b), see Slavny and Parr (2015) on cases of harmless, but wrongful, discrimination. 
105 The only explicit reference to moral nudges that I have found in the literature is in Van Ijzendoorn 
and Bakermans-Kranenburg (2011: 23), which, as we will see later (§5.2.3), offers an inadequate 
characterisation. Recently, Ishmaili M’hamdi et al. (2017) have introduced the concept of “other-regarding 
nudges” into the debate about healthcare interventions, specifically with regards to maternal choice 
during pregnancy, given the impact that this behaviour can have on perinatal morbidity and mortality and 
the potential development of chronic diseases later in life. In cases where this is done to prevent harm, 
this would count as what I am calling moral nudging.  
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The point here is only to show that, when we move beyond social welfarism as 
the grounds for assessing permissibility, we see that there is a specifically motivated 
subset of PCA that has not been adequately examined within the literature. The moral-
improvement reasons for nudging have often been missed within the debate. There are 
a number of questions about how we might characterise and justify the aim of moral 
improvement that will have important implications for how we think about whether 
moral nudges are permitted for use by governments (these issues are addressed in §5.2). 
The reasons that support the goal of moral improvement do not necessarily say that we 
ought to pursue it by any means available. It may be the case that there are conclusive 
moral reasons to avoid certain means; or, more commonly, among means that are not 
conclusively ruled out, some means might be deemed to be better supported by moral 
reasons than others (Douglas 2014: 76). Our task here is to examine the permissibility 
of using PCA as a means to moral improvement – an assessment that will speak at times 
both to the evaluation of this type of intervention relative to other means and to the 
comparative assessment of different types of moralising choice architecture.      
      
§5.1.2: Moving Beyond Current Debates on Moral Improvement 
There are several ways in which we might try to improve an individual’s moral conduct, 
from traditional legal and educative means to new, more controversial possibilities such 
as neuro-interventions and other forms of bioenhancement. As Douglas states, “There 
is […] much interesting work to be done in assessing the morality of different possible 
means to greater moral conformity” (2014: 76). Indeed in recent years the literatures 
relating to the permissibility conditions required for the use of moralising interventions, 
especially those that operate by directly manipulating our biology in various ways, have 
burgeoned. In light of this, it is surprising that so little work has been directed towards 
exploring the moralising potential of nudges, especially as they are grounded in similar 
neuroscientific discoveries and because it would appear that they could offer distinct 
advantages over other means. Before proceeding to that neglected task in the remainder 
of the chapter, it is worth briefly surveying the current debates on moral improvement 
in order to situate the discussion to come within its broader context and, in so doing, to 
highlight elements of its novelty within, and value for, the existing discussions about 
means of moral improvement.  
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(i) Biomedical Means 
Much of the current debate is focused on the moralising potential of biotechnological 
means such as pharmaceuticals and electrostimulation of the brain. These are known 
collectively as moral bioenhancement. The central idea is that recent neuroscientific and 
technological advances may yield new means of “modifying morally significant aspects 
of motivation and behaviour” in ways that “make it more likely that [a person] will act 
morally, in some future period, than would have been the case if it were not used” 
(Savulescu, Douglas and Persson 2014: 91-92, 95). 
Although the prospects of technically feasible bioenhancements lie in only the 
medium-term future, there are a number of studies that offer early signs of success with 
respect to the development of biomedical interventions that may be able to safely and 
reliably improve moral behaviour. This is due to the fact that scientific research is 
providing more robust evidence for biological correlates of morally-relevant traits. To 
take one example, neuroscientists have investigated the effects of serotonin, one of the 
main neurotransmitters in the brain, on moral behaviour and judgement. Specifically, 
they tested: (i) the difference in the willingness of serotonin-enhanced and non-
enhanced participants to harm others via their responses to moral dilemmas similar in 
kind to the trolley problem; and (ii) the difference in these groups’ evaluations of the 
fairness of monetary offers in the ultimatum game, and the associated rates of the 
rejection of unfair offers (Crockett et al. 2008, 2010a). The studies found that enhancing 
serotonin made participants both more likely to judge harmful actions as forbidden 
(though only in cases where harms were emotionally salient), and less likely to reject 
unfair offers.106 These results have been taken to show that serotonin directly alters 
moral judgement and behaviour by increasing people’s aversion to personally harming 
others (Crockett et al. 2010a).107  
Empirical research of this sort, and its potential ethical and political 
implications, has recently generated significant philosophical interest. Different types of 
arguments have been advanced in defence of moral bioenhancement. A moderate view, 
offered by Douglas (2008) against what he calls the “bioconservative thesis”, maintains 
that there are some reasons that support the permissibility of individuals morally 
                                                          
106 Note that the second finding is not obviously preferable from a moral point of view. 
107 There are similar, but less robust types of findings relating to oxytocin and propranolol. With regards 
to the former, studies have shown that oxytocin (administered via a nasal spray) increases trust and 
cooperation, but this effect is limited to those people within one’s social group (Kosfeld et al. 2005), 
while it reduces empathy for those outside of this group (De Dreu et al. 2010). With respect to the latter, 
propranolol has been found to reduce implicit racial biases (Terbeck et al. 2012). For a brief overview of 
the current state of the evidence, see Savulescu, Douglas, and Persson (2014: 93-94).    
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enhancing themselves via biomedical means.108 A much more radical view, based on a 
thoroughly consequentialist account of morality, had argued that the development of 
biomedical moralising technologies should be prioritised and aggressively pursued by 
governments (Persson and Savulescu 2012).109  
The main (interrelated) objections to moral bioenhancement are grounded in 
the importance of moral reasoning and the value of autonomy. Harris, for example, is in 
agreement about the need for moral improvement; but the problem with biomedical 
approaches, he argues, is that using neurally active drugs to directly manipulate people’s 
emotions does not count as moral enhancement, properly understood: “tinkering with 
the emotions […] may make immoral behaviour less likely, but it does not enhance 
morality” (Harris 2013b: 171-172). The claim is that, although they may produce pro-
social outcomes, some kinds of enhancements – specifically, those that employ direct 
means, in the way that biomedical drugs do – “fail to produce […] a deeper kind of 
moral improvement that is typically produced by traditional, deliberative 
enhancements” (Douglas 2014: 78, where he calls this ‘the superficiality concern’; cf. 
Harris 2011). This first objection (from the importance of moral reasoning) draws our 
attention to the question of what should be classed as moral improvement, a 
foundational issue that I address in the following section (§5.2.1). It is strongly related 
to the objection from autonomy: in essence, the direct nature of biomedical means 
reduces the freedom to do wrong, and thereby undermines personal autonomy and the 
value that attaches to its exercise. These two issues – reasoning and autonomy – are 
clearly important features of the account of the political morality of nudging so far 
defended in this thesis. Precisely how the arguments made in the previous chapter 
translate into the moral domain is the issue that we will be engaging with fully over the 
course of this present chapter.  
For now, it is worth noting three points about this debate that are relevant to 
the discussion about moral nudging. First, it opens up a sight of the potential 
contribution that moral nudges might make. The debate between advocates and critics 
                                                          
108 Douglas’ arguments have focused on interventions that aim to increase one’s own moral attitudes and 
conduct, rather than on interventions that aim to increase the moral conduct of others, which is the focus 
here given our inquiry is centred on the governmental use of PCA to improve its citizens’ moral attitudes 
and conduct (2008; 2014: 76 fn. 4).   
109 The view that moral enhancement is our most urgent task is grounded in a number of different claims: 
(i) the urgent global crises facing humanity (such as global warming and weapons of mass destruction), 
compounded with (ii) the biological limits to the human capacity for altruism, empathy, and a sense of 
justice, which are exacerbated further by (iii) huge changes to the conditions of living brought about by 
science and technology that have made us “less psychologically and morally fit for life” in this new 
environment (Persson and Savulescu 2011: 486). The adoption of moral bioenhancement in the near 
future is, they argue, necessary for the long-term survival of humankind. 
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of moral bioenhancement tends to set hypothetical future biomedical interventions that 
operate via direct emotion-modulating drugs against traditional, usually educational, 
interventions that aim at enhancing moral reasoning.110 While the former are not 
currently available and are unlikely to be so in the near future, the oft-mentioned (non-
normative) problem with the latter is that they have not proved to be adequately 
effective. Choice architecture, by contrast, is an institutional option that is available to 
us now and that may be more effective than, or at least an important complement to, 
traditional educational means (Zarpentine 2013). It therefore seems worth taking moral 
nudging seriously as a potential means of moral improvement.  
Second, the debate over the ethics of moral bioenhancement can be read as 
taking on a somewhat similar structure to the discussion on the permissibility of 
nudging in the previous chapter: it seems that System 1 nudges share features with the 
direct modulation of bioenhancement, while System 2 nudges are intended as cognition-
improving means and, hence, are closer to traditional moral enhancement. Third, in 
their interaction with this critique, defenders of biomedical means have suggested that 
their arguments on the permissibility of moral bioenhancement offer us “reasons to 
doubt that the [autonomy-based] objections will count decisively against nudge 
techniques” (Savulescu, Douglas, and Persson 2014: 109). This may be true; but, they 
provide no direct arguments to this end and this short shrift means that any morally 
relevant differences between the two means of influence are overlooked.111 This gives us 
another reason, in addition to their current availability, to explore the moralising 
potential of PCA.    
 
(ii) Traditional Means 
There is also a wealth of ongoing and novel discussion in the literature relating to more 
traditional means. This comprises a more expansive set of debates than the discussion 
over bioenhancement, including issues such as: the cultivation of (liberal) virtues, the 
use of social norms in public policy, moral and civic education in schools, the role of 
the law in enforcing morality, and the idea that punishment can be used as a means of 
“moral fortification” (Howard 2017). The most relevant for our purposes are the 
                                                          
110 Note that there are some examples that would seem to count as bioenhancements that we have known 
about for some time, e.g., that pupils who have sugary food and drinks are more likely to cause 
behavioural problems in the classroom, and schools often prohibit them (to some degree at least) for that 
reason and offer a different diet.    
111 This lack of attention from those within the moral enhancement debate rests, it appears, on the 
noncontroversial nature of moral nudges. But this cannot simply be assumed or intuited; and, to the best 
of my knowledge, no arguments have been given to this end. 
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arguments that relate to the use of social norms and the potential role of the legal 
system in supporting the development and exercise of citizens’ moral reasoning and 
agency.     
With respect to the former, there has been a debate over the implications of the 
psychological evidence for which (of the more traditional) political means of moral 
improvement should be favoured. McTernan has argued that, in light of the empirical 
thesis of situationism – which contends that human moral agency is “typically a function 
of the situation a person inhabits, or takes herself to inhabit, rather than any traits of 
character she putatively possesses” (Upton 2009: 104) – any kind of defence of the view 
that liberal virtues should be cultivated as “an effective means by which to make citizens 
behave” has been fatally undermined (McTernan 2013: 2).112 She has argued that liberals 
ought instead to secure (or induce) stable patterns of behaviour from citizens via the 
use of social norms, i.e., “standard[s] of behaviour shared by a social group, commonly 
understood by its members as authoritative or obligatory for them” (Anderson 2000: 
170). The central thought is that members of the social group will hold each other 
accountable to their norms, and that they will often “apply sanctions such as social 
exclusion or blame to those who fail to follow norms” (McTernan 2013: 11). This is of 
interest to the debate over nudging because some (moral) nudges work by making use 
of social norms. For example, choice architects sometimes design PCA that include 
“descriptive norms” relating to the levels of others’ behaviour or “injunctive norms” 
relating to the level of others’ disapproval (Cialdini et al. 2006: 3), for the sake of 
influencing people’s other-regarding behaviour.  
McTernan’s argument, however, seems problematically to assert that social 
norms – and, by extension, the nudges that utilise social norms – are mutually exclusive 
from the deeper kinds of moral learning and the resultant behaviour change that 
accompanies, and is the primary aim of, civic education (which, for Callan, is the same 
as “the cultivation of civic virtue”) (Callan 2015: 491-492). On her view, this is due to 
the psychological evidence about how our choice environments affect our moral 
agency. But it is not clear why this would necessarily be the case. In Callan’s response to 
this argument, he states that:  
 
“the inference to draw from the experimental evidence is not that virtue does not exist 
but that its rationally expected exercise is typically indexed to a range of circumstances 
within which the agent has been habituated to act and feel as she should, and where 
                                                          
112 For more on the (philosophical) situationist challenge, see Doris (2002) and Harman (1999).  
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temptation comes from predictable sources she has been taught to manage well.” (Callan 
2015: 495) 
 
This seems right in so far as it goes (for more on this and related issues, see 
Kristjánsson 2000 and Adams 2006: 114-158); but it offers only a negative defence of 
traditional civic education, rather than any active engagement with the psychological 
evidence, or a positive account of how traditional educational means might need to be 
updated or supplemented in light of this evidence. This reveals the opportunity for 
exploring the potential of moral choice architecture – which by its very nature takes 
situationism seriously – as a way of achieving the goals of moral and civic education, 
and potentially doing so more effectively than some current policies that are insensitive 
(or less sensitive) to moral psychological research.  
There has been some related discussion about the role of the legal system in 
recent years. I will briefly make reference to three novel arguments. First, Shiffrin has 
argued that “legal standards”, i.e., directives that incorporate thick, substantive terms 
that require the direct application of the background principle to a fact situation, may 
have the virtue of inducing greater levels of moral deliberation, relative to “legal rules”, 
i.e., directives that instruct people to respond in a determinate way to the presence of 
delimited triggering facts (Shiffrin 2010: 1214-1215). Second, Brownlee and Child 
(2012) have argued that there is a case for the law being able, in principle, to guide us 
morally through (i) its instructions, (ii) its examples, and (iii) its motivational prompts. 
Third, relatedly, Brownlee has presented a defence of the view that the law might offer 
a means of cultivating virtue through its “setting a moral example that we have good 
reason to emulate” (Brownlee 2015: 2).113 Moral choice architecture may also be able to 
play similar roles. If so, there may be interesting comparative assessments about the 
conditions under which nudging may offer advantages over the legal measures. This 
provide further reason to take it seriously as a potential means of improving people’s 
moral capacities and conduct.  
 
§5.2: Moral Improvement 
So far we have established that there is interesting work to be done relating to moral 
nudges and the permissibility conditions for their use by governments. There are several 
complex questions and issues that this inquiry will need to address. The two central 
                                                          
113 For a discussion of whether and how nudges can be used to in the policy-led process of cultivating 
virtues, see Niker (forthcoming). 
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issues that we need to get clearer on first are: (i) what we might mean by “moral 
improvement” (§5.2.1), and (ii) the reasons that the political community may have to try 
to promote moral improvement (§5.2.2).  
 
§5.2.1: Characterising Moral Improvement 
What constitutes moral improvement? We can begin by distinguishing between an 
individual’s behaviour, on the one hand, and her beliefs or motivations, on the other. 
Accordingly, we can separate analytically three distinct elements of the “anatomy” of 
moral improvement: (i) behavioural improvement, (ii) improved insight, and (iii) 
motivational improvement (DeGrazia 2013: 362-363). As we will see below, the second 
and third elements may overlap in some instances, but they can come apart too.  
The first element, improvement of moral behaviour, is outcome-oriented; that 
is, it is concerned with increasing the occurrence of right action by bringing about 
greater conformity with what a person has moral reason to do. In these cases, all that 
we would mean by nudging a person for moral improvement purposes is that the 
intervention improves her morally relevant behaviour in some way. Of course, 
behavioural improvement may occur as a result of improved insight or motivational 
improvement – indeed this may be considered a part of the (instrumental) value of 
these two elements. But it can occur independently, too, such as in cases where 
someone is forced to perform the right action. It is these cases that this category is 
principally intended to capture (as distinct from the other elements).  
The second and third elements concern the beliefs and motivations that explain 
our behaviour. Let’s begin with the second: improved insight. Unsurprisingly, our 
beliefs about what we have reason to do direct much of our behaviour. We often 
behave in a particular way – say, one that prevents harm to the environment – because 
we hold a particular belief or set of beliefs, in this case, the belief that we ought not to 
contribute to climate change (which could be grounded in the impersonal value of the 
natural environment or in intergenerational duties, or both). Independent of the beliefs 
that we actually hold, morality gives us reasons to act, and not to act, in certain ways; 
and our beliefs can correspond to a lesser or greater extent to these moral reasons. 
Morality sometimes also gives us reasons (not) to act from certain beliefs. Hence, a 
person can fail to act in accordance with morality either in virtue of being unaware or 
ignorant of relevant moral reasons or because she holds irrelevant or mistaken moral 
beliefs. The second kind of moral improvement, then, refers to the improvement of an 
individual’s moral insight, such that her beliefs and judgements about what she ought to 
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do are more in line with the moral reasons that there are. This epistemic dimension is 
what moral education, for instance, takes as its primary goal. As already mentioned, 
improved insight will lead to behavioural improvement in many cases. This is because 
people can be motivated directly by their beliefs about reasons to act in accordance with 
them. This highlights that moral insight and moral motivation are not as separable as 
the taxonomy above may have initially suggested.  
There is an important and highly contested debate in philosophy, and a related 
empirical investigation in psychology, relating to moral motivation.114 It is beyond the 
scope of the present inquiry to set out an account of the nature of the connection 
between moral judgement and motivation; however, it will be helpful to offer a few 
indicative comments about some issues relating to moral psychology. The first relates to 
why I take it to be necessary to include motivational improvement as a separate 
category in our analysis. The second, by contrast, returns to the idea that moral insight 
and motivation are not completely separable, by taking a view on the role that emotions 
can play in informing us about what is right. 
One of the main strands of the debate over moral motivation revolves around 
the issue of whether moral beliefs and judgements motivate necessarily, as the internalism 
thesis contends, or whether they do so only contingently, as the externalism thesis holds 
(Rosati 2016).115 Korsgaard has distinguished these two theories thus: 
 
“An internalist theory is a theory according to which the knowledge (or the truth or 
acceptance) of a moral judgement implies the existence of a motive (not necessarily 
overriding) for acting on that judgement. If I judge that some action is right, it is implied 
that I have, and acknowledge, some motive or reason for performing that action. It is 
part of the sense of the judgement that a motive is present: if someone agrees that an 
action is right, but cannot see any motive or reason for doing it, we must suppose, 
according to these views, that she does not quite know what she means when she agrees 
that the action is right. On an externalist theory, by contrast, such a conjunction of moral 
comprehension and total unmotivatedness is perfectly possible: knowledge is one thing 
and motivation another.” (Korsgaard 1986: 8-9) 
 
                                                          
114 There is an extensive philosophical literature on moral motivation. For a helpful overview of the 
debate, see Rosati (2016).  
115 A second strand in this debate is whether moral beliefs require the presence of a desire or another 
conative state in order to motivate us to action, as Humean views argue (Smith 1987; Railton 1986b), or 
whether beliefs about moral reasons motivate on their own, as anti-Humean views maintain (Nagel 1970; 
Scanlon 1998). I do not take sides on this issue, especially since I believe that the arguments I defend are 
compatible with both accounts of human action. 
. 
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A historical survey of the internalism/externalism debate shows, nonetheless, that the 
original distinctiveness of these two positions has been eroded over the years, as 
versions of internalism have become “increasingly qualified” in order to retain their 
plausibility against externalist critiques (Rosati 2016).116 We have already recognised that 
people can be directly motivated by their beliefs, but this leaves it open whether this is a 
necessary or contingent connection. The empirical evidence at the heart of this thesis 
seems to support the latter view. We are interested in certain problematic cases of 
automaticity, in which an individual acts in a way that is not (necessarily) motivated by 
her beliefs – either when she acts in a certain way without believing that there is a 
reason to do so, or when she fails to act in a certain way despite believing that there is a 
decisive reason to do so. One prominent example is that of implicit biases in which an 
individual who holds the moral belief that racist or sexist judgements are wrong, and 
therefore does not believe that there is a reason to discriminate along racial or gendered 
grounds, nonetheless acts in a prejudiced manner on account of (relatively) unconscious 
and automatic cognitive processes (Brownstein 2015). Thus, the cognitive and 
behavioural science evidence highlights that, even though the connection between 
moral beliefs and motivation might be strong and predictable, it is ultimately contingent. 
This suggests that there may be motivational improvement strategies aside from that 
which follows as a result of improved moral insight.      
Moral beliefs, then, can sometimes issue in moral motivation, but this is not to 
say that the relationship between motivational states and moral insight is unidirectional. 
The second comment we need to make about moral psychology relates to the idea that 
certain interventions that might be described as seeking to bring about motivational 
improvements in so far as they influence affective (or, more precisely, affective-cum-
motivational) states, such as emotions, may have an important role to play in moral 
insight. There are several philosophical theories of the emotions that offer competing 
accounts of the relationship between emotion, value, and reason (see Deonna and 
Teroni 2012 for an overview). My own view aligns with what I take to be the most 
common in the current literature, which is generally referred to as the perceptual theory 
(see De Sousa 1997: 149-158 for a discussion of the analogy with perception).117 This 
                                                          
116 For instance, Shafer-Landau treats the defeasibility of moral motivation under certain conditions – 
such as severe exhaustion, serious depression, or overwhelming contrary impulses – as supporting 
externalism (2003: 147-148), while Smith (1994) treats similar defeasibility conditions as being compatible 
with a form of internalism.    
117 The attractiveness of this theory rests in its steering a middle course between two opposed accounts of 
emotions – the feeling theory and the judgemental theory – which each have some plausibility, but which 
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name is somewhat misleading as there are many different perceptual theories of the 
emotions (e.g., Tappolet 2016; Roberts 2013; McDowell 1998; Deonna 2006; Zagzebski 
2003; Nussbaum 2001; Brady 2013); but the central thought is that, in their capacity as 
analogous to perceptual states, emotions have an epistemic function in moral cognition. 
That is, emotions can play a role in informing us about our moral reasons.118 The least 
controversial claim to this end, and one that is heavily supported by the empirical 
psychological evidence (Damasio 1994), is that emotions are detectors of salience: they 
draw our attention to morally relevant features of the situation and, in so doing, can 
help us better to recognise our (moral) reasons for action (De Sousa 1997). Classic 
examples include anger at the sight of an injustice and guilt or shame when one realises 
that they have violated a moral standard.  
  
§5.2.2: Justifying Moral Improvement 
With respect to the second issue, that of justifying moral improvement as a legitimate 
aim, the key question is: Why might the political community wish to improve an 
individual’s moral conduct (in one or more of these three ways)? This is a derivative of 
the moral general question “Why be moral?” and, as such, requires that we give an 
account of why we and others have compelling reason to be moral (Scanlon 1998: 148; 
see also Dworkin 2011: 191-199).  
There are two possible reasons for designing PCA for the purpose of moral 
improvement, both of which are grounded in its instrumental value. The first is to 
protect the interests of others, which would be (wrongfully) harmed if the moral 
improvement is not brought about. The second is to support morally responsible 
agency, which is a source of ethical value for the target of the intervention. The second 
type of reason is more controversial than the first. In my view, the question of when it 
is permissible to use moral nudges needs to assess both kinds of reasons (these 
normative analyses are carried out in §5.3 and §5.4, respectively), as well as to examine 
the issue of how to weigh them against each other in cases of potential conflict (§5.4.4). 
Governments have always engaged in efforts to improve citizens’ moral 
conduct. The most common reason for doing so is in order to prevent an individual 
from acting in ways that harm others. Although the ideal of autonomy and its value to a 
human life morally constrains the use of public nudges and other interventions in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
are both “ultimately unsatisfactory” (Tappolet 2014: 168). For more on this, see Deonna and Teroni 
(2012) and Tappolet (2014, 2016).  
118 For what it’s worth, I favour an “evaluative perception” account of this, such as the neo-Aristotelian 
theory offered by McDowell (1998) and Wiggins (1987).  
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various ways, as we saw in the previous chapter, liberals are in agreement that some 
violations of an individual’s autonomy are permissible. The interests of others can be 
sufficiently weighty so as to justify the claim that we have moral duties to attend to them 
in an appropriate way, either by doing something (in the case of positive duties) or by 
refraining from doing something (in the cases of negative duties). Many of these duties 
are, in principle at least, enforceable by the political community (more on this in §5.3). 
In these cases, governments themselves may be under a moral duty to protect their 
citizens from certain kinds of harm. When considering this reason in isolation, it does not 
seem particularly relevant what form the moral improvement takes so long as the 
outcome is secured (unless, as is sometimes the case, the duty in question requires that 
one fulfil it from a certain motive).       
The second justification of moral improvement relates to the promotion of the 
well-being of the target of the intervention. In my view, a person’s life goes better when 
she recognises for herself and appropriately responds to the moral norms and reasons 
that apply to her in a situation, than when she is forced to perform the actions that are 
required by these norms and reasons. Consider two citizens, Amy and Amin, both of 
whom act in the ways that morality requires over the course of their adult lives. Amy 
behaves in these ways because she is the target of some sort of mind control, perhaps 
psychologically manipulative nudges, that get her to perform the actions automatically. 
By contrast, Amin acts in these same ways, but does so because he is receptive and 
reactive to the moral reasons that exist. A simple way of capturing the difference 
between Amy and Amin is to adopt the distinction between conformity and compliance 
with moral reasons.  
According to Raz, we conform with a reason for action when we perform the 
action that the reason favours, while we comply with it when we perform the action in 
direct response to the reason for its favouring of that action (1999: 178-179). To 
illustrate this contrast, imagine a case in which Adam has a decisive reason to stay at 
home with his partner Eve because Eve has just received news of a friend’s death and 
Adam’s presence around the house would provide her with comfort and support.119 If 
Adam stays at home, then he conforms with this reason. But, in cases of conformity, he 
may have stayed at home not out of an appreciation of the reason provided by Eve’s 
need for moral support; rather, what motivated this action is that he wants to be close 
to his computer in case he gets some inspiration about how to finish the current chapter 
                                                          
119 This case is a lightly revised version of the case Raz uses to illustrate this distinction (1999: 178-179). 
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of his novel about which he is currently suffering from writer’s block. By contrast, if 
Adam not only stays at home, but does so (a) because he recognises that this will bring 
Eve some comfort at this difficult time, and (b) is motivated to do so for this reason, 
then he complies with the reason. We can assume that Adam is acting autonomously in 
both cases, since he might be equally responsive to his own reasoning. There is, 
nonetheless, an important difference between conformity and compliance, in my view, 
at least from the point of view of their ethical value. What explains this?     
Let’s return to the example of Amy and Amin. Amy’s life is one of moral 
conformity, while Amin’s is a life of moral compliance. On my view, Amin’s life 
includes an important aspect of what it means to live well, which Amy’s life lacks, 
namely, moral responsibility. Part of this value comes from the fact that morally 
responsible agency often tends to be autonomous agency. In Amin’s life, for instance, 
his actions result from his being responsive to his own reasoning, such that he can be 
described as the author of these actions in the relevant sense. The “Autonomy View” of 
moral responsibility, which claims that “beings are responsible just in so far as they are 
autonomous” (Wolf 2008: 261), does capture the (true) idea that the reason why Amy is 
not morally responsible is because her actions are the result of someone manipulating 
her to act as she does: if Amy has no control over these actions, it is easy to see why she 
cannot be said to be responsible for them. But this view fails to capture the whole 
picture. Even if one holds that morally responsible agency needs to meet this “control 
condition” to the same degree as autonomous agency (a view which is often contested, 
see, e.g., McKenna 2008 and Wolf 2008), there remains a difference between the kinds 
of “epistemic condition” carried by two types of agency.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, what matters for autonomy is that an 
individual is able to be responsive to her own reasoning; hence, any epistemic condition 
that there might be for autonomous agency would be restricted to matters relevant to 
the goals, attitudes, beliefs, values, and so on that serve as the basis for her self-
authorship. A stronger epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, 
however. On the view that I favour, Amy is not morally responsible not only because her 
actions are controlled by someone else (i.e., because she is not autonomous with respect 
to her actions), but because this manipulation denies her “the freedom to see things 
aright” (Wolf 2008: 273). Amin, by contrast, is morally responsible not only because he 
acts autonomously, but because his embracing and acting on relevant moral values is an 
expression of his understanding and appreciation of the reasons that exist in favour of 
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acting in accordance with these values. This process of appreciating moral reasons, like 
the process of acting autonomously, cannot and need not be done independently of 
external influences. The public environment (or what Hurley calls the “public ecology”) 
can, and should, play a role in helping us with both the control (autonomy-supporting) 
condition, as well as the content-sensitive epistemic condition, required in the 
development and exercise of morally responsible agency. Moral choice architecture is 
one way in which this can occur. As Susan Wolf explains:  
 
“It is by being rationally persuaded that these values are good ones that the agent makes 
them her own in a way for which she is responsible. But there is no analogous story to be 
told of the agent who acquires bad values from his culture. We cannot say that the racist 
is responsible for his racism if it results from his understanding about what is good about 
racism – for there is nothing good about racism for him to understand. Nor can we say 
that the racist is responsible for his racism if it results from his understanding about what 
is bad about racism – for no sane person chooses values because he understands them to 
be bad.” (Wolf 2008: 269-270) 
 
On this so-called “Reason View”, therefore, a person is morally responsible for her 
actions “if she was not only free to govern her actions in accord with her values, but 
that she was able to revise her values in accord with reason and truth” (Taylor 2008: 
269).  
Consequently, moral compliance, and the moral responsibility that attaches to it, 
can be understood as responsiveness-to-reasoning plus, if you will, where the “plus” refers to 
the addition of the more stringent epistemic condition required when we bring in moral 
values. Acting autonomously is valuable, but this value has an epistemic conditionality 
in place which requires that the agency is responsive to the reasons that there are. In the 
case of Adam, moral compliance requires that he recognises the reason there is to 
support Eve (i.e., (a) above, which can be described as “reasons-recognition”), and that 
an appreciation of this reason is what motivates his conduct (i.e., (b) above: “reasons-
reactivity”) (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Similarly, Amin exercises morally responsible 
agency because, by stipulation, he recognises and reacts appropriately to moral reasons. 
This second justification for moral improvement maintains that, on account of the 
ethical value to the agent herself of morally responsible agency, there is a pro tanto 
reason in favour of adopting means of moral improvement that support compliance 
over those that merely secure conformity.  
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§5.2.3: A Taxonomy of Potential Moral Nudges 
We have distinguished between three types of moral improvement – improvements to 
behaviour, motivation, and insight – and two kinds of reason that may be used to justify 
these moralising interventions – to prevent harm to others and for the ethical benefit of 
the agent. Our task now is to examine whether moral nudges can permissibly be used as 
a means of moral improvement and, if so, under what conditions. To give some 
structure to this analysis, it is instructive to clarify the different ways in which PCA 
might interact with the characterisations and justifications of moral improvement.  
 There are three kinds of relevant considerations. The first is that morality gives 
us reasons to act in certain ways, as well as reasons to refrain from acting in others. In 
many of these cases, these duty-based reasons in themselves require only that we act in 
conformity with them. Hence, behavioural improvement would be sufficient in such 
cases. Nonetheless, and this is the second point, sometimes morality gives us reasons to 
do (or to refrain from doing) things from certain motives; that is, we are sometimes under 
moral duties that require compliance. In these cases, behavioural improvement would 
not be enough; it must be accompanied by, or more precisely follow from, relevant 
moral beliefs or motives. The third consideration is that, in addition to the duty-based 
reasons outlined in the first and second points, which are justified via the prevention of 
harm to others, there is also an ethical consideration that favours the use of interventions 
that aim at changing a person’s behaviour by improving her moral insight and/or 
motivation, wherever feasible.  
As a result, it seems that we can distinguish between four different potential 
aims of moral nudging:  
 
(1) to change an individual’s other-regarding behaviour, regardless of her beliefs;  
(2) to help bring an individual’s behaviour in line with her existing moral beliefs,   
though passively on the part of the agent;  
(3) to induce deliberation in order to support an individual’s moral reasoning, 
which may:  
(a) support her in bringing her own behaviour in line with her existing 
moral beliefs; or. 
(b) bring about changes in her behaviour and sometimes her beliefs through 
a process of better recognising moral reasons; or, 
(4) to change an individual’s beliefs to be more in line with the what morality 
requires.  
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The distinction between “System 1” nudges and “System 2” nudges that played a role in 
our prudential analysis is relevant here, too. Recall that the former bring about 
behavioural modifications via (relatively) automatic processes, while the latter act on us 
in ways that encourage some conscious engagement. Both (1) and (2) will be delivered 
via System 1 nudges; while (3) and (4) require System 2 nudges. With respect to (1), the 
moral nudge would aim to induce behavioural improvement for the sake of preventing harm 
to others. This type of intervention mirrors the psychologically manipulative System 1 
nudges delineated in the previous chapter. Indeed, some describe the category of moral 
nudging in general in these terms: e.g., Van Ijzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg 
define moral choice architecture as: “a myriad of situational manipulations that 
effectively change human behaviour in [morally] desirable directions without changing 
their moral reasoning, dispositions or motivations” (2009: 23; emphasis added). This 
view seems importantly incomplete, given the other three categories of potential moral 
nudges. The purpose of (2) would be to use moral choice architecture as a means of 
securing motivational improvement. This category of System 1 nudge parallels the auto-
nudge mechanism set out in Chapter 4. Like (2), (3a) is a form of motivational 
improvement, but it differs in so far as it seeks to bring this end about via deliberative 
processes, much like those involved in the nudge-autonomy mechanism. Both (3b) and 
(4) aim at encouraging improved insight. Relating to the discussion above about morally 
responsible agency, these two possible types of moral nudging seek to persuade citizens 
about the reasons that there are to act in particular other-regarding ways.       
 On my view, the project of moral improvement via PCA should be primarily 
directed towards supporting and stimulating citizens’ moral agency so that they are 
better able correctly to identify and respond appropriately to moral reasons, and thereby 
bring about the desired or required behavioural improvements in an autonomous and 
morally responsible way (i.e., (2)-(4), in various ways). This is because PCA is doubly 
justified in these kinds of cases: it protects others within the political community from 
harm, and does this in a way that supports the agent in living well. Nevertheless, the 
well-being-based justification is, as we mentioned above, a more controversial type of 
justification than the harm-prevention-based one. We might accept, for example, that it 
would be better if people gained moral insight and motivation with respect to fulfilling 
their duties – that this would make their lives go better – but nonetheless worry about 
how much conformity, if any at all, we should sacrifice in our attempts to secure moral 
compliance. I address this complex issue later in the chapter (see §5.4.4).  
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 The remainder of the chapter explores the complexities involved in assessing 
the ethics of moral nudging, which it does by carrying out two strands of normative 
analysis. The first, in the next section, leaves aside considerations relating to the ethical 
value of moral responsibility to explore the permissibility conditions for the category of 
nudges that aims to secure behavioural improvement, i.e., (1). It asks when, if ever, we 
have good reasons to use (manipulative forms of) choice architecture, as compared with 
more traditional coercive means, for the purpose of securing conformity with our moral 
duties. The second part, carried out in §5.4, examines the conditions under which it is 
permissible to use PCA as a means of supporting morally responsible agency.           
 
§5.3: Moral Duties, Enforceability, and Choice Architecture 
It follows intuitively from the idea that the political community is entitled to force its 
citizens to perform a given action that it would also be entitled to act on its citizens in a 
noncoercive way in an attempt to get them to perform this same action (assuming the 
same effectiveness). One claim that we might make about moral nudging therefore is 
that, when an individual has an enforceable duty (not) to act in a particular way, we are 
permitted to use PCA in any way that may bring about the morally required behavioural 
improvement. The reference to ‘in any way’ in this statement refers, most particularly, 
to the distinction that we drew in the previous chapter between manipulative and non-
manipulative types of nudges. In the prudential realm, we have seen that only the latter 
are morally permitted. This analysis does not neatly extend into the moral realm, as we 
shall see.   
The moral constraint in the earlier cases was provided by the ideal of autonomy. 
Yet, despite its weighty value, autonomy is but one value among many, and there will be 
occasions when state support of these other values will override its commitment to 
personal autonomy. When it comes to citizens’ other-regarding behaviour, the idea that 
sometimes violations of autonomy are morally permissible is generally considered to be 
uncontroversial. Liberals typically hold that the central justification for infringing on a 
person’s autonomy is the prevention of harm to others.120 We are under several duties 
to others that are, in principle, enforceable. Thus, the political community has a moral 
permission – and, in some cases, an obligation – to ensure that people perform these 
duties. Following Tadros (2011), we can call this the duty view and, for our purposes, it 
                                                          
120 One way of cashing out this thought is that a person’s autonomy is not sacrificed in these cases, 
because he or she has no claim, grounded in autonomy, to have access to options to wrongfully harm 
others (Wall 2013: 105).  
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can be summarized thus: in cases in which an individual has an in-principle enforceable 
duty to serve a particular end, intervening in that individual’s behaviour to get her to 
serve that end does not wrong her. 
We now need to say a bit more about the issue of enforceability. Enforceable 
duties are duties that it is permissible to coerce – i.e., threaten or force – a person into 
fulfilling. These are distinguished from nonenforceable duties, which can take one of 
two forms. The first concerns duties that, despite being enforceable in principle, it is 
not morally desirable for the state to coerce people into performing, such as duties to 
aid others. The state may often permissibly use other policy levers, such as persuasive 
techniques, as a means of getting citizens to perform these duties, but it cannot force 
their fulfilment. The second concerns duties that are nonenforceable in principle. Some 
duties, by their very nature, require that they are performed freely, such as the duties of 
benevolence or friendship. There is a range of factors that bear on whether a duty is 
enforceable or not, which include (but are not exhausted by) the following set of 
considerations: “the moral significance of the duty, the extent to which it is likely that 
the ambitions that ground the duty are likely to be advanced through enforcement, the 
harms that will typically be imposed on the duty bearer through enforcement, [and] the 
extent to which it is important that the person acts on the duty for good reason rather 
than because she is forced to do so” (Tadros 2011: 132).  
The most innovative uses for moral choice architecture, in my view, involve the 
ways in which it can help the political community in overcoming some of the problems 
associated with nonenforceability, which we will explore in the next section. The focus 
of this section is on the use of moral nudges in cases where it is permissible to coerce 
people into moral conformity. In such cases, is it also permissible to use nudges – in 
particular, the psychologically manipulative System 1 nudges that we earlier ruled out as 
impermissible (when used for prudential ends) – as a means of eliciting behavioural 
improvement? And, if so, what are the reasons either in favour of or against using 
nudges rather than (additional) coercive means for this purpose?              
Recall that psychological manipulation occurs when an individual is influenced 
by causing changes in mental processes other than those involved in understanding 
(Faden and Beauchamp 1986: 366). As we have defined them, System 1 nudges are 
manipulative, when they are not consented to, because they act on their target by 
directly influencing their automatic cognitive processes, thereby bringing about 
behavioural modifications passively from the point of view of the agent being acted on. 
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It seems possible that, in line with what the duty view claims, we could use these nudges 
in cases where citizens have an enforceable duty to act in a particular way. But when 
might it be desirable to do so? In one type of case, this question is the same as: when 
might nudging be preferable to (further) coercion? This is the type of case we will look 
at first.   
 The most obvious answer to this question would appear to be grounded in the 
non-moral value of efficacy. Nudges, even psychologically manipulative ones, are 
permitted in cases where they are more effective than coercive measures at increasing 
moral conformity (Moles 2015: 660). There are two ways in which this might be the 
case: either they are just as effective as coercive means, but are cheaper and easier to 
implement (and therefore more efficient) or, more simply, they are better at achieving 
the intended behavioural results (perhaps because they operate covertly). For example, 
research has found that behaviourally informed design interventions may have a 
significant effect on reducing tax evasion. Specifically, changing the design of self-report 
forms by moving the declaration-of-honesty signature box from the end to the 
beginning of the form has been shown to reduce instances of fraudulent reporting.121 
The important subtle change relates to temporality. If the signature is given at the end, a 
person may have already provided a dishonest self-report, and we know that 
“immediately after lying, individuals quickly engage in various mental justifications, 
reinterpretations, and other ‘tricks’ such as suppressing thoughts about their moral 
standards that allow them to maintain a positive self-image despite having lied” (Shu et 
al. 2012: 15197; see also Bandura et al. 1996). There may be different ways of 
interpreting how this particular nudge acts on its target; but, for our purposes, let us 
assume that it works as a form of unconscious moral priming.122 Let us also assume that 
                                                          
121 Instances of cheating (by overclaiming income) in this laboratory experiment was 79% in the condition 
where the signature box was at the bottom and only 37% when it was placed at the top of the page, 
relative to 64% where no signature was asked for (Shu et al. 2012). 
122 It may be the case that this effect on reporting behaviour is explained by reference to the nudge acting 
to “make morality salient” to the person right before they act (since, e.g., signatures are one possible way 
of activating attention to the self) (Shu et al. 2012: 15198). And this could, in turn, be thought to work as 
a form of unconscious moral priming or rather by supporting our moral reasoning when we are deciding 
what figures to report, i.e., by making moral reasons more salient so that they are less likely to be 
overpowered by our self-interested ones (see, e.g., Batson and Thompson 2001 for more on this 
phenomenon). Here, we assume the former, which is also in line with the view taken by the authors of 
this study. There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence relating to the kinds of potential means 
that could be used for unconscious moral nudging, so we could reasonably expect that there would be 
other possible moral System 1 nudges that could have a similar effect with respect to discouraging fraud. 
For instance, researchers at Harvard have found that displaying cues such as moral quotations at the 
bottom of emails and pictures of moral leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi can trigger implicit (or 
unconscious) psychological processes such that people feel discouraged from behaving immorally (Desai 
and Gino, unpublished). Similarly, it has been shown that cues relating to childhood, such as recollecting 
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it is more effective, in one of the two ways specified above, than increased penalties – 
an assumption that is supported, in part at least, by the UK Behavioural Insights Team’s 
promotion of this policy (Cabinet Office 2012: 14-16). Despite there being different 
views about the scope of justified coercive taxation, there is a general consensus in both 
political philosophy and practice that each citizen has an enforceable duty to pay 
whatever taxes they are deemed to owe to the political community. Hence, on this duty 
view, it would be permissible for the state to use these System 1 nudge policies to 
secure moral conformity.  
But this view, as it stands, does not represent the whole story, because there 
may be morally relevant differences between these nudges and standard coercive 
measures, such as (threats of) fines and imprisonment. One way of addressing this is to 
explore the question about whether manipulative nudges might ever be described as a 
means of enforcement. Given that choice architecture is characterised as being the 
noncoercive alternative to these traditional measures, this question might seem 
misguided: there is no threat of force and no legal consequences with respect to the 
criminal law if someone opts out; hence, nudges cannot be thought of as an 
enforcement mechanism. This is true; but such a view seems too simplistic in the case 
of psychologically manipulative choice architecture. We can see this by referring to a 
more detailed definition of coercion, which recognises a distinction between two kinds: 
 
“We typically say that A coerces B to do X when A gets B to do something by 
threatening to harm B or by making B worse off in case B should not do X. We also often 
say that coercion interferes with one’s freedom or autonomy, that if B is coerced into 
doing X (or does X under duress), then B’s action is involuntary.” (Wertheimer 2015: 2) 
 
This type of distinction has been drawn as far back as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
(2009: 38; at 1110b 1-7). There, Aristotle more or less explicitly distinguishes between 
two types of actions that are enforced (biaia). One kind is enforced because the agent 
contributes nothing to the act, thereby making them unintentional (akousia) or 
“involuntary”, in the terms used above. A second kind are those acts where the agent 
does contribute something, but does so under threat; these are intentional (hekousia) or 
“chosen, viz. as preferable to not performing the act with the consequences that this 
would have” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983: 182). Importantly for our purposes, manipulative 
                                                                                                                                                                    
memories of your first experience of riding a bike, can result in less cheating behaviour and increased 
generosity toward others (Gino and Desai 2011).       
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nudges can be thought of as being a form of coercion-as-involuntariness, as we might call it, 
while traditional coercive means operate as coercion-as-threat.  
It is this, I think, that explains the charge that, even when violations of 
autonomy are permissible, manipulative System 1 nudges can nonetheless be morally 
problematic on account of their insidiousness. Hausman and Welch suggest this type of 
view when they highlight that “there may be something more insidious about shaping 
choices than about open constraint” (2010: 130). Essentially, the thought is that the 
insidiousness associated with the mechanism by which manipulative nudges operate 
could be a wrong-making feature that renders the practice an impermissible means of 
serving the permissible end of enforcing morality.  
There are two comparative elements to this claim. The first is that nudges of 
this sort bypass our reasoning process in a way that we might think of as being akin to 
mind control, and this is more insidious than using explicit coercion to exercise control 
over the actions people choose. The thought is that psychologically manipulative 
nudges may disable citizens from being able to recognise and endorse the reasons to 
perform their duty, which is something that remains open to those who are subject to 
coercion-as-threat. The latter policies are an example of what Clayton and Moles 
(forthcoming) call “Frankfurt interventions”, namely, interventions that protect the 
interests of others while ensuring an opportunity for the agent to perform the required 
action freely.123 Standard legal prohibitions allow an individual to act on her own moral 
reasoning free from interference so long as her actions do not violate any of her 
enforceable moral duties.124 By contrast, psychologically manipulative nudges act on 
everyone and, as a result, they manifest disrespect in citizens’ ability to form and act on 
moral beliefs that adequately track the moral reasons there are.  
The second comparative element relates to the fact that, in some cases, part of 
the justification of the coercive policies comes from their communicative effects. 
Coercion plays the important role of communicating the political community’s 
judgements about a given kind of conduct, and it is this expressive value that sometimes 
grounds part of its permissibility (Duff 2001). This communicative potential, and its 
                                                          
123 These are named in reference to part of Frankfurt’s argument in ‘Alternative Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility’ (1969). 
124 The problem in the case of real-world examples like legal coercive measures is that, unlike the fictitious 
Frankfurt interventions, they are not able to kick in to prevent a person acting against her enforceable 
duties. Consequently, they cannot always prevent harm to others (but only to punish the agent 
afterwards). Hence, the preventative nature of mind control measures does provide a pro tanto reason in 
their favour (for more on this, and the issue of the right to do wrong more generally, see Savulescu, 
Douglas, and Persson 2014: 100-108).  
  
120 
 
associated potential as a means of supporting improved moral insight and motivation, is 
not open to the kinds of nudges that we are discussing in this section. These two points 
highlight that manipulative nudges block the possibility of developing and exercising 
morally responsible agency in a way that coercive measures do not and, as a result, deny 
citizens the opportunity to access the ethical value that attaches to the exercise of such 
agency. 
Hence, it might sometimes be morally impermissible (or at least, undesirable) to 
use moral nudges as a means of securing moral conformity, even though it would be 
permissible to force people to conform. But this concern requires only that we qualify, 
not abandon, the duty view. The two considerations outlined above offer pro tanto (or 
defeasible) reasons; and so it is possible that there will be some cases in which the 
political community will have decisive reasons to use these kinds of moral nudges rather 
than (further) coercion. This may be the case if: (a) nudges were (much) more likely to 
be successful, (b) nudges were (much) less costly to implement (on the assumption of 
similar efficacy), or (c) nudges would not (but coercion would) impose on the target 
burdens greater than that for which he or she is liable.125 When one or more of these 
defeasibility conditions is met, psychologically manipulative nudges are all things 
considered morally permissible, despite the fact that their insidiousness does make them 
worse than coercion in one way.  
 
§5.4: Moral Responsibility, Living Well, and Choice Architecture 
This is not the only way in which PCA might be used to bring about moral outcomes. 
We distinguished four distinct potential aims of moral nudging in §5.2.3, and have so far 
focused only on the first. In this section, our focus shifts to the question of whether 
choice architecture can play a role in helping citizens to comply, rather than merely 
conform, with moral reasons.      
One of the most interesting features of PCA, and in my view the key to its 
potential in bringing about active or voluntary behaviour change, is that it operates by 
altering the way in which people see their choice environments. The main issue that 
interests us here is whether it is able to do this in ways that support the development 
and exercise of morally responsible agency. My argument in this section, and the central 
contribution of the chapter, is that there are three distinct ways in which PCA is able to 
encourage the kinds of moral improvement involved in exercising such agency. It is 
                                                          
125 I thank Tom Parr for helping me to delineate these three defeasibility conditions more clearly. 
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argued that moral nudges can support morally responsible agency by: (i) helping people 
to act in line with their moral beliefs (as in (2) above); (ii) inducing moral deliberation 
(as in (3) above); or (iii) changing people’s beliefs about what they owe to others (as in 
(4) above).  
The first of these represents a form of motivational enhancement, since citizens 
already hold the relevant moral beliefs in these cases. For this reason, I call this category 
motivational scaffolding (§5.4.1). The second and third, by contrast, are primarily directed at 
improved insight – though they differ in terms of their (epistemic) directiveness. Inducing 
moral deliberation (§5.4.2) is relatively nondirective (which is why it can also act as a form 
of motivational improvement, as in (3a), as well as improved insight, as in (3b)), while 
public-ecological persuasion (§5.4.3) offers a more directive attempt to influence citizens’ 
beliefs. Before discussing each of these in detail below, it will be instructive to offer 
some general comments.  
Which kinds of moral duties might these interventions be directed towards 
securing? As mentioned above, the distinctive advantage and contribution of moral 
choice architecture rests in its ability to serve as a means of overcoming problems 
associated with nonenforceability.126 There are many moral duties which are, for a variety of 
reasons, nonenforceable. We drew a distinction between two categories of such duties 
above: (i) those that are nonenforceable in principle because, by their very nature, they 
need to be performed freely; and (ii) those that are enforceable in principle, but which it 
is neither possible nor morally desirable for the state to coerce people into performing, 
perhaps because they are considered “imperfect duties” (Kant 2002: 40), or because the 
agent’s decisions about whether or not to act on this duty are taken to be protected by 
an “injunction” (Kagan 1989: 219-230; more on this below). In both cases, there are 
good reasons – moral and ethical – to see that citizens fulfil these duties, even though it 
is not possible to use the traditional coercive measures of the state to do so. Our focus 
will tend to be on duties that fall into the latter category, those that are nonenforceable 
in practice rather than in principle, since this includes more of the kinds of duties on 
                                                          
126 There are active, ongoing debates about how we should categorise many duties. One illustrative 
example is the debate over organ donation. We might think that there is a duty to make our organs 
available to those in need of life-saving transplants, at least in the event of our death. But many people 
think that this duty to aid is nonenforceable, that is, that the compulsory confiscation of cadaveric organs 
is wrong. Others have argued that the needs of the sick should, at least in principle, be met by the 
confiscation of organs from the dead and even from the living (Fabre 2006). There is, therefore, a certain 
level of indeterminacy about what types of duties some duties are (Krishnamurthy 2015). We will not enter 
into, or take any substantive views on, these debates here. Instead, we accept the less controversial view 
that we have many duties (e.g., duties to aid, duties of beneficence, and so on) that are putatively 
nonenforceable as the basis for exploring the conditions under which it might be permissible to use moral 
nudges as a means of compliance-promoting moral improvement. 
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which governments might feel that they need to encourage for the sake of meeting their 
public policy objectives: e.g., organ and blood donation, charitable giving for poverty 
alleviation, neutralising discriminatory implicit biases, pro-environmental behaviour to 
reduce the speed and harms of climate change, parents supporting children’s learning, 
and so on.127      
A separate distinction relating to moral compliance tracks, to some extent at 
least, the distinction between categories of nonenforceable duties. When a duty is non-
enforceable in principle, it requires that we recognise and act from a particular (kind of) 
reason or motivation. In these kinds of cases, moral compliance is regarded as a duty, 
i.e., there are moral reasons to secure compliance. By contrast, in other cases, such as 
when a duty is nonenforceable in practice, it does not require compliance with reasons, 
though it remains in the interest of the agent to comply. In these types of case, moral 
compliance is not regarded as a duty, but as something that is valuable for the agent – 
she lives better by doing so. Given the focus noted above, it will be this second category 
– based on the ethical reasons (in addition to practical ones, given that coercion is not 
an option) in favour of pursuing moral improvement in a way that supports morally 
responsible agency – that will be our primary site of interest when considering how 
moral nudges might be compliance-supporting. 
Such agency requires that an individual is both reasonably receptive (the epistemic 
condition) and adequately reactive (the control condition) to the moral reasons that there 
are.128 To be morally responsible for an action, and thereby for it to have ethical value 
for the agent or for it to count as a fulfilment of compliance-requiring duties, the 
mechanism that issues in the desired or required action needs to be, in an appropriate 
sense, the agent’s own mechanism (Fischer 2012: 187). How might choice architecture 
play a role in the design of policies, or “moral ecologies” (Kelly and Morar 2016), that 
meet these conditions for moral responsibility? One of the most promising approaches 
comes from taking into account the important psychological findings about the role of 
salience in attentional selection, and exploring the political implications of this empirically 
grounded view of moral psychology.  
Within the study of perception and cognition, salience (or “saliency”) is a term 
that refers to any aspect of an environment that stands out from the rest in some way. 
                                                          
127 By comparison, the in-principle nonenforceable duties, which include the duties of friendship and 
consideration, are more controversial sites of interference since they relate more to private interactions 
and personal virtues.  
128 Here I follow Fischer and Ravizza in adopting a moderate version of reasons-responsiveness. For 
more on this, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 62-91). 
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As a result, salience – which can be the result of emotional, motivational, or cognitive 
factors – has a determining role in directing attention. For our purposes, the central 
thought is that there may be ways in which the political community could induce or 
support practical moral reasoning and reasons-recognition by making relevant moral 
considerations and reasons for action (more) salient within the choice environment. By 
designing choice environments that alter the way in which citizens see (perceive, feel, 
and so on) a situation, it may be possible to improve their understanding of the morally 
relevant reasons that apply to them in that situation. In some contexts this might be 
achieved by obscuring morally distracting or irrelevant features of the situation, so as to 
“hinder hindrances” to perceiving or acting in light of its morally relevant features 
(Connelly 2014: 228). The first of the three compliance-supporting moral nudges, which 
we move on to describing now, includes aspects of this hindrance-hindering, while the 
other two forms seek rather to induce moral deliberation and reasons-recognition.  
    
§5.4.1: “Motivational Scaffolding” 
Some nudges may support a person’s ability or reduce her disability to act in accordance 
with how she believes she ought to act. In so doing, they can help to bring about greater 
coherence between an individual’s behaviour and the belief she herself holds about her 
reasons for action in a given, morally relevant situation. In these cases, the person holds 
a particular belief, but, for one of many reasons including some relating to automaticity, 
she (predictably) fails to act in the way that she believes she ought. This mismatch 
between a person’s beliefs and her behaviour can occur for a number of reasons. One is 
due to weakness of will (or moral akrasia), which captures cases in which a person holds 
a belief but experiences motivational hindrances to acting on it. Another relates to lack 
of awareness: although an individual holds the belief that she should act in a certain way 
in relevant circumstances, she might be unaware that the current situation is such a 
circumstance – something that is often due to attentional deficits. A third is on account 
of the phenomenon of (inauthentic) implicit bias, which issues in automatic prejudiced 
judgments and social behaviour, even in those who explicitly hold non-discriminatory 
beliefs.   
It is clear that the harm and wrongs committed would be significantly reduced if 
people could more reliably (be motivated to) comply with the moral reasons that they 
acknowledge and accept. But, in addition, part of the justification for motivational 
scaffolding comes from its potential to promote the agent’s morally responsible agency 
in so far as it promotes her autonomous agency. The three examples above describe 
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instances of there being a mismatch between an individual’s beliefs and her actions, and 
such mismatches are generally considered to be a problem for her autonomy. Any 
motivational improvement that PCA can generate would serve the individual’s interest 
in being able to execute the moral beliefs she has. This reasoning grounds a (defeasible) 
reason in favour of these compliance-supporting moral nudges. 
This argument, however, requires a content-sensitive limitation because the ideal 
of autonomy, and its associated weight as a moral constraint to intervention, does not 
extend from the prudential to the moral domain in any straightforward way. In short, it 
matters whether an individual’s beliefs reasonably track the moral reasons there are. 
Even though it would promote a person’s autonomy in a particular sense if she is better 
motivated to act on her moral beliefs, if these beliefs are inadmissible then interventions 
that improve her motivation to act on such beliefs do not support moral responsibility, 
and so do not contribute to living well at all. Another way of putting this is: if (and only 
if) a person is receptive – even if not adequately reactive – to a decisive moral reason for 
action, then nudges that help to reduce the mismatch between her belief and her action 
can support moral responsibility and, consequently, can play a role in supporting her in 
living well. 
Unlike the two categories of moral nudges that are directed at improved moral 
insight (detailed below), motivational scaffolding could, in principle, take the form of 
either a “System 1” or “System 2” nudge, although additional constraints may be 
necessary in the case of the former. Let’s begin with the case of neutralising implicit 
biases, where System 1 nudges are most likely to be permissible on account of the 
nature of the problem at hand. Implicit biases are “automatic associations, often 
operational without the reflective awareness of the agent, which influence action” 
(Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 106). As Moles highlights, the “unconscious nature of implicit 
biases does not cancel the duty that individuals have not to behave in a racist [or 
otherwise wrongfully discriminatory] manner” (2015: 663). The most potent aspect of 
these biases is that they are possessed by most people, including those who explicitly 
and sincerely hold egalitarian beliefs – a phenomenon that has been called “aversive 
racism” in cases where the bias is based on racial associations (Pearson et al. 2009). The 
issue of whether and how we might be able to regulate and control these biases is 
currently a site of much empirical and philosophical interest (see, e.g., many of the 
chapters in Brownstein and Saul 2016a and 2016b). What the empirical research does 
suggest is: (i) that attempts at directly suppressing implicit associations are unlikely to be 
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successful and, in fact, may sometimes exacerbate the problem (Holroyd 2012 on the 
evidence on “rebound effect”), which seems to advise against System 2 nudges; and (ii) 
that individuals’ ability to sustain and implement their egalitarian commitments in the 
face of these unconscious threats “depends crucially on hospitable environments” in 
helping to automatise the egalitarian motivations that are representative of her moral 
beliefs (Rees 2016: 209-210).  
Taking these two things together, motivational scaffolding is likely to work best 
when delivered via System 1 nudges in the case of reducing implicit biases. For instance, 
the political community might arrange social environments in ways that offer counter-
stereotypes, the idea being to rewrite citizens’ automatic learned associations over time 
in order to dissociate the negative link between, e.g., black people and violence 
(Dasgupta 2013; Moles 2015: 664).129 There is also some evidence about regulating the 
cognitive “accessibility” of stereotypes: for those with egalitarian beliefs, there is some 
evidence that biased reactions can be partly regulated by nonconsciously “activating” 
these goals (Madva 2016).130 This is because, given limited cognitive resources, people 
struggle to keep their liberal and egalitarian goals activated all the time, with the result 
that stereotypes are more readily accessible in the brain. Hence, PCA may have some 
role to play in “scaffolding” moral cognition by keeping egalitarian goals activated.131  
Despite sharing a similar underlying motivation, these System 1 nudges differ in 
subtle but important ways from the auto-nudges discussed in the analysis of prudential 
nudging. That category was restricted specifically to System 1 nudges that a person 
herself opts in or consents to. As we have been focused on that category of people who 
are committed to non-discrimination above some threshold, it is likely that these people 
would consent to regulating their implicit biases in these ways. But, in the moral realm 
(or in cases like this one at least), the commitment to consent is lessened, because these 
interventions are designed primarily for the sake of preventing harm to those who are 
the target of these implicit biases. Those who do not hold egalitarian beliefs therefore 
                                                          
129 The evidence shows that white people, even those with explicit egalitarian beliefs, “often display 
reflexive signs of distrust and aversion, including increased blinking rates and decreased eye contact when 
they interact with black people” (Hueber 2016: 48; for original study, see Dovidio et al. 1997). This leads 
to epistemic injustices, in particular, testimonial injustices (Fricker 2007) and can have serious – even life-
threatening – implications for black people, such as the well-documented “shooter bias” (see Brownstein 
2016: 776-778 for an overview of the evidence).  
130 In psychology, accessibility refers to “the ease with which a particular unit of information is activated or 
can be retrieved from memory” (Morewedge and Kahneman 2010: 435; cited in Madva 2016: 192). 
131 The closest Sunstein gets to talking about moral nudges in the way that we are understanding them is a 
short clarification in his latest book, The Ethics of Influence, in which he states that: “Some nudges are 
designed not to promote the interest of choosers, but to give fairness the benefit of the doubt, by 
promoting particular understandings of (say) equality” (2016a: 34-35). 
  
126 
 
do not have a complaint against their use. Nonetheless, the hypothetical consent of the 
portion of the population for whom these interventions count as a form of motivational 
scaffolding, a significant proportion if the existing data is anything to go by, is not 
unimportant; it signifies that moral nudges of this kind are compliance-supporting for 
these citizens. These nudges deliver on Sunstein’s promise that nudges increase how 
well a person’s life is going by “steering [his or her] decisions in the right direction (as 
judged by themselves)” (2014a: 17; emphasis added).   
There are examples of motivational scaffolding that do operate in a way that 
parallels the auto-nudge mechanism. One example is the weak-willed philanthropist 
(Krishnamurthy 2015). Consider a person who holds the belief that the needs and 
human rights of those in poverty mean that she ought to give a certain amount of her 
disposable income each month to effective poverty-alleviation charities. Even though 
she sincerely holds this belief, she is not always adequately motivated to make the 
transfer that she believes she should make. It is permissible to do a number of things 
that might help this individual act on her beliefs by helping her to overcome her 
weakness of will. The charity to which she donates, for instance, could give her the 
option of setting up a monthly direct debit transfer or opting in to a voluntary text 
message reminder service that sends her a message at the beginning of each month 
reminding her about her charitable commitment – these are classic examples of pre-
commitment or “auto-nudges”. Similar kinds of policies could be used for supporting a 
person’s commitment to, e.g., donating blood at regular intervals, carbon offsetting, and 
so on.  
In one way, such policies would seem not to be compliance-supporting. If 
people are weak-willed or attentionally deficient in certain situations, and need PCA to 
help them secure certain outcomes in practice, it would appear that they are not 
sufficiently reactive to reasons, even if they do recognise them. But this concern misses 
the point of these kinds of interventions: in the empirical conditions under which we 
seek to exercise our moral agency, recognising that there are several kinds of 
motivational threats to bringing our moral beliefs into action and acting in order to 
lessen or cancel the effects that these threats might exert on us can be seen as an 
important part of what it means to exercise morally responsible agency. Callan expresses 
a similar point when he states that, “A necessary part of virtuous motivation as it has 
been traditionally conceived is the desire to avoid circumstances in which our own 
virtue is needlessly put under strain” (2015: 493). PCA offers one way in which we can 
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support this reasons-reactivity side of moral compliance, which links back to our earlier 
discussion (in §4.4.1) about the idea that autonomous and now, by extension, morally 
responsible agency is partly a social achievement, as well as an individual one.  
So far we have discussed System 1-based versions of motivational scaffolding. 
This relates to the second potential aim of moral nudging, i.e., (2). It is also possible that 
System 2 nudges can act as a form of motivational scaffolding. One of the potential 
outcomes of inducing moral deliberation – the category explored in full in the next 
subsection – is that it might help people to bring their own behaviour in line with their 
beliefs in morally relevant situations, i.e., (3a). By encouraging people to direct their 
attention towards some morally salient feature of a choice environment, choice 
architects might not only nudge citizens into taking into consideration reasons they had 
not previously recognised, they might also remind those who have already recognised 
the relevant reasons of their commitment to act in accordance with them. Of course, 
choice architects cannot discriminate between these two groups; but there is no need to, 
since the same intervention will interact with people’s practical reasoning processes in 
different ways according to their existing epistemic status vis-à-vis the issue at hand.  
One limitation of motivational scaffolding is that it is premised on citizens’ 
already holding the relevant moral beliefs. This shifts our attention to the question of 
how moral nudges might act on citizens who do not. The second and third categories in 
the account are concerned with PCA’s potential as a means of enhancing an individual’s 
understanding of morality. This is more controversial than motivational scaffolding 
because, rather than seeking to bring a person’s behaviour in line with the beliefs she 
already holds, these interventions seek to influence and develop her understanding of 
the moral reasons there are and, in some cases, to do so in a way that seeks to change 
her current beliefs about what she has reason to do. There are two types of roles that 
moral System 2 nudges might play in this process: inducing moral deliberation 
(discussed in the next subsection) and a more directive version that I am calling “public-
ecological persuasion” (discussed in §5.4.3). 
 
§5.4.2: “Inducing Moral Deliberation”  
Like the nudge-autonomy mechanism outlined in Chapter 4, moral System 2 nudges can 
support compliance by encouraging, prompting, or inducing moral deliberation on a 
particular issue about which citizens are reasonably considered to have a duty. One of 
the main ways of doing this is to make its morally relevant aspects more salient within 
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the choice environment.132 Consider the policy for organ donation registration in the 
UK. Unlike other countries that have either an opt-in (e.g., Germany) or opt-out (e.g., 
Austria) default rule, the UK has designed an active choosing policy that asks people 
when they visit the DVLA website to apply for a driving licence or to tax their vehicle 
whether they wish to register as an organ donor and, if so, which organs they would be 
willing to donate in the event of their death. This type of design encourages people – 
specifically, those who are not already registered as donors – to think about the issue. 
We might assume that, for some at least, this encourages them to deliberate to some 
degree about what it is that they owe to others and how this should be weighed against 
other, prudential reasons they might have.  
 This type of moral nudge is nondirective in an important sense. Although it is a 
measure that is intended to increase registration, and thereby to lessen the harm 
suffered by those in need of transplants, it does not seek actively either to manipulate or 
persuade people into making a particular choice. Rather, it respects that people are 
capable of reasons-responsiveness and that, either via individual forms of deliberation 
or by deliberating with others about what it is reasonable for citizens to expect of one 
another, citizens can come to appreciate the applicability and force of relevant moral 
reasons. The deliberation that is elicited may clarify, and in some instances change, an 
individual’s belief about what he or she owes to others in this particular case. 
Sometimes this will involve the application of a belief relating to a moral principle – 
such as a general commitment to fairness and reciprocity, for instance – to a specific 
real-world case, thereby producing a more specified belief about what such a 
commitment means for one’s decision about whether or not to register as an organ 
donor. At other times, it may lead to citizens forming or modifying a belief at a more 
abstract level by creating an opportunity for people to “grapple with the relevant moral 
concepts directly” (Shiffrin 2010: 1222). In either case, these nudges can support moral 
compliance and, as a result, can serve the interests of the agent, as well as the interests 
of those (who will be) in need of organ transplants. 
                                                          
132 Note the difference between aiming at encouraging moral deliberation and aiming at another good, but 
foreseeing that the most effective choice architecture design might act by nudging people into moral 
deliberation. This relates to different uses of the term intention (and therefore intentional): in both cases we 
are aware of what will be the consequences of the intervention (the broader sense); but only in the first 
case do we intend moral deliberation in so far as this is what we aimed at or planned for (the narrower 
sense) (Scanlon 2010: 10-11; see Anscombe 1958: 9, for a similar distinction). This is related to the point 
made in fn. 78. Here, we adopt the broader notion (which includes the narrower sense), because the 
principal goal is to protect others from harm, even though there may be ethical value to doing this in a 
way that encourages people to recognise and respond to moral reasons.  
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In reality, the deliberative processes that result from these nudges will only 
rarely, if ever, approximate the idealised – or rather “unrealistic” – model of deliberation 
that is thought to involve an individual identifying an evaluative term, coming to a 
considered judgement about its proper application, and then adjusting his or her 
conduct accordingly at that point in time (Shiffrin 2010: 1226). But the fact that the 
induced deliberation will include unconscious as well as conscious elements (such as 
emotions) and errors as well as insights, both across the citizenry and within individual 
citizens, does not offer a reason against the use of nudges that aim at influencing 
people’s beliefs and behaviour in this way.        
Inducing moral deliberation might have an interesting role in counteracting a 
phenomenon known as “strategic ignorance” (Wieland 2016, 2017; Heffernan 2012 
explores a similar phenomenon, calling it “wilful blindness”).133 The central thought 
here is that sometimes we know (in a second-order sense, as it were) that being aware of 
certain facts about a situation (in a first-order sense) would give us reasons to change 
our current pattern of behaviour; thus, we deliberately try to avoid such knowledge, 
most likely because we would feel forced to weigh the moral reason against conflicting, 
self-interested ones. This example is difficult to categorise because in some ways it is 
similar to cases requiring motivational scaffolding: an individual has a particular moral 
belief or is aware of a moral belief that she thinks she should hold, and the aim of the 
nudge intervention is to try to reduce the mismatch between this and her behaviour. 
But it also seems that there is something different about these kinds of cases. In 
particular, there is a sense is which the nudges that act as motivational scaffolds in the 
cases above secure or at least support moral compliance in a way that they would not do 
in cases of strategic ignorance. The difference seems to come from the strategic nature 
and perhaps even intentionality associated with the ignorance, namely, this betrays a 
lack of commitment to the moral belief and the role that it should play in our action. 
There is a certain amount of moral insight in these cases, but this insight is being used 
more to shield the person from some inconvenience or their anticipated guilt rather 
than to direct their actions in morally good ways. Strategic ignorance does not cancel 
out the duty that individuals have not to be complicit in, for example, exploitative and 
unjust labour conditions; so nudges that make certain morally relevant information 
                                                          
133 Moody-Adams has suggested that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the 
tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known” (2004: 266). 
Wieland offers an analysis of “willful” (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance (2017), and discusses 
issues relating to responsibility for such ignorance (2016).  
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salient can induce (unwanted) moral deliberation about how the moral reasons should 
weigh against other reasons. 
To clarify, the principal aim of using these kinds of nudges is, like those 
belonging to the nudge-autonomy mechanism, to help citizens better to recognise for 
themselves the moral reasons that apply to certain situations. They do not seek to direct or 
persuade citizens towards particular decisional outcomes, despite there clearly being a 
sense in which the choice architecture communicates something about the political 
community’s norms and judgements. Shiffrin makes a similar argument with respect to 
legal standards (vis-à-vis legal rules), which I made reference to in §5.1. She writes:  
 
“the rationale for standards I have been discussing does not aim to impart specific 
content through bypassing independent deliberation but rather aims to spark independent 
deliberation; although the standards themselves incorporate moral concepts and so, in 
that way, aim to elicit an interpretation or conception of what is morally apt or 
appropriate, that standard that elicits deliberation dictates no specific content to that 
interpretation.” (Shiffrin 2010: 134) 
 
In the organ donation example, for instance, the main aim is that people are responsive 
to their own reasoning on this issue, which is an important feature of morally 
responsible agency too. As it is, policies of this kind are directive in so far as they direct 
people’s attention and deliberation toward an issue and in so far as this is perceived by 
citizens as carrying an implicit recommendation about behaving or deciding in one way 
or another. But people are free to make their decision about whether to register as an 
organ donor without any further pressure being exerted on them. There is another 
category of System 2 nudge that does seek to exert this kind of persuasive pressure for 
the sake of enhancing citizens’ understanding of morality. We discuss this next.  
 
§5.4.3: “Public-Ecological Persuasion” 
A more controversial type of moral nudge might seek not to bring behaviour into 
conformity with one’s beliefs or to encourage moral deliberation, but to change people’s 
beliefs concerning what they owe to others. Its controversiality rests on the idea that 
interventions that interfere with people’s belief-formation are often more worrisome 
than those that influence their actions (Clayton and Moles, forthcoming). Recall that 
there is an epistemic condition, as well as a control condition, for morally responsible 
agency. The issue at stake relates to whether it is permissible for the political community 
to influence an individual in ways that enhance her understanding of morality for her 
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own sake, that is, in ways that help her to meet the epistemic condition required for 
moral responsibility. The challenge that needs to be addressed is: even if moral 
responsibility is part of what it means to live well, and that this requires moral insight, it 
does not necessarily follow that it is permissible for the state to seek to morally educate 
its (adult) citizens without their consent. In response, I will defend the view that moral 
choice architecture can act as a form of persuasion – a form that I will call public-ecological 
persuasion – and that its use as a means of belief and behaviour modification is morally 
permissible under certain conditions.  
There is surprisingly little philosophical work on persuasion as a political 
method.134 This dearth is odd for two main reasons. First, despite rational persuasion 
generally having a special moral status as compared to other means of influencing 
beliefs and behaviour, there is not much more than a common characterisation of it in 
the political-philosophical literature as, in short, reason-giving.135 Second, there have been 
substantial developments in both psychology (e.g., Cialdini 1994) and technology (e.g., 
Fogg 2003) that have provided us with the tools both to understand and to exploit, 
respectively, the power of influences on our beliefs and behaviours. These have often 
been described in terms of persuasion – e.g., “persuasive technologies” and Packard’s 
(2007) description of advertisers as “hidden persuaders” – despite their questionable 
connection to reason-giving. One way of describing our discussion here is that it will 
take place within the conceptual space created by the interaction of these two reasons: 
based on the psychological evidence about influences on our beliefs and behaviour, it 
will explore the potential for a special type of rational persuasion that extends the 
common characterisation of reason-giving to include reasons that are given by being 
built, in effect, into the choice architecture. It will argue that this type of persuasion, 
under certain conditions, shares in the special moral status that is given to the other 
members of this family – even if only in a more qualified way. 
Rational persuasion involves “the act or activity of presenting information, facts, 
evidence, or arguments that one [i.e., the persuader] takes to provide reasons”, where 
reasons are “particular considerations that count in favour of belief, attitude, or action, 
and that have normative force” (Tsai 2014: 89). Thus, the activity of offering reasons to 
a person represents an attempt on the behalf of the persuader to change the receiving 
                                                          
134 Some notable exceptions include Burnell and Reeve (1984), Strauss (1991), Sawicki (2016), and Tsai 
(2014).   
135 For a recent paper questioning this special moral status, see Tsai (2014), which argues that some kinds 
of rational persuasion are paternalistic. 
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agent’s beliefs and his or her subsequent behaviour.136 Through the provision of 
reasons, persuasion aims to influence how people see their choices in relevant choice 
environments. The reasons given can be either explicit, as when a doctor tells an 
individual that her (deteriorating) health gives her reasons not to smoke, or implicit, as 
when a doctor presents her with statistics relating to the relationship between poor 
health and smoking.137 It does not appear that there is any normative difference between 
implicit or explicit forms of rational persuasion. 
In their assessment and critique of nudging, Hausman and Welch claim that: 
“Coercion is often justified, and shaping [i.e., PCA] sometimes a better alternative than 
coercion, but rational persuasion is the ideal way to influence the behaviour of citizens” 
(2010: 135). However, is the distinction between rational persuasion and nudges (i.e., 
“shaping”) as stark as these commentators make out? Their claim about the relative 
desirability of the different interventions rests on the view that “only rational persuasion 
fully respects the sovereignty of the individual over his or her own choices”, that is, his 
or her autonomy (ibid.). Hausman and Welch nonetheless note two important qualifiers 
concerning (i) the limited force and effectiveness of rational persuasion and (ii) the fact 
that, in reality, persuasion is “rarely purely rational”. The authors follow the second up 
with a footnote, important within the context of the view I wish to defend, which states 
that:  
 
“A systematic account of rational persuasion is needed here. We do not mean to suggest 
that rational persuasion is emotionless cold calculation. Clarifying the role of emotion in 
rational persuasion is a difficult task for another occasion.” (Hausman and Welch 2010: 135; 
emphasis added)  
 
It seems clear, to me at least, that the concept of persuasion is in need of further 
conceptual refinement, especially in light of the psychological evidence and its bearing 
on how we conceive of rationality; and that the corollary of this is that its use as a 
                                                          
136 The use of the term “attempt” is important. It refers to a distinction, which Burnell and Reeve 
highlight (1984: 399), between two ways in which we might understand persuasion. On the success 
conception, calling something an act of persuasion is dependent upon it producing a successful outcome, 
namely, that the target comes to share the reasons advanced by the persuader. See, for instance, Faden 
and Beauchamp’s approach which refers to persuasion as “an intentional and successful attempt” (1986: 
261, 347). By contrast, the process conception views persuasion simply as the activity of advancing reasons, 
regardless of whether the target is persuaded by the reasons or not. This distinction is important because 
it determines persuasion’s relative distance from coercion. One way of thinking about the nature of 
coercion is that it simply fails to be coercion if it is unsuccessful; that is, “coercion depends upon success” 
(Burnell and Reeve 1984: 396). The success conception therefore makes persuasion more like other forms 
of power, such as coercion, than perhaps we might think it should be. For this reason, I adopt a process 
conception.         
137 I first saw this distinction, together with a similar example, in an unpublished paper by Tom Parr.  
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political method is also in need of further normative analysis. Although this “difficult 
task” cannot be addressed here in the detail it deserves, the argument offered in this 
subsection is intended as an initial contribution to developing this part of the literature, 
specifically as it relates to the ethics of behaviourally-informed governmental influence. 
 We first need to address a terminological issue. Some use “persuasion” in a 
broad sense that takes it away somewhat from the central idea of reason-giving. In a 
recent paper that marks one of the few normative contributions to the literature, 
Sawicki distinguishes between different kinds of “persuasive appeals” according to the 
“degree to which they engage reason”. She maintains that some are made on rational 
grounds (such as “presenting truthful facts […] with no inaccuracies, omissions, or 
biases”), while others influence choices “on grounds unrelated to reason – because they 
distract from rational deliberation, operate on a plane apart from rational deliberation, 
or render rational deliberation irrelevant” (2016: 213). On her definition, persuasion that 
is based on “arational” factors “either distracts from, or renders irrelevant, the listener’s 
reliance on reason in making a given decision”, and she lists emotional appeals and 
appeals that rely on cognitive biases alongside subliminal messaging as examples of this 
arational persuasion (Sawicki 2016: 214).  
This raises a number of issues that I wish to address, in particular, the role that 
emotions can play in our reasoning processes. The point to make at this stage, though, 
is that what Sawicki is defining as arational persuasion is more appropriately described 
in terms of “manipulation”, given the way in which she has described what it means for 
an influence to be arational (i.e., as reason-bypassing in various ways). Accepting this 
allows us to keep the term “persuasion” for reason-giving influences. This is the 
terminological route taken by Tsai, too, whose work also highlights that manipulative 
influence can take place via rational means. He gives the following examples of rational 
manipulation:  
 
“One might introduce reasons into a person’s deliberations in order to play on her 
neuroses (or simple, individual preoccupations) so as to impede her deliberation and 
control the likelihood of a certain outcome to her deliberation. One might inundate 
someone with lots of relevant information, doing so precisely in order to overwhelm her 
and hinder her deliberation. One might present someone with evidence with the aim of 
emphasizing certain relevant information and facts, while intentionally neglecting to 
mention other information one acknowledges as relevant.” (Tsai 2014: 89-90).   
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As a result, we can represent this conceptual space with four quadrants, where the x-axis 
captures the space between manipulation to persuasion, and the y-axis captures the 
space between rational to nonrational (not “arational”) forms of influence (see Figure 1, 
below). Four kinds of influence are roughly plotted on this graph: those that tend to be 
viewed as classic cases of rational persuasion (e.g., factual information provision) and of 
manipulation (e.g., subliminal messaging) are marked by X1 and X2, respectively; and 
those that count as less well established forms of both persuasion (i.e., public-ecological 
persuasion) and manipulation (i.e., rational manipulation) are marked as X3 and X4, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Plotting the conceptual space. 
 
The first point to make about this conceptual space requires returning to 
Sawicki’s conceptualisation. Recall that she defines “arational” persuasion as those 
influences that affect choices in ways that are “unrelated to reason – because they distract 
from rational deliberation, operate on a plane apart from rational deliberation, or render 
rational deliberation irrelevant”. We have categorised such influences instead as 
manipulation. Where Sawicki’s conceptualisation goes wrong, in my view, is that it 
appears at times to categorise all forms of influence with emotional and cognitive 
heuristic-based elements as arational and, consequently, as manipulative.138 But there is 
an important difference between influences that act in this arational or manipulative 
                                                          
138 Sawicki claims, for instance, that: “While subliminal advertising may be an extreme example, the same 
outcome would likely play out were the state to communicate through appeals to emotions or cognitive 
biases – a person’s thought process would be affected without her consent, and she would not be able to 
make a substantive decision without the intrusion of the government’s message” (2016: 218-219). 
X3 
manipulation 
        rational manipulation    X4 
 
persuasion 
X3 
rational 
nonrational 
classic manipulation          
 
X2 
X1 
“public-ecological persuasion” 
classic rational persuasion  
  
135 
 
fashion, and those that involve nonrational elements. On my view, there are ways in 
which influences that include cognitive heuristic-based and emotional elements can 
permissibly be used with the aim of engaging reason, for the purpose of helping people 
better to appreciate moral reasons. This is the basis of the nudge-based category of 
persuasion that I label public-ecological persuasion.  
 Public-ecological persuasion will often take the form of what we might call 
“enhanced” active choosing policy designs.139 Take as an example a prompted choice 
design for organ donation registration that includes a factual statement intended to 
make salient the moral reason in favour of registering as a donor. One possible example 
would be: “On average, 22 people die each day in the United States alone while waiting 
for a transplant”.140 Another might make use of a descriptive norm, such as stating the 
percentage of people who are already registered as organ donors. There is clearly an 
element of rational persuasion here; indeed, some would be happy to call such an 
influence just that. My own view is not very far away from this, as can be seen in where 
this influence is plotted on the graph above. But it does contend that public-ecological 
persuasion is a distinct category. In particular, these persuasive efforts are better 
described as being a kind of mixed policy: part rational persuasion, part nudge. They 
clearly involve efforts at rational persuasion because they convey important information 
that is relevant to the person’s decision, and they allow an individual to engage in their 
own deliberative process about how to respond to this information. Nonetheless, 
designing an active choice framework (in place of, say, the traditional opt-in framework) 
and presenting the information in psychologically salient ways – such as by framing the 
information in terms of those who die waiting for organs rather than those who 
successfully receive organ transplants, or in terms of those who are already registered as 
donors rather than those who are not (Bovens 2009: 208-209) – clearly also count as 
elements of nudging, that is, as using public-ecological design as a means of bringing 
about belief or behaviour change.  
 Some might worry about this “persuasive design” of moral nudge policies on 
one of two potential grounds. The first concerns their directiveness. In the case of 
prudential nudging, it was deemed objectionably paternalistic to use System 2 nudges to 
steer people’s deliberative processes in a directive way. Why, then, is this not the same 
                                                          
139 Sunstein and Reisch briefly introduce (a version of) “enhanced” or “influenced” active choosing as a 
possibility (2015: 154), though this idea is originally introduced by Keller et al. (2011).  
140 See the following webpages for infographics displaying this figure from the US Department of Health 
and Human Services (2016): (1) https://www.organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html, and (2) 
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov. 
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in the case of moral nudging? The answer can be found in the differences between the 
epistemic conditions for autonomous and morally responsible agency. As was explained 
in §5.2.2, supporting the latter requires supporting citizens in coming to an appreciation 
of the moral reasons, but doing so in a way that gives them the freedom to see things 
aright. The aim of the System 2 nudges that are used in public-ecological persuasion is 
precisely this: to encourage citizens to recognise and appreciate moral reasons, where 
fully appreciating a reason means that an agent assigns it the appropriate weight in her 
deliberations (Hanna 2015: 627-628). The asymmetry with the prudential realm is 
grounded in the following three points: (i) the state does not have the same authority to 
protect people from their own self-regarding behaviour (when this is sufficiently 
voluntary and autonomous) as it does in constraining the harm that their other-
regarding behaviour can cause to others; (ii) this is partly because there is and always 
will be considerable reasonable disagreement about what it could mean to “see things 
aright” in the prudential realm; and (iii) this heterogeneity is central to the idea that it is 
part of what it means to live well to take an active role in creating and performing one’s 
own life, which is what grounds the value of autonomy. (I return to this concern in the 
next subsection.)  
 The second kind of concern worries not about the directiveness itself, but about 
the mechanism by which it operates. Does it work by inducing certain emotional 
reactions? And, if so, does this count as a form of psychological manipulation? The 
worry is that the addition of the statement about the average amount of daily deaths of 
people waiting for organ transplants is intended to work, and indeed is successful at 
generating behaviour change, by inducing guilt in citizens about not registering as organ 
donors. If this is true, then it may seem that it is not their appreciation of the reason 
that produces the outcome, but rather the fact that the government intentionally played 
on their emotions in a potentially manipulative way in order to bring about a particular 
decision. I think this concern is an important one; if this were the case, this would raise 
interesting questions about whether this might still be permissible. Nevertheless, I also 
think that this mischaracterises the way in which affect-cum-motivational states such as 
guilt are involved in bringing about behavioural changes in cases such as these, and that 
clarifying this diffuses the worry (and, more than this, offers further support for public-
ecological persuasion).141 To show this, I will engage with some recent studies that seek 
                                                          
141 For an instructive collection of essays on the relationship between morality and the emotions, see 
Bagnoli (2011).  
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to explore the underlying mechanism at work in nudge policies aimed at reducing harm 
to the environment.       
The early work in this area has tested experimentally to what extent it is guilt – 
or, more precisely, “anticipated guilt” – that is responsible for bringing about pro-
environmental behaviour change (Theotokis and Manganari 2015; Hedlin and Sunstein 
2016). One of these studies tests how active choosing policies (some “enhanced”, 
others not) fare in terms of their effectiveness at getting people to choose the “green” 
over the “grey” energy program, as compared with automatic enrolment in the more 
climate-friendly option (Hedlin and Sunstein 2016). The authors report three main 
findings: (i) active choosing led to higher enrolment in pro-environmental behaviour; (ii) 
active choosing caused participants to feel more guilty about not enrolling in the green 
energy program; and (iii) the level of guilt was positively related to the probability of 
enrolling. How might we interpret these findings and, in particular, the role that guilt 
plays? We might distinguish between three interpretations. The first, which is the basis 
of the concern outlined above, is that guilt is being used as a policy tool to bring about 
behaviour change via the motivation of guilt-avoidance. On this interpretation, the 
difference between active choosing policies and automatic enrolment defaults is that the 
former, in prompting deliberation, seeks intentionally to induce or trigger feelings of 
guilt about not acting in a pro-environmental way. Since guilt is “an aroused form of 
emotional distress that is […] based on the possibility that one may be in the wrong or 
that others may have such a perception” (Baumeister et al. 1994: 245), this also induces 
a desire in people to get rid of this unpleasant feeling and, in so doing, motivates them 
to conform to acting in the desired way.142  
It seems to me that this is not a particularly plausible interpretation of the 
results. This is due mainly to my account of moral psychology, which includes the 
perceptual theory of emotions that I introduced earlier in the chapter. According to this 
theory, emotions can play a role in informing us about our moral reasons. The least 
controversial type of claim about this epistemic function, supported by a significant 
amount of empirical research (Damasio 1994), is that emotions act as detectors of 
salience.143 As De Sousa explains:  
                                                          
142 This type of explanation is referred to in Theotokis and Manganari’s article, where they state that 
“consumers are stimulated to act against the cause of the guilt, in order to alleviate the harm caused and 
consequently the feeling of guilt” (2015: 425). 
143 Experts in this area state: “We consider affective processing to be an evolutionary antecedent to more 
complex forms of information processing; but higher cognition requires the guidance provided by 
affective processing” (Adolphs and Damasio 2001: 45). 
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“Despite common prejudice, reason and emotion are not natural antagonists […] For 
emotions are among the mechanisms that control the crucial factor of salience among what 
would otherwise be an unmanageable plethora of objects of attention, interpretations, and 
strategies of inference and conduct.” (De Sousa 1997: xv; emphasis is original) 
 
Contra those who regard emotion as “at best irrelevant to, and at worse as distorting, 
good reasoning”, this empirically grounded view suggests that “affective responses are 
actually, though only partially, constitutive of good reasoning” (Levy 2017: 5; see Berker 
2009 for more detailed discussion).144 The central idea is that emotions, in this case the 
feeling of anticipated guilt, draw our attention to morally relevant features of the 
situation, which enables deliberation and, as a result, can help people better to recognise 
and appreciate reasons that apply to them.145  
 Hence, even if these kinds of nudges involved (reported feelings of) guilt and 
that this is important for explaining people’s changes to their behaviour, this is not 
necessarily problematic in the way specified by the concern. Enhanced active choosing 
policies may “urge consumers to consider their ethical responsibilities” (Theotokis and 
Manganari 2015: 426), or “trigger moral values and social norms” that people can then 
deliberate on (Hedlin and Sunstein 2016: 115). This is permissible in the moral realm 
when it triggers emotions that serve to highlight reasons that the person accepts or 
could accept (and she accepts the salience of these reasons to the choice at hand); it can 
support citizens in exercising morally responsible agency. This would be enough to 
diffuse the concern, on the assumption that results show that guilt is causally involved 
in bringing about the behaviour change. Nonetheless, it is not clear that we need to 
accept this assumption, as we shall see below.   
The third interpretation contends that the finding that active choosing is more 
effective at producing compliance than green defaults is due to the simple fact that, 
when people are required to choose, that mere requirement “might trigger otherwise 
                                                          
144 This more subtle view accepts that emotions do not always lead to better deliberation and decisions. 
As Levy contends, “The naïve view is quite right that sometimes strong emotions may cause people to 
take unjustifiable risks, overlook important options, and so on. But objecting that the influence of affect 
on cognition cannot amount to reasoning on the grounds that it sometimes misleads us is holding it to a 
standard that nothing meets. Conscious reasoning, too, may mislead…” (Levy 2017: 5).   
145 Some have made stronger claims about the relationship between emotions and reasons-
responsiveness, namely, that “acting on the basis of an emotion may involve responding to a reason” 
(Tappolet 2014: 171; Tappolet 2016; Jones 2003). The less controversial, “majority view” (which I am 
adopting) is that: “our emotions do not, as such, allow us to respond to reasons. When we undergo an 
emotion, we, or maybe more accurately some mechanism in us, might at best be tracking reasons, but we 
do not respond to reasons in virtue of our emotions. What is taken to be necessary for responding to 
reasons is deliberation (i.e., reflection about practical reasons), and this, it is thought, requires judgements 
about the agent’s practical reasons” (Tappolet 2014: 171; for advocates of this type of view, see 
Korsgaard 1997; Wallace 1999).   
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dormant or ineffective moral values and social norms”, and especially so when the 
active choosing design is “enhanced”. When asked a question about what to do in such 
a situation people’s response, according to Hedlin and Sunstein, tends to be in line with 
“what they believe morality requires” (2016: 137).146 It is the thought of diverging from 
this in their decided-upon action that induces the reported feelings of guilt; but, 
importantly, this occurs only as a by-product of recognising the moral reasons that apply 
to them in this situation. Despite the reported feelings of anticipated guilt, then, this 
emotion does not play any causal role in changing the agent’s behaviour. The aim of 
policy designs that work in this way is to make certain reasons that people might have 
to act in a particular way more salient within the choice environment. The reported 
feelings of anticipated guilt might be understood as evidence, therefore, that the policy 
is working with respect to making people consider and respond to the reasons to act in 
a pro-environmental way. In other words, guilt might have probative importance in so 
far as it is an indicator that active choosing policies improve compliance. If accepted, 
this interpretation nullifies the concern about guilt-inducement playing a causal role in 
behavioural public policy. 
This illustrative example has highlighted two possible responses to this second 
concern. For my argument, it does not matter whether one finds the second or third 
interpretation more convincing. My sense is that, outside of this particular example, 
some forms of public-ecological persuasion will involve mechanisms that are explained 
better by the second interpretation, while others will operate in ways better captured by 
the third interpretation. The general point is that even if public-ecological persuasion 
involves nonrational elements (as when it works according to the second interpretation), 
this does not make it a form of “arational persuasion”; rather, it is a form of non-classic 
rational persuasion, where the PCA has been designed in ways that indirectly offer 
reasons by making them more salient within the choice environment.  
You will notice on the graph above that public-ecological persuasion is plotted 
as sitting across the rational and nonrational boundary. This is because it will sometimes 
involve nonrational elements, though these are for the sake of engaging the individual’s 
moral reasoning; and sometimes it will, more simply, engage her reasoning processes 
along the line of more classical rational persuasive appeals. In both cases, efforts at 
public-ecological persuasion are permissible in the moral domain, and offer a promise 
                                                          
146 For clarity’s sake, it is worth noting that Hedlin and Sunstein (2016) do not offer a clear or explicit 
position with respect to the underlying mechanisms at work; here I am reconstructing possible positions, 
some of which are hinted at by passages in their discussion of their results. 
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of helping governments deal with problems that come about as a result of the non-
enforceability of some moral duties.  
 
§5.4.4: Weighing Compliance and Conformity 
Paralleling the argument made in the previous chapter concerning PCA designed to 
support citizens’ prudential practical reasoning, this section has outlined ways in which 
moral choice architecture might be used to support citizens’ practical moral reasoning. 
It has defended three kinds of moral nudge as presumptively permissible: motivational 
scaffolding, inducing moral deliberation, and public-ecological persuasion. The first is a 
System 1 nudge that supports autonomy by helping citizens to reduce the mismatch 
between their moral beliefs and behaviour. The second and third are kinds of moral 
System 2 nudges that aim at moral improvement principally via improved insight, in 
particular, by supporting people in being sensitive and responsive to the reasons 
provided by the value of other people’s lives. Any behavioural improvements that 
follow as a result of this will represent both autonomous and morally responsible 
agency, meaning that they will have ethical value for the agent, as well as the moral 
value that comes with duty-fulfilment. 
But this raises an important question, flagged earlier in the chapter, relating to 
cases in which there is a conflict between intervening for the sake of behavioural 
improvement (only) and intervening for the sake of improving an individual’s ability to 
act in a morally responsible way. We have seen that there are reasons to favour nudges 
that support rather than bypass our practical moral reasoning. But can it ever be 
permissible to sacrifice some – or indeed, any – conformity with moral duties if doing 
so would be the inevitable by-product of individuals achieving more compliance? With 
regards to the category of nonenforceable duties that these moral nudges are aimed at, 
this weighting issue would arise in those cases where the choice architect has the option 
of choosing between different nudge designs in a way that takes on the following form: 
Nudge A (e.g., a System 1 nudge) improves behavioural outcomes more than Nudge B, 
but does so without improving her moral reasoning, whereas Nudge B (e.g., one of the 
three moral nudges outlined above) is better in the latter respect but simply less 
effective in achieving the morally desirable behavioural outcomes than Nudge A.  
There are many different considerations that would need to be taken account of 
in assessing this type of issue, and it is not likely that there is any general answer that 
would apply in all such cases. It is important to make clear that my argument in favour 
of autonomy- or compliance-supporting nudges does not overreach. It acknowledges 
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that, although there are reasons to favour nudges that support rather than bypass our 
practical moral reasoning when all else is equal (when they are both as effective as each 
other), it is clear that all else is not often equal in real-world cases, given that System 1 
nudges, being a type of enforcement (as we suggested in §5.3), are more likely to secure 
moral conformity than System 2 nudges. This will not always be the case. In some cases, 
measures that offer the opportunity for moral compliance may be more effective at 
bringing about the desired behavioural change than those that do not. We saw this in 
the data presented above on pro-environmental behaviour, where active choosing 
policies secured the desired behaviour more efficiently than the automatic enrolment 
scheme. It is an empirical question, therefore, which types of nudges actually do achieve 
the behavioural outcomes most effectively in each policy area; and, in cases where this is 
shown to be those that aim at securing moral compliance, the weighting issue will not 
arise. Furthermore, we have seen that one set of nonenforceable duties would not 
provide this type of choice between Nudge A and Nudge B either since, by their very 
nature, they cannot be fulfilled through certain measures, meaning that a conformity-
driven System 1 nudge would not be available for the purpose of moral improvement in 
these cases. 
There will certainly be cases, however, where a choice architect does have such a 
choice to make between policy designs and where there is data that a design which does 
not support morally responsible agency is more effective than its counterpart that does. 
Take the example of organ donation again. We might assume that a default rule that 
presumes consent for cadaveric organ donation is more effective at securing conformity 
with the duty to aid others (when this has little or no cost to oneself) than is an active 
choosing nudge design, though the latter are better at securing compliance.147 In this 
type of case, it is possible that the pro tanto reasons in favour of active choosing will be 
outweighed by the considerations of those in society who are or will be in need of a life-
saving organ transplant. Some governments have decided this way; others, including the 
UK, have not, and have adopted a prompted choice design that fits into my “inducing 
moral deliberation” category. It is not clear to me which all things considered judgement 
is correct in this case; this depends partly on consideration of deeper issues, such as 
                                                          
147 Like many real-world cases, assessing whether this is in fact the case is made somewhat messy by the 
possibility that a proportion of those people who are now registered as organ donors under the automatic 
enrolment scheme would otherwise have opted in freely without any nudges or would have done so as a 
result of an active choosing nudge. Similarly, it is possible that the default might be responsible for 
encouraging some people to appreciate the reasons in favour of registering as an organ donor by, e.g., 
“conveying the impression that decision-makers should depart from the default only if they can identify 
good reasons to do so” (Hanna 2015: 628).  
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whether or not the duty to aid others in this way is subject to an injunction, meaning 
that the state cannot interfere coercively with a person’s choices relating to organ 
donation (Kagan 1989: 219-230), which would rule out those System 1 nudges that 
count as coercion-as-involuntariness. I do not take a position on this issue, and remain open 
to the idea that an all things considered judgement in this and other similar cases would 
see the reasons in favour of supporting compliance outweighed by the requirement for 
harm-prevention. 
But we can also think of examples in which the reverse might be the case, that 
is, where reasons for compliance outweigh reasons for conformity. As Clayton and 
Moles (forthcoming) contend, we need to recognise that “individuals can have a valid 
complaint against others reasoning in the wrong way as well as behaving in the wrong 
way and that the latter complaint does not always defeat the former”. Consider a nudge 
that is designed to reduce implicit racial biases in hiring practices that has the side-effect 
of reducing in some way the target’s ability to evaluate candidates. Her decisions are 
now not motivated by implicit racist attitudes, but she does fail more often in hiring the 
most qualified candidates.148 Adopting this type of policy may lead to lesser conformity 
with the principle of fairness in hiring, but it may represent the morally desirable action 
all things considered, given the wrongness attendant on racial disadvantage and its 
(implicit) proliferation and, to a lesser degree, the ethical value to the target of not 
acting in a way that she would reject on the basis of moral beliefs she has.149  This would 
give us reasons to select Nudge B over Nudge A. 
Speaking generally, there are also likely to be cases in which citizens’ interests 
(and their collective interest) in living in a political community that respects their claim 
to be treated as moral agents, capable of living up to the demands of morality for the 
right reasons irrespective of their potential moral deficiency, outweighs the potential 
welfare losses that might come with choosing Nudge B over Nudge A. Citizens might 
acknowledge that this respect-based reason means that they will not always receive the 
treatment they are owed from others, but nonetheless wish to live in a political 
community that respects theirs’ and others’ claim against it not to disable their ability to 
respond to reasons about what they have reason to do – by, e.g., using psychologically 
manipulative nudges to ensure higher rates of conformity with nonenforceable duties – 
unless the stakes are sufficiently high. This respect-based reason does not, however, 
seem to preclude the government from taking certain actions to create or sustain an 
                                                          
148 This example is a very lightly modified version of one offered in Clayton and Moles (forthcoming).   
149 Here I assume that the target does not explicitly hold racist beliefs. 
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environment that offers some support to citizens with regards to responding to the 
reasons that apply to them. Given the threat to our ability to respond to reasons that 
comes from automaticity and its associated cognitive biases, compliance-supporting 
nudges can be viewed as respecting, rather than disabling, this ability – and therefore as 
respecting citizens’ claim to be treated as a moral agent.150  
The account of moral nudging I have defended seeks to respect this claim of 
citizens, and provides a sketch of some practicable policies that represent the view that:   
 
“[t]he more we are able to understand and correctly and sensitively evaluate our world, 
the more responsible we are able to be in acting within and upon it. Insofar as we want to 
promote freedom and responsibility, then, […] we can do so by promoting as well as by 
exercising faculties of reason, perception, and reflection, by encouraging as well as by 
cultivating open and active minds and attitudes of alertness and sensitivity to the world. 
These are what we need if we are to have the ability and the freedom to see things aright.” 
(Wolf 2008: 274) 
 
I do not profess to have assessed all of the relevant considerations relating to moral 
nudging. But this chapter has provided the first full account of the moralising potential 
of PCA and its permissibility, and has done so in a way that builds on the assessment of 
(purely) prudential nudging outlined in Chapter 4 in order to offer a complete theory of 
the political morality of public nudging. 
   
§5.5: Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the reasons that a political community has to nudge citizens 
for the sake of others – a complex analysis that has taken into account both the moral 
value and the potential ethical value of these kinds of policies. It has argued that, with 
regards to enforceable duties, there may be some role for (System 1) moral nudges, but 
that it is often be morally desirable to use traditional coercive strategies. It set out a 
conditional set of comparative conditions under which it would be permissible to use 
                                                          
150 An analogous issue is raised in this moral case to that in the case of prudential nudging regarding 
whether or not the policies that have been defended are objectionably paternalistic. My account of moral 
nudging can be understood as a (weak) form of moral paternalism, since it defends certain kinds of public 
nudging on the grounds that (1) these interventions can help to bring about morally improved states, and 
that (2) certain such states are good for the individual in question (Dworkin 2005: 308). In my view, since 
(2) rests on the value of autonomy to living well, it is not objectionably paternalistic (i.e., disrespectful) for 
the same reasons as those outlined in §4.4.4 in defence of autonomy-supporting nudge paternalism. In 
the case of moral nudging, which is done for the sake of others, this ethical value is not what principally 
motivates these policies; but it becomes particularly relevant to the analysis because the main promise of 
PCA comes not from enforcing morality, but from helping governments to deal with problems relating to 
nonenforceability.   
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moral nudges as a means of securing moral conformity. The principal promise of moral 
choice architecture has been shown to come from the role that PCA can play with 
bringing about greater compliance with respect to nonenforceable duties. To this end, 
the chapter has outlined three permissible types of moral nudge that are justified by 
reference to their ability both to prevent harm to others and to support autonomy in 
moral action, which has ethical value for the agent. Such nudges count as moral nudges 
because of the type of behaviour they target; but they might also be understood as 
representing a distinctive type of prudential nudging. This fulfils my ambition to present 
a complete, yet simple account of permissible public nudging.      
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6. Permissible Public Nudging in Practice 
 
The preceding chapters, comprising the main argumentative body of the thesis have set 
out a more complete and philosophically sophisticated theory of the political morality 
of nudging than is currently present in the literature. This final substantive chapter 
moves on to the practical question of what this extended argument can and does say 
about the way in which governments should make behavioural policies today. After 
discussing the relationship between philosophy and public policy (§6.1), the chapter 
draws out the essence of the general argument offered in this thesis and elucidates the 
two central ethical principles of the transformative nudge model (§6.2). It then sets out how 
this model might be applied to policy, particularly within the UK’s Behavioural Insights 
Team, and discusses some implementation issues (§6.3). The chapter rounds up by 
reviewing some of the limitations of my argument in its current form and, in doing so, 
sets out an agenda for future research (§6.4).          
 
§6.1: A Note on Political Philosophy and Public Policy 
Two points are worth making at the outset of this chapter relating to the relationship 
between political philosophy and public policy. These are important because they have 
implications both for what we might reasonably expect in terms of policy prescriptions 
and for how we should understand the value of philosophical contributions to the 
policy debate.  
The first is the acknowledgement that “philosophy, even political philosophy, 
has only a modest and specific part to play when it comes to policy prescriptions” 
(Brighouse and Swift 2014: 176). The normative considerations we have focused on in 
this thesis are but one kind of consideration at stake in policy debates, meaning that 
these principled considerations need to be examined alongside a set of complex 
empirical considerations. This amounts to recognising the (widely accepted) claim that 
good policies need to be sufficiently attentive to the relevant non-normative facts, in 
addition to being grounded on sound principles – and that the role of philosophers and 
political theorists is chiefly to contribute to the latter enterprise. As a result, this sets the 
ambitions of the chapter as outlining the essence of the extended argument developed 
in these pages in a way that is accessible to nonspecialists and presenting ethical 
guidelines for designing behavioural policies that follow from this philosophical account 
of permissible nudging. This is to say, more negatively, that it will not be in a position to 
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provide a complete evaluation of the considerations at stake in the policy debate over 
PCA.  
Second, at the same time, it is crucial not to underplay the importance of this 
role for political philosophy, or to allow it to be significantly underplayed or 
misrepresented within this policy debate. One of the main motivations for this thesis is 
to address the fact that such an undervaluation and misrepresentation has occurred in 
this case, and to highlight and to seek to remedy the problematic effects that this has 
had on how the debate has developed. More specifically, as has been mentioned before, 
nudging’s main proponent is suspicious about the role of theory. Not wanting to fall 
into what he calls the “trap of abstraction”, Sunstein has bracketed many of the serious 
philosophical questions that arise, and has sought to gain justificatory purchase for PCA 
in ethically non-committal, or at least ecumenical, ways. His approach is marked by the 
thought is that people can agree that nudges are to be welcomed, or at least that a 
significant proportion of them are, despite having disagreements about foundational 
questions in moral and political philosophy (Sunstein 2016a: 52).  
There are two points to make in response to this approach. First, as plausible as 
it sounds, this methodological approach can work only if disagreements about such 
foundational questions do not in fact matter for the particular controversies under 
examination. Sunstein’s “hope” is that “those disagreements will not arise often” (ibid.). 
This thesis has shown that this viewpoint is overly optimistic. Second, Sunstein’s 
approach appears to consider it sufficient that, generally, people agree that certain 
nudges are welcome. Yet such agreement is insufficient, since what we need to show, 
instead, is that it is morally permissible to impose a nudge on a particular person who 
objects. In other words, it is the relationship between the political community and the 
individual that needs justifying, and this cannot be done merely by establishing that 
generally people agree to this particular kind of relationship. What needs establishing is 
that the individual in question has no valid complaint against the nudge in question 
being imposed upon her. This is why it is necessary to engage with, rather than bracket, 
a number of the philosophical questions raised by the use of PCA, and to offer a theory 
of the political morality of nudging.  
Sunstein recently offered his first sustained attempt to attend to the normative 
issues raised by choice architecture (Sunstein 2016a). This was published well over a 
decade after the original statement of the pro-nudge argument (in Sunstein and Thaler 
2003) and was only deemed necessary, it might be assumed, due to ongoing critical 
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engagement with their earlier, less developed arguments. Nonetheless, as one reviewer 
of The Ethics of Influence writes:  
 
“The result is an excellent primer of the relevant debates on nudges... But we do not get a 
bona fide philosophical inquiry into the underlying ethical issues – one that would 
[plough] headlong into the most difficult dilemmas, rather than immediately veering onto 
safe ground. And this is the sort of investigation that is sorely needed.” (Johnson 2016)  
 
Another reviewer writes that his “pragmatist avoidance of issues of principle frequently 
conspire to muddy the conceptual waters in troubling ways” (Anderson 2010: 375). 
These two criticisms represent precisely where the “modest and specific” function of 
political philosophers comes into play. This thesis has provided this “sorely needed” 
conceptual and normative analysis and, in doing so, has uncovered several of the 
weaknesses of a pragmatist methodology. Many of these comes as a result of failing 
adequately to delineate the relevant conceptual and philosophical considerations, which 
has led both to a lack of clarity in the foregoing discussion and to ethical analysis that 
attempts to deal with these confusions in an unsatisfactorily ad hoc fashion.     
Even if the policy prescriptions of the two views (i.e., Sunstein’s view and the 
theory developed here) were identical, an assumption we can grant for the sake of 
argument at this point, the former would lack the justificatory force available to the 
latter. This is because the arguments offered for these prescriptions by the former can 
reasonably be expected to be either incomplete or mistaken, or both. In the first 
instance, the defences offered by Sunstein might be incomplete for three possible reasons, 
that is, because the normative considerations they appeal to (i) are not sufficiently deep, 
(ii) fail to address important objections, or (iii) are insufficiently nuanced. In the second 
instance, such defences might be mistaken because the arguments offered for them are 
not sound, where soundness requires (i) validity (i.e., correct inferences) and (ii) true 
premises. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, the standard pro-nudge argument 
falls foul in both of these ways. It is incomplete because, among other things, it fails to 
acknowledge the morally relevant differences between nudging in the prudential and 
moral domains. And it is mistaken because, among other things, its account of well-
being lacks plausibility. As a result, Sunstein’s arguments provide insufficient normative 
justification for the (stipulated) policy prescriptions, assuming that my arguments are 
accepted.  
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The implication of this is that the argument presented in these pages, or 
something like it that also commits to performing the specific functions assigned to 
political philosophy, is necessary for grounding the permissible use of nudges, even in 
the unlikely event that it had no distinct prescriptions for policymaking in practice (for a 
similar point, see Dworkin 2011: 110). Hence, even while accepting the limits of the role 
of political theory, we should be clear about the value of its specific contributions, both 
clarificatory and normative, to the debate over the ethics of nudge policy.151  
 
§6.2: From Extended Argument to Ethical Principles 
The two parts of the extended argument – prudential and moral – were carried out 
separately in order to keep important differences from clouding our ethical analyses. 
Nevertheless, amid the specificity and complexities of these detailed normative 
examinations, the two analyses share an argumentative essence and this provides a basis 
on which to develop overarching ethical guidelines for the design of nudge policies. 
This section begins to move us from political theory to political practice by, first, 
extracting and expressing the essential form of the thesis’s extended argument and, 
second, encapsulating the principles that, according to this argument, should be adopted 
by policymakers when designing PCA.  
 
§6.2.1: Essence of Principled Evaluation: Agency-Enhancement 
The account of living well developed in Chapter 3 has played a central role in directing 
our normative investigation. It claims that, for an individual to live her life well, she 
must live it in an active sense: prudentially, her life goes better the more she is the (part) 
author of it; morally, her life goes better the more she fulfils her moral duties to others 
out of a recognition of moral reasons. Ultimately, both rest on the value of personal 
autonomy to a person’s life. Hence, in so far as nudges can be justified on first-personal 
“welfare-promotion” grounds, to use Thaler and Sunstein’s terms, such governmental 
influences should be supportive of the development and exercise of these capacities for 
autonomous and morally responsible agency.  
Across both strands of normative analysis, then, the kinds of psychologically-
informed behavioural interventions that have been deemed permissible share a similar 
character: they are compatible with creating and sustaining the conditions for living well 
on account of their capacity to play what we might call an “ecological-educative” role in 
                                                          
151 See Wolff (2011) for more on the role of political philosophers in practical applied policy debates.  
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supporting citizens’ agency.152 Those interventions that are designed to act on people in 
other ways, such as to modify their behaviour “by stealth rather than engagement” 
(Rowson 2011: 16), fail generally to meet the conditions for permissibility.153 Once we 
acknowledge that the government is inevitably involved in structuring the landscape of 
choice, policymakers must use this power (when they do) not as a means for modifying 
or controlling their citizens’ behaviour; governments have other ways of doing this that 
are safeguarded by a transparency that comes via the democratic processes attendant on 
legal and regulatory action. On the occasions when they do intentionally make use of 
this power (recall that “choice architecture” is not inevitable, even though the 
government is inevitably involved in structuring “the landscape of choice”), they must 
do so carefully, and in ways that aim at supporting citizens’ agency to act in autonomous 
and morally responsible ways. This is because there is an important difference between 
a government employing nudge techniques to bring about what we might call “first 
order change” (i.e., behaviour modification), and its doing so for the sake of supporting 
the possibility of “second order change” (i.e., agency-enhancement, which may lead to 
the same targeted behaviour modification being decided upon and performed by the 
agent herself) (Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch 1974).    
This argument directly challenges the claim, proffered by a number of people in 
the literature and succinctly captured by Rowson’s formulation, that the “deepest 
problem with nudge is that it is not transformative” (2011: 16; see also Goodwin 2012: 
86). By this, they mean something like that nudges are not able to help foster the types 
of human learning and development processes that can contribute to more enduring 
changes to our behaviour or our beliefs. As the reader will now know, my argument is 
in agreement with this critique to a certain extent: in both the prudential and moral 
domains, some kinds of nudges are ruled out as impermissible for precisely this reason. 
But, importantly, the thesis has distinguished those types of PCA that are unable to 
promote this type of development and agency-enhancement – we can call these “non-
transformative nudges” to adopt the terminology used by the critique – from a set that 
are able to play a role in these processes – “transformative nudges”. Hence, the model 
developed here can be labelled the transformative nudge model.  
                                                          
152 For more on what is meant by nudging’s “ecological-educative” capacity, see §6.2.3.     
153 The inclusion of the word ‘generally’ here is to acknowledge that the case is slightly more complicated 
in the moral domain, as we saw in Chapter 5. In §5.3, I outlined some conditions under which it would be 
all things considered morally permissible to use psychologically manipulative moral nudges, whilst 
simultaneously arguing that these conditions are unlikely to be met on very many occasions, since 
(additional) coercive measures may sometimes or often be morally preferable in these kinds of cases.  
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§6.2.2: The Transformative Nudge Model: Two Ethical Principles  
The essence of the transformative nudge model, then, is agency-enhancement. Recall 
the distinction drawn between “System 1” and “System 2” nudges: in brief, the former 
bring about behavioural modifications via nonconscious automatic processes, while the 
latter act on us in ways that encourage conscious, deliberative choices. Across both the 
prudential and moral analyses, it has been shown that at least one form of each type of 
nudging is permitted. Following on from this, two main normative principles form the 
basis of the ethical framework for designing permissible nudge policies: (1) the nudge-to-
deliberate principle, and (2) the nudge-to-motivate principle. The permissible System 2 nudges 
relate to the former, while the permissible System 1 nudges relate to the latter. I will 
briefly explicate each principle in turn.  
The first principle of the transformative nudge model is the nudge-to-deliberate 
principle. It maintains that PCA is morally permissible in so far as it supports people’s 
practical reasoning and autonomous decision-making. According to this principle 
nudges can be used to activate or engage citizens’ deliberative thinking processes in 
contexts in which their behaviour is likely to be subject to a predictable cognitive bias or 
to predictable motivational or attentional strain.154 In doing so, it will often act as a form 
of psychological debiasing and, in some cases, also as a counter-nudge. Much of the world in 
which we navigate our lives is not set up “neutrally”, as it were. We face a near-constant 
stream of information and influences seeking to shape our preferences, direct and 
demand our attention, and steer our behavioural responses. Governments can protect 
and support their citizens’ exercise of autonomous agency, and support them in freely 
complying with their moral duties, by using nudges that operate via the nudge-autonomy 
and inducing moral deliberation mechanisms, respectively, since these mechanisms involve 
enhancing in some way an individual’s general ability to engage in deliberation relevant 
to the situation she is in (the deliberation-activating view). The public-ecological persuasion 
mechanism discussed in the context of moral nudging also falls under the nudge-to-
deliberate principle (see the top row of Table 1, below), but it differs from these other 
                                                          
154 I do not want the terminology of “deliberation” in the nudge-to-deliberate principle to misrepresent 
the principle’s aim. The nudges that fall into this category need not engage their target’s deliberative 
processes in ways that are cognitively burdensome. In many cases, it will involve only the momentary 
conscious process of ‘checking’ – which may result in the individual confirming the automatic response 
or replacing it with a behaviour that is more in line with her reflected preferences, neither of which 
require any significant cognitive load. In such cases, the term “deliberate” possibly gives a false sense of 
the type of cognitive processes that are triggered, given its association with long, careful consideration. 
There will also be some cases in which this more cognitively burdensome consideration is triggered by the 
PCA, especially in the case of moral nudging. Whether or not this is the case will often depend on 
whether a particular individual already has a reflected preference on the matter at hand or not. If not, it 
may encourage her to consider her view, whereas it may only involve a momentary checking otherwise.  
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two mechanisms in so far as it seeks not only to activate deliberation, but to do so in a 
directive way, i.e., to steer people towards recognition of a particular reason. Hence, this 
mechanism has the additional aim of enhancing an individual’s ability to track the truth 
about what reasons apply to her (the truth-tracking view).155  
 
 
Table 1: A typology of permissible nudge mechanisms captured by the two principles (the top 
row represents the nudge-to-deliberate principle across both domains; the bottom row the 
nudge-to-motivate principle).  
 
The second principle, the nudge-to-motivate principle, holds that nudges are 
permissible in so far as they help people to act in accordance with their own beliefs and 
intentions (see the bottom row of Table 1). In cases where an agent voluntarily opts in 
to receiving motivational support from PCA, such auto-nudges count as ways of 
supporting and enhancing her autonomy by ensuring that her future behaviour is 
constrained so as to align with her goals and values. In the moral realm, motivational 
scaffolding encompasses more than (explicitly) consented-to System 1 nudges. It also 
includes nudges that reduce implicit biases, which highlights that interventions that 
make use of and seek to (re)shape our automatic responses are not necessarily 
problematic for autonomous and morally responsible agency.   
The table above is structured along the lines drawn by the thesis, and thereby 
categorises the nudge mechanisms relating to whether the intervention is principally for 
the sake of the individual upon which the nudge is acting or for the sake of others. The 
moral column is labelled Moral * because, on my view, although the content of the 
agency-enhancing nudges in this column is moral (i.e., for the sake of others), prudential 
reasons play an important role in motivating and justifying these mechanisms. That is, 
the moral nudges that are justified by the nudge-to-deliberate and nudge-to-motivate 
principles are partially justified by the idea that it is in the interests of the target of these 
interventions to act on one’s own judgement; in particular, one’s life goes better when 
                                                          
155 It should also be added that an implicit (empirical) assumption of the other mechanisms that fall 
within the nudge-to-deliberate principle is that deliberation-activation will tend also to enhance a person’s 
ability to truth-track with regards to the reasons that apply to her; but this need not be the case. 
 Prudential Moral * 
“System 2” 
 
Nudge-autonomy Inducing moral deliberation; 
Public-ecological persuasion 
“System 1” 
 
Auto-nudge Motivational scaffolding 
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one is sensitive to the ways in which one’s behaviour and attitudes harm or wrong 
others, and when the appreciation of this consideration motivates one to act in 
accordance with moral reasons.  
Together, these two principles should direct the design of PCA within those 
societies that currently employ this policy lever and those that may want to do so in the 
future. When used in accordance with these principles, nudges can be used by 
governments as a means of enhancing citizens’ agency in ways that support the recovery 
of control over their thinking and behaviour. Any nudges that do not comply with one 
of these two principles – with the exception of the category of moral nudges that might 
be more effective than coercive measures at bringing about conformity with enforceable 
duties – are ruled out as impermissible.   
 
§6.2.3: Nudging’s “Ecological-Educative” Capacity 
Others who have advanced broadly similar kinds of arguments to mine, at least in so far 
as they might also be categorised as “liberal” responses to the standard nudge view, 
have set up their alternative proposals in (terminological) opposition to nudging. Such 
views are grounded in the view that nudging is problematic because “it is not 
transformative” (Rowson 2011: 16) or, in other words, because it lacks the capacity to 
play any educative role. There are two main examples of such alternative “liberal-
educative” proposals in the literature: the ‘think’ model advanced by Peter John et al. 
(2009, 2013) and the ‘risk literacy’ model grounded in the work of psychologist Gerd 
Gigerenzer (2014, 2015). It is instructive to offer a brief overview of these models in 
order to highlight both the similarities with and differences from the transformative 
nudge model. Doing so will, I hope, make clearer what is distinctive about this model 
vis-à-vis other liberal-educative alternatives and, consequently, what is meant by the 
“ecological-educative” capacity that I ascribe to some forms of choice architecture. It 
will also go some way towards answering the terminological question about my decision 
to stick with the nudge vocabulary, when others have abandoned it.     
‘Think’ refers to a behaviour change strategy that takes its lead from deliberative 
theories of democracy. The group of political scientists behind it begin with the thought 
that citizens are “reasonable, knowledge hungry and capable of collective reflection” 
(John et al. 2009: 366). This assumption about human nature grounds the claim that, 
despite people having a series of cognitive biases that can cause them to choose in non-
rational ways, social fora and institutional settings through which deliberation and free 
discussion take place provide a means by which citizens can overcome non-rational and 
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immoral or anti-social beliefs and behaviours. The thought, which follows from their 
underlying commitment to deliberative democracy, is that ‘think’ has both an epistemic 
and a moral dimension. First, deliberation is assumed to have an educational effect: 
providing citizens with a public space in which they can step away from day-to-day life 
and reflect on a wide range of social policy choices with others in their community 
enables them to increase their knowledge and understanding, often by learning from 
others. Second, it is thought also to have a “moralising effect” (Miller 1992): dialogue 
and discussion, where citizens are required to justify their perspectives and preferences 
to others, helps to reduce or eliminate non-rational and unreasonably self-interested 
preferences (John et al. 2009: 364).156           
 In contrast, ‘risk literacy’ is grounded in an interpretation of the empirical 
psychological evidence, rather than in democratic theory; although, as we will see, there 
are significant underlying similarities between the two models. On Gigerenzer’s view, it 
is not “fast and frugal” heuristic-based reasoning that is the cause of the non-rational 
choices that behaviour change strategies wish to target (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
1996).157 Rather, he diagnoses the cause as being that citizens are not currently receiving 
the types of education that enable them to develop the skills necessary for dealing with 
the risk and uncertainty pervasive in modern technological societies. These skills relate 
to the development of both automatic and deliberative cognitive processes. On this 
theory, practical rationality is comprised both of the “unconscious intelligence” 
provided by intuitive and automatic thinking, which is required for dealing with 
uncertainty (i.e., unknown risks), and the logical and statistical reasoning associated with 
deliberative thinking, which is required for dealing with known risks (Gigerenzer 2014: 
123-124). What is needed, then, is to address the “amazing blind spot concerning risk 
literacy” in our current educational system (ibid.: 13-14).158  
Developing risk literacy, and thus “risk savvy citizens”, requires teaching a basic 
knowledge of humans’ intuitive psychology and an understanding of statistical 
information – both of which can and should, according to this model, be taught to 
citizens in schools from a young age, and extend into higher education too (especially 
                                                          
156 In his argument against nudging, Goodwin also suggests that “the government ought to embrace more 
deliberative models and public engagement, which arguably encourage people to think more collectively 
and engage with issues more deeply” (2012: 90). This shares elements with the ‘think’ model, in particular 
the aspects relating to collective deliberation.  
157 For more on the differences between Gigerenzer’s “simple heuristic” program and Tversky and 
Kahneman’s “heuristics and biases” program, see Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016). 
158 Gigerenzer (2010: 469) argues that: “We need to change school curricula. Our children learn the 
mathematics of certainty, such as geometry and trigonometry, but not the mathematics of uncertainty, 
that is, statistical thinking. Statistical literacy should be taught as early as reading and writing are.”  
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for those attending medical and law schools). These educational reforms would focus 
on “training the individual to avoid the bias and, thereby, equipping him to maximize 
his own welfare without the help of some policy maker or other outside party” (Hertwig 
and Ryall, unpublished: 7). Such options, recently labelled “boosts” by Grüne-Yanoff 
and Hertwig (2016), aim to provide people with “the ability to independently surmount 
a bias for an entire class of problems – but, at the cost of an up-front resource 
investment” (Hertwig and Ryall, unpublished: 8). 
These two models share with the transformative nudge model an ambition to 
bring about more lasting behavioural changes by supporting citizens’ decision-making 
competencies and reasoning processes. In other words, they all have an educative 
core.159 It is not clear beyond this whether the three broadly liberal-educative views 
share the same ends, since the ‘think’ and ‘risk literacy’ models specify their ends in 
fairly vague terms. For instance, it is not clear whether the goal of ‘think’ is personal 
autonomy, democratic competence or “good citizenship”, civic renewal more generally, 
etc., or some mix of these. A different way of putting this is that the transformative 
nudge model follows from and is set within a full theory of political morality, which is 
not (currently) the case for the two alternatives. It is not necessarily the case, then, that 
‘think’ and ‘risk literacy’ share the same ends but adopt different means to realising 
them; we would need to know more about their more specific aims to conclude this. 
And, despite being based (at least initially) on a rejection of the nudge programme, both 
of these models might be best understood as offering complementary proposals. As 
advocates of ‘think’ acknowledge in the mature statement of their view, this strategy is 
not offered in opposition to nudging, but rather provides an additional, complementary 
strategy that can “deepen and broaden out the behaviour-change programme” (John et 
al. 2013: 3). Similarly, the educational reforms advocated by ‘risk literacy’ – which 
include adding subjects like health literacy, financial literacy, and digital risk competence 
to school curricula so that students learn skills required for living in a “risk society” 
(Beck 1992) – can be pursued alongside nudges, as a complementary response to the 
psychological evidence aimed at those in (often mandatory) full-time education rather 
than (adult) citizens influenced by PCA. 
These two models differ from the transformative nudge model, then, since the 
proposals offered by ‘think’ and ‘risk literacy’ are based in institutional and educational 
reform, rather than in the design of psychologically-informed behavioural public 
                                                          
159 This is unsurprising. As Ben-Porath (2010: 9) states: “The two domains making up the landscape of 
choice – the political and the personal – converge in the realm of education.” 
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policies. The distinctiveness of the transformative nudge model comes from its 
ecological-educative capacity: it seeks to enhance citizens’ agency (like ‘think’ and ‘risk 
literacy’), but to do so through the design of policy ecologies rather than institutional 
and educational reforms (like the standard, non-selective account of nudging). Of 
course, this second means-related aspect is unsurprising. This thesis examines the 
ethical dimensions of one particular means of intervention in order to answer the 
question of what forms of PCA are permissible in light of our new understanding of 
human action. The transformative nudge model is the answer that follows from the 
extended arguments presented here. A central point has been to show that liberals do 
not necessarily need to reject PCA as a means of influence out of hand and come up 
with alternative ways of responding to the psychological evidence. It is possible for 
nudges to play some role at least in achieving the liberal-educative goals that those who 
often dismiss nudging as non-transformative wish to achieve. We can hold this view 
while simultaneously acknowledging that alternatives such as ‘think’ and ‘risk literacy’ 
may: (i) complement transformative nudges, (ii) be deemed desirable or even necessary 
additional responses, and/or (iii) have advantages over the transformative nudge model. 
This does not fully answer the semantic question that spurred this clarificatory 
detour. Part of the reason for retaining the language of nudging does follow from the 
point made above, namely, that by providing a comprehensive ethical assessment of the 
use of PCA the thesis has been able to show that some kinds of nudges are permissible 
(contra some liberal views). But there is another, perhaps implicit, dimension to the 
terminological question: why retain the overall language of nudging given the potential 
for confusion between its permissible and impermissible forms? I could, for instance, 
have labelled my positive view in non-nudge terms in order to avoid any such potential 
confusion. The main reason for resisting this is that adopting different terminology 
would concede too much to the standard account of nudging. Nudging is something 
that has won considerable favour with policymakers, and it has become or is becoming 
a part of the institutional mind-set or status quo in governments across the world. 
These institutional facts are important. To offer a different (non-“nudge”) account 
would not only be unrepresentative of the project, it also would undermine the success 
of its main practical goal, which is to ensure, given that nudges are in fact a (fairly fixed) 
feature of contemporary governmentality, that there are ethical conditions placed on 
which kinds of nudges are used, through the establishment of ethical guidelines that at 
least approximate those outlined above. Hence, my analysis is well positioned both to 
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take advantage of the approval that nudging has generally won in policymaking circles 
and to address the underlying reservations, also present within these circles (e.g., House 
of Lords 2011) as well as in academia and the media, about whether or not nudges raise 
ethical qualms.  
This point extends to a pragmatic advantage that the transformative nudge 
model has over the two alternatives outlined above. As noted earlier in the thesis, much 
of this support from policymakers comes from nudging’s low cost, both financially and 
politically (since it is, in general, a non-regulatory policy lever). The transformative 
nudging model does not need to gather any additional political will or support in the 
way that ‘think’ and ‘risk literacy’ would need to. It suggests a modification to existing 
practices (and one that, as we will see in the next section, aligns with the public’s views 
on the acceptability of these techniques and which would, therefore, have political 
benefit), rather than the introduction of any costly new policies and reforms. 
Strategically, then, these favourable practical features make it worth pursuing as one 
response (amid others) to the psychological evidence. The next section addresses both 
the implications of this proposal for nudge policy in practice.  
 
§6.3: Transformative Nudging in Practice 
The next task for this chapter is to try to translate the transformative nudge model and 
its two ethical guidelines into an accessible policy framework that can be used by 
governments – or at least the early stages of one.  
 
§6.3.1: The Beginnings of an Ethically-Sensitive Policy Framework 
What difference might the ethical principles make to existing governmental approaches 
to designing PCA here and now? One way of answering this question would be to 
engage in comparative analysis of different ethical guidelines – the transformative nudge 
model versus the ethical guidelines currently in use by, e.g., the Behavioural Insights 
Team (BIT).160 However, to the best of my knowledge, the behavioural insights teams 
working across the UK government do not have any specific, formalised ethical 
                                                          
160 I use the example of the BIT throughout this subsection for a number of reasons. Most pragmatically 
from my perspective, the BIT is the behavioural policy unit in my own political community, the United 
Kingdom. More generally, though, it was the first such unit to be set up and is “the model that many 
other governments have begun to follow” (Halpern and Sanders 2016: 54). If the BIT made changes to 
its practices, this would certainly have wide ranging implications on behavioural policymaking practices 
generally.  
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guidelines that are used for intervention design.161 It seems that the ethical concern is 
directed solely towards the issue of BIT’s trialling, usually without citizens’ consent, 
groups of the population for the randomised control trials that are the focus of the 
team’s work. A more formal “trial protocol clearance process” has recently been put in 
place for this purpose (Halpern 2015a: 311). Even in the House of Lords investigation 
into the government’s use of behaviour change techniques, consideration of the ethical 
dimensions of the issue was relegated to an appendix (House of Lords 2011: 105-109). 
Unsurprisingly, then, building such guidelines into the framework(s) currently employed 
by the behavioural insights teams is the main implication for behavioural policymaking 
argued for here. This subsection seeks to engage in a deeper fashion with current 
practices (and the ways in which these are framed and discussed by policy designers) in 
order to explore how formally establishing the ethical principles outlined above would 
affect the operation of the BIT.  
 Let’s begin by briefly outlining the policy frameworks provided by the BIT in 
recent years in order to get a better sense of current practices and to highlight the 
current level of consideration of the ethical dimensions. The BIT’s first framework was 
outlined in the report ‘MINDSPACE: Influencing Behaviour through Public Policy’ 
(Dolan et al. 2010). Its title is a mnemonic designed to be used as “a checklist for 
policy-makers”, listing the main influences on people’s behaviour which might be taken 
into account when making policies (ibid.: 7-8).162 In order to build these into policy-
making, the authors proposed the “6 Es Framework”: Explore, Enable, Encourage, 
Engage, Exemplify, and Evaluate (ibid.: 49-62). As Halpern recounts in his book Inside 
the Nudge Unit, after about a year or so a simplified framework was developed (2015a: 
60). It was replaced by the more straightforward mnemonic EAST, to capture the BIT’s 
four key principles for applying behavioural insights to policy interventions: Easy, 
Attractive, Social, and Timely (Service et al. 2014; Halpern 2015a: 59-149). The first 
                                                          
161 There are some ethical constraints on what can be done, but these are set out by the particular 
department or agency with which the behavioural insight team is working, not by the BIT itself. For 
example, those working in Public Health England’s BIT do have fairly rigorous ethical procedures in 
place, but “only insofar as what’s necessary for passing NHS ethics. Obviously there’s no point in 
designing a trial to only have it rejected by the ethics board, so the trial will be designed with reference to 
what the NHS ethics committee permits” (personal correspondence with an employee at the BIT).  
162 These are: Messenger (we are heavily influenced by who communicates information), Incentives (our 
responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental shortcuts), Norms (we are strongly influenced 
by what others do), Defaults (we ‘go with the flow’ of pre-set options), Salience (our attention is drawn to 
what is novel and seems relevant to us), Priming (our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues), 
Affect (our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions), Commitments (we seek to be 
consistent with our public promises and reciprocate acts), and Ego (we act in ways that make us feel 
better about ourselves) (Dolan et al. 2010: 8; see pp. 18-48 for more on this framework). 
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principle – Make it Easy – suggests harnessing the power of defaults, reducing the 
“hassle factor” of taking up a service, and simplifying messages. The second – Make it 
Attractive – comprises of attracting attention and designing rewards and sanctions for 
maximum effect. The third – Make it Social – captures the results of showing that most 
people perform the desired behaviour, using the power of networks, and encouraging 
people to make a commitment to others. Lastly, the fourth – Make it Timely – 
recommends prompting people when they are likely to be most receptive and helping 
people plan their response to events (Service et al. 2014: 9-42). Some of these evidence-
based recommendations might be deemed permissible according to the transformative 
nudge model’s ethical principles; clearly, others would not. For now, I leave aside the 
exploration of these finer details and instead address the more general question of why 
this framework is silent on the normative dimensions of behavioural policymaking, and 
how it might be possible to integrate the relevant normative considerations into this 
existing framework.    
 There are a number of factors explaining why the BIT has developed and found 
favour in the way it has, many of which are contingent political-strategical ones (see 
John 2014). One of the main reasons, according to Peter John, is that it has been able 
“to promote a more entrepreneurial approach to government by using randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) as a robust method of policy evaluation” (2014: 257). It thereby 
promises to deliver more effective and cheaper behaviour change interventions by using 
evidence from the cognitive and behavioural sciences to design trial interventions and 
to test these in RCTs to generate data about “what works” (Halpern 2015a: 281-294; for 
a more critical discussion of RCTs, see Cartwright 2010). This extends the trending 
category of “evidence-based policy”. Indeed, according to the BIT’s Chief Executive, it 
takes this approach to the next level, because it represents “the rise of experimental 
government” (Halpern 2015a: 295). The EAST framework is embedded within this 
broader methodology, and is comprised of four main stages (Figure 2, below).  
 These stages would all still be a part of any updated policy framework based on 
the normative arguments of this thesis; they represent the cumulative wisdom of 
behavioural policy experts over the years since (and indeed before) the BIT was 
established. But, it is nevertheless importantly incomplete. It does not recognise that 
behavioural policy design and decision making involves value judgements. As a result, it 
lacks any attempt to address the issue of how we should think about the relationship 
between normative and non-normative considerations in the design of public policy. 
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Figure 2: EAST’s overarching experimental methodology (Service et al. 2014: 7). 
 
How might we proceed in addressing this incompleteness? I am in agreement 
with Goodin’s statement that, “Empirical and ethical theory ought both to be used, and 
used in tandem, to guide public policymaking” (Goodin 1982: 4). Yet it remains a 
complex task to specify precisely how this “in tandem” component would work in 
practice. One recent suggestion for thinking about how this might occur in educational 
policy has been offered by Brighouse et al. (2016). This also sets out a four-part 
procedural framework (see Figure 3, below). 
The main aim of this framework is to aid policymakers in making decisions that 
“explicitly combine values and evidence” (Brighouse et al. 2016: 20). The particular 
framework mapped out below is directed at a specific policy area; nonetheless, the 
procedure it outlines has wider relevance. It provides us with a general approach to 
thinking about how this type of framework might be integrated with BIT’s existing 
methodology outlined in Figure 2. It is worth noting here that the authors clarify that, 
“Although we describe the procedure in terms of ordered steps, it is better to think of 
the parts simply as distinct elements of the process, all of which need to be addressed, 
often iteratively and not necessarily in the sequence presented here” (ibid.). 
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Figure 3: Brighouse et al.’s framework for decision-making about educational policy, which 
suggests how to incorporate educational goods and values into standard policy decision-making 
procedures (2016: 20).  
 
In designing permissible PCA, we might start with identifying a particular policy 
problem or goal that might have a role for nudges to play in bringing about positive 
behavioural outcomes. This initial stage is best captured by the BIT method’s first stage, 
‘Defining the outcome’. We might then move on to identifying the pertinent values in 
play – the first stage of Brighouse et al.’s model and the main contribution of this thesis. 
On my account, the main values are living well, personal autonomy, harm-prevention, 
and morally responsible agency. But, there may be other values in play either generally 
or within the particular domain to which the policy goal in question belongs, and 
consequently there may be tensions between values (for more on this in the case of 
transformative nudges, see §6.3.2). We might then move on to identifying the potential 
choice-architectural means that could be used to more effectively achieve this policy 
goal, while not offending against (and hopefully furthering) the values outlined in the 
preceding stage. This requires “contextual work” (Brighouse et al. 2016: 20) and so 
takes the form of being a hybrid of the BIT method’s second stage, ‘Understand the 
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context’, and Brighouse et al.’s second part of their procedure. Sometimes there will be 
a number of different feasible options; other times there may only be one nudge 
mechanism that is able to meet these practical and ethical conditions. Where there are 
different options, we might design and test trial interventions to gather evidence about 
the relative effectiveness of these permissible options. This relates to Brighouse et al.’s 
third part of the procedure, about which the authors write: “The values guide the search 
for evidence, and the evidence makes possible the evaluation of the options” (2016: 21). 
Similarly, with respect to the design of nudge interventions, the ethical guidelines place 
constraints on the types of interventions that are designed and trialled in RCTs in the 
first place, and therefore on the kinds of evidence that is taken into account. (Note that, 
in terms of the BIT method’s third stage, the full EAST framework would not be used as 
some of its effectiveness-based recommendations would not pass the standards 
generated by the two agency-enhancing ethical principles, the nudge-to-deliberate and 
nudge-to-motivate principles.) The final stage would be to decide whether or not to 
implement the public nudge on the available evidence of its effectiveness at achieving 
the policy goal and the attendant value of agency-enhancement, as well as how this 
weighs against other values identified in the earlier stages.   
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to integrate existing 
experimental behavioural policy frameworks with philosophically well-defined ethical 
guidelines. My main hope is that the clearer understanding of the ethical and moral 
dimensions of nudging presented in these pages will be an important contribution to 
the two-way discussion that needs to happen between ethicists and policy practitioners 
about what using empirical and normative theory “in tandem” to guide the design of 
permissible public nudges might look like.163 This is an important aim and (potential) 
real-world contribution because, up until now, my reading of the debate is that these 
two groups have been talking past one another, essentially having separate discussions.  
 Finally, I would like briefly to highlight something that I take to offer a source 
of optimism for this shared, collaborative project. Although the BIT was established by 
the Coalition government in 2010, this behavioural-based policy entrepreneurship in the 
UK can be traced back at least as far as a 2004 report published by the Cabinet Office’s 
                                                          
163 Policy practitioners are themselves becoming increasingly aware of the need to open up this 
discussion. In personal correspondence, one of the BIT’s employees stated that: “The ethical issues 
surrounding these techniques are becoming increasingly prevalent in discussions and everyone in my team 
[the Behavioural Insights Team at Public Health England] is very interested in this. If you developed 
comprehensive, useable criteria that delineate what techniques are considered ethical/unethical and under 
what circumstances, there would be a lot of interest in a document of this kind!” Similar sentiments have 
been shared with me from other practitioners, including at the World Bank.  
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Strategy Unit under Labour – and written by David Halpern (the now Chief Executive 
of the BIT) and Geoff Mulgan (the now Chief Executive of Nesta, the organisation in 
which the BIT is housed), among others – called ‘Personal Responsibility and Changing 
Behaviour: The State of Knowledge and its Implications for Public Policy’. In addition 
to making points about the cost-effectiveness of these types of interventions relative to 
“traditional service delivery”, this report argues that there are good reasons to think 
about how behavioural strategies might be used for the sake of developing citizens’ 
personal responsibility. The authors claim that: 
 
“There are strong moral and political arguments for protecting and enhancing personal 
responsibility. Most of the dominant traditions of social and political thought in the UK 
value individuals’ and communities’ ability to take control and act in their own best 
interests as goods in themselves. Other things being equal, they see it as better for 
governments to empower citizens as much as possible rather than making decisions on 
their behalf.” (Halpern et al. 2004: 3) 
 
Similarly, in one of the first official BIT publications, the MINDSPACE report six years 
later, personal responsibility remains the main focus of the relatively limited normative 
discussion, in which the authors mention that it is possible “for government to just 
supply the trigger or support for individuals to take greater personal responsibility” 
(Dolan et al. 2010: 70-71). These references, especially the earlier extended quotation 
from before the publication of Nudge, highlight that the original or underlying ambitions 
of the BIT policy entrepreneurs are perhaps more aligned with the transformative 
nudge model than we might have thought, especially if what they mean by “personal 
responsibility” can be understood primarily in terms of what we might think of as the 
ethical responsibility (or autonomy) discussed in Chapter 4, and moral responsibility 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
The publication of Nudge a number of years later brought behavioural policy-
making to the fore and laid the foundation for the creation of the BIT. But it also 
brought with it a way of framing and discussing the issues that has created a kind of 
conceptual and argumentative path dependency. The transformative nudge model 
recommends a return by BIT policy entrepreneurs to their earlier orientation and, with 
it, a recovery of their initial motivation for engaging with the evidence from the 
cognitive and behavioural sciences. The promise of this possibility gives me some hope, 
even if overly optimistic perhaps, that the model’s ethical principles might be able to 
have some influence on the BIT’s policy agenda as it develops into the future.       
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§6.3.2: Some Issues Relating to Implementation 
Nevertheless, consideration of the implementation of the transformative nudge model 
does raise a host of complex issues – some practical in nature, others relating to 
tensions between values. As Brighouse et al. maintain with respect to the latter: “good 
policy making requires awareness of how decisions are likely to affect the full range of 
values at stake”, which itself necessitates explicit and careful consideration of these 
tensions (2016: 4). Although such a complex, all things considered assessment is not 
something that can be delivered in this chapter (as I noted at the outset of this chapter), 
it is important carefully to delineate, formulate, and discuss these considerations. To this 
end, this section outlines and briefly addresses four issues that may be relevant to the 
design of nudge policies that have not yet been discussed. With no pretensions to 
exhaustiveness, the issues covered here relate to: (i) political feasibility; (ii) public 
acceptability; (iii) efficacy and superficiality; and (iv) distributive concerns.    
 First, as is the case with all policy levers, PCA is designed and delivered by 
human choice architects and their use is authorized by political decision-makers whose 
benevolence and competence cannot be assumed. It is necessary, therefore, to assess 
the political feasibility of institutionalising the transformative nudge model, including 
vis-à-vis other means of achieving its desired ends. Of course, this implementation issue 
also arises for the standard nudge view – and more so, it seems fair to say. One of the 
main practical reasons for carrying out this investigation is to set and establish ethical 
standards by which benevolence, or the lack of it, can be measured in some way and to 
design easy-to-use guidelines that reduce the risk that incompetence, in ethical reasoning 
or otherwise, might cause problems for the design of permissible behavioural policies.  
Second, there is an issue about in what way(s), if at all, citizens’ views about 
nudges matter in deciding whether PCA is morally permissible. Increasingly, empirical 
research is being carried out into public attitudes towards nudging, including how 
people distinguish among different types of nudges and what effect these perceived 
differences have on their views about the acceptability of these interventions. Some 
have already discussed the issue of what role such data should (or should not) play, and 
for what reasons (e.g., Sunstein 2016a: 116-120; Dolan et al. 2010: 63-65). I broadly 
agree with these existing views, which state that taking account of public attitudes is 
important in liberal-democratic societies, but that these data cannot play a decisive role 
in evaluating moral permissibility. The first part of this statement can be grounded by 
reference to different values (legitimacy, self-government, political autonomy, well-
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being, etc.), but the general point is that democratic governments ought to attend to 
what citizens think of nudges.164 However one chooses to make this first point, it seems 
that they can all agree that “it is not necessary to make strong claims about the wisdom 
of crowds […] in order to believe that an ethical judgment, on the part of those who 
might be subject to nudges, deserves respectful attention” (Sunstein 2016a: 117-118). 
Nevertheless, and moving to the second part of the statement, it is clear that “there are 
good reasons why public acceptability should not be the sole or determining condition 
for going forward with behaviour change” (Dolan et al. 2010: 63). Such data cannot 
resolve ethical questions because: (i) public responses may be “confused, insufficiently 
considered, or wrong” (Sunstein 2016a: 116); (ii) there are deontological constraints that 
apply, regardless of public opinion; and/or (iii) governments may, in some instances, 
need “to take a lead on issues despite public opposition”, and that this sometimes 
actually leads to a shift in public attitudes in response to the introduction of the policy 
(Dolan et al. 2010: 63).  
I do not have any novel claims about this methodological issue. Rather, I do 
wish to highlight that the existing data on public attitudes do not pose any challenge to 
the transformative nudge model, since the data are broadly aligned with it. If anything, 
they provide the transformative nudge model with additional validation, especially 
relative to the standard nudge model as it is represented by Sunstein’s arguments and 
the BIT’s practical design and implementation of nudge policies. Across the three main 
existing studies of public attitudes, the basic finding is that “strong majorities were 
inclined to prefer nudges that appeal to people’s deliberative capacities” (Sunstein 
2016a: 141). This type of nudging was referred to as “System 2” (versus “System 1”) 
nudges in both Jung and Mellers (2016) and Sunstein (2016b), and as “overt” (versus 
“covert”) nudges in Felsen et al. (2013) – though both sets of terms are defined in the 
same way. This evidence shows that the nudge-to-deliberate principle is, as a matter of 
empirical fact, supported.165    
                                                          
164 Dolan et al. argue in terms of legitimacy: “Government legitimacy rests on the fact it represents and 
serves the people, and thus it is vital that their views are taken into account when considering any attempt 
to influence their behaviour” (2010: 63). Sunstein makes a similar claim with reference to self-government: 
Given the “commitment to democratic self-government…whenever public officials are uncertain about 
whether an approach is desirable, it would be reasonable, in the name of self-government, for them to 
give consideration to the views of members of the public” (2016a: 118). Others might also make 
reference to the value of political autonomy to a flourishing life: “Just as there is a value to individuals having 
control over their own lives and choices, independently of the quality of their decisions, so there may be a 
value to people exercising control over their shared environment and the rules […] that apply to them 
collectively” (Brighouse et al. 2016: 17). 
165 Although more nuanced experiments that might test for public support for the nudge-to-motivate 
principle have not yet been designed, some related research into the concept of “pre-authorization” 
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Third, there is the issue of about nudging’s superficiality as a way of responding 
to social problems. The strong form of this challenge is that the use of nudges, even 
transformative nudges, is an excuse for not acting more decisively on a particular issue. 
This worry has two parts: first, these interventions can act only on the effects, rather 
than on the causes, of certain social problems; and, second, their use provides the 
government with essentially “a fig leaf for inaction” (Halpern 2015a: 315). In other 
words, nudges may allow governments to appear as if they are tackling a problem 
without taking the (often more politically costly) action needed to deal effectively with 
the problem and its causes.  
Research into the relationship between social order in modern societies and 
people’s moral behaviour highlights an illustrative example. This has found that anxiety 
in the workplace leads people to “focus narrowly on their own basic needs and self-
interest”, and that this “self-protective mode” can cause them to be “less mindful of 
principles that guide ethical and moral reasoning – and make them rationalize their own 
actions as acceptable” (Kouchaki and Desai 2015: 360). Assuming that the research has 
found a robust link, this raises the question of whether moral nudging is problematically 
superficial: instead of dealing with some of the underlying issues relating to why people 
are living their lives in this self-protective mode, and therefore why they are more likely 
to fail to reason and act in accordance with moral norms, transformative nudges appear 
only to be able to act on (some of) the surface-level effects of the deeper problem.  
A question that follows from this is what proportion of its (limited) resources 
should governments be giving over to developing such policies, relative to the resources 
they devote to seeking to deal with the more complex and costly underlying problems 
causing, in this case, anxiety? Given the pervasiveness of anxiety in modern societies, 
and its relationship with rising levels of uncertainty and ever-more precarious 
organisational corporate structures (Standing 2014), citizens might have a legitimate 
complaint if their government’s response to this social ill is to nudge them (even in 
permissible ways) rather than to address the root causes of these behaviours by, for 
example, regulating at least the most anxiety-inducing working conditions (e.g., zero-
hour contracts). Governments may, in turn, respond by claiming that, in the case of 
moral nudging at least, it has a duty to act in some way and that, in lieu of bringing about 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Niker et al. 2016) suggests that people’s attitudes towards different kinds of System 1 nudges – i.e., those 
that offer motivational scaffolding for behaviours we believe we have reasons to perform, versus those 
that seek to change our automatic behavioural responses regardless of our beliefs about reasons for action 
– might also align with the normative analysis presented here. 
  
166 
 
more politically fraught institutional changes (which can take a long time, even when 
political will exists), PCA represents one way of addressing a problem.166  
Even taking into consideration this possible governmental response, it is easy to 
feel the force of this issue, and rightly so. Yet two related points temper it as a criticism 
of my account of permissible nudging. The first is again to restate the scope of the 
ambitions of the thesis and of the transformative nudge model, which has been to 
answer the question of which forms of public nudging are, in principle, morally 
permissible. In this inquiry, all of the other policy levers remain in the policymaker’s 
toolkit to be used when necessary and, if the arguments presented in this thesis were 
extended to these, there would evidently be a huge number of policies that democratic 
governments should consider pursuing in order to enable citizens to live well – 
including, no doubt, labour reforms for the sake of anxiety-reduction. Of course, these 
issues lie beyond the scope of the thesis.  
The second point is that nothing in my argument has indicated that nudge 
policies should be used as the sole or the primary means of addressing social and 
political problems. By arguing that some forms of PCA are morally permissible, what 
has been shown is that governments can use this form of intervention, wherever 
appropriate. This appropriateness might come about because other policy levers are 
unable to address the problem at hand (such as in the case of implicit biases), or 
sometimes because nudges are more efficacious due to certain properties of the case in 
hand (note: this does not mean more cost-effective). But they will often be used as a 
low-cost complement to other, longer-term and more costly forms of intervention. 
Policy problems are complex, and so policy responses often need to be multi-pronged. 
Permissible nudges may provide a helpful supplement in such cases, but often cannot, 
and therefore should not, be offered as the only or often even the main intervention.167  
A fourth issue is comparative in nature, since it attends to a problem that arises 
due to how some in the political community are treated in comparison with how others 
are treated. The particular concern relates to the possibility that some cognitive biases 
may be worsened, or even caused, by particular social conditions. There are different 
ways of specifying this kind of concern empirically, but I will do so by reference to 
                                                          
166 This is, in fact, the kind of response given by Halpern. He acknowledges this “efficacy challenge”, 
which he believes comes from “the political left”, but responds with the “pragmatist” view that “we 
should do whatever works, particularly if it has minimal costs” (2015a: 315-317).   
167 This point was clearly made in the House of Lords Select Committee report Behaviour Change, the 
central finding of which is that “non-regulatory measures used in isolation, including ‘nudges’, are less 
likely to be effective. Effective policies often use a range of interventions” (2011: 5). 
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evidence from developmental psychology. As we have seen, the cognitive biases and 
motivational shortfalls that nudges are designed to overcome tend to be the result of 
the “uneasy interaction” between two kinds of cognitive processes (Kahneman 2011: 
415). Is it the case that some people are, due to their upbringing for instance, more 
likely to be prone to these decisional and motivational biases? According to Matt Grist, 
research into how our brains develop in childhood suggests just this. He writes: 
 
“One crucial implication of brain plasticity is that cognitive and emotional brain processes 
in children, although innate, do not properly develop without the right kind of nurturing 
and learning. Children who do not receive the latter are not likely to develop a well-
functioning balance between their controlled and automatic brains. If this happens they 
may be unable to exercise self-control or take into account long-term consequences, 
which in turn affects their ability to learn [and their capacity to respond to reasons]. Their 
decision-making and behaviour may also be hijacked by fearful and aggressive responses 
emanating from their automatic brains. Finally, they may not properly develop emotional 
capabilities such as empathy for others.” (Grist 2009: 43-44)  
    
The issues raised by this quotation are complex and wide-ranging. For our current 
purposes, however, this brief insight into developmental psychological research raises 
the question of whether public nudges may, in reality, often operate on certain groups 
within the population more than others, and whether one relevant factor in this relates 
to whether or not one was fortunate enough to receive the “right kind of nurturing and 
learning” in one’s early years. This raises further complex questions about the 
distributional dynamics of nudging across the population. If the transformative nudge 
model is found to act on certain people more than others, would this de facto targeting 
necessarily cause problems for the permissibility of this account? In order to assess 
these questions in our all things considered judgements, we would need to know more 
about the distributional dimensions of PCA. There is currently very little (if any) work, 
either empirical or normative, on this issue. Hence, rather than make any tentative 
comments here, I raise this issue in order to highlight an important area for future 
research – which, in turn, leads us to the chapter’s final section.  
 
§6.4: Future Directions 
Of necessity, this thesis has focused its attentions on a particular (and currently the 
most prominent) category of choice architecture – public nudging – and the related set 
of questions about its permissible use as a means of intentionally influencing people’s 
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behaviour. This final section moves beyond these limitations by briefly sketch some 
further questions and issues relating to the political implications of the psychological 
research into human behaviour and decision-making. These issues broadly fall into one 
of two categories – possible extensions of the analysis of public nudging (§6.4.1) and 
ethico-political questions that arise when we turn our attention to the use of nudges 
outside of the public realm (§6.4.2). These represent two ways in which my current 
theory of the political morality of nudging could be extended. Even though this theory 
provides many of the resources required for carrying out these extensions, further 
distinctive questions need to be addressed and the results of these inquiries integrated 
into the existing account in order to provide full answers to these important extensions. 
This section can, therefore, be understood as setting out an agenda for future research.  
 
§6.4.1: Further Issues Relating to Public Nudging 
Within the first of these categories, there are (at least) two additional issues that would 
be worth exploring. These relate to the limitations on the thesis’s scope concerning the 
persons whom the nudges have been assumed to be acting upon. This thesis has 
accounted for a central range of cases, namely, adult citizens assumed to be above a 
minimum threshold of autonomy. Further research could explore how the permissibility 
conditions for nudging change when applied to cases outside of this central range, such 
as those directed towards young children and adolescents, on one side of this range, and 
previously-autonomous but currently non-autonomous adults such as those with 
dementia, on the other. The key consideration in these cases is to assess whether there 
is anything special about children or the demented that narrows or widens the scope of 
permissible nudging.  
With respect to children, there is a widely held belief that the child’s lack of 
autonomy justifies widening the scope of permissible interference beyond that which is 
permissible in the case of adults and that this grounds, for instance, the compulsory 
education systems for children that exist in many societies. There are important and 
ongoing debates about how precisely this more extensive interference should be 
discharged (e.g., debates about the content of moral and civic education). For our 
purposes the main question is, with more traditional modes of influence available, what 
role, if any, is there for nudges within the education system? The fact that the scope of 
permissible interference is wider in the case of children does not necessarily extend to any 
widening in the scope of permissible nudging of children. It might do: for instance, 
System 1 moral nudges might be considered permissible forms of non-intellectual 
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character habituation, at least in the case of young children, since they might play an 
early role in shaping citizens’ moral and civic characters.168 But, if so, arguments would 
have to be offered to this end, and no such arguments have been provided here. It is 
also plausible that, given the other options on the table, any such extension of the scope 
of permissible nudging would, even if permissible in principle, be overridden by the 
possibility of using more effective or more morally desirable methods. Gigerenzer’s 
suggestions for educational reforms might be one such option. In any case, it is clear 
that more work needs to be done, first, to clarify precisely what the morally relevant 
differences are between the two cases and, second, to examine how the theory of the 
political morality of nudging developed in these pages (or an alternative theory) would 
apply in the case of children.169 
With respect to the demented, it seems plausible that there might be several 
ways in which extreme forms of choice architecture might be used as part of their 
publicly-funded medical treatment. Take the case of a progressive care home for those 
with severe dementia in the Netherlands as an example. ‘Hogewey’ is a gated model 
village, complete with town square, post office, theatre, hair salon, café-restaurant and 
supermarket – as well as cameras monitoring residents around the clock, and well-
trained staff working incognito, holding a myriad of occupations such as post-office 
clerks and supermarket cashiers. Every detail of this “fake reality” has been meticulously 
designed in the hope that the residents can experience life as close to ‘normal’ as 
possible.170 It has been shown that this all-day reminiscence therapy reduces the amount 
                                                          
168 For what is, to the best of my knowledge, the only paper in the literature at the current time addressing 
the relationship between nudges and habituation, see Niker (forthcoming). Although the socio-ecological 
account of critical habituation that it develops relates to adults only, see the final section for a brief 
discussion of its potential implications for traditional educational contexts and, by extension, children. 
For more on habituation, see Burnyeat (1980), Sherman (1989), and Kristjánsson (2006).  
169 With regards to the first point, see Fowler’s ‘Perfectionism for Children, Anti-Perfectionism for 
Adults’ (2014) as an example of the view that different criteria apply. Furthermore, this task might include 
assessing whether certain kinds of nudges negatively impact on “childhood goods”, that is, goods that are 
available only in childhood (see Brighouse et al. (2016: 15-17) for more on accounting for these kinds of 
goods in policymaking). With respect to the second point, the work of Clayton and Moles (forthcoming) 
and MacMullen (2013) will be instructive – particularly with regards to the case of moral nudging. Also, 
for real-world examples relating to the case of children, see ‘Nudging for Kids’: an online platform for 
creating “creative visual solutions for parents, schools, communities, and organizations to build a positive 
environment for children and students” (http://www.nudgingforkids.com/).  
170 Hogewey’s critics have drawn parallels with the deception depicted in the social-science-fiction film, 
The Truman Show; but many Alzheimer’s experts have praised it for being the first to adjust ‘our’ reality to 
allow for those with dementia. Taking inspiration from Hogewey, care homes in the UK – such as Grove 
Care in Winterbourne, Bristol – have developed similar (non-immersive) features; in Grove Care’s case, 
‘Memory Lane’: a recreation of a 1950s high street, including a Post Office, pub, bus stop, phone box, 
and shop windows full of memorabilia. For more on this, see my blog post for Justice Everywhere (26th 
January 2015): http://justice-everywhere.org/old-blog/truman-care-for-dementia. 
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of medication that residents need to take, and is said to improve their lives in numerous 
other ways.  
There is, of course, the question about whether such forms of influence, given 
their relationship with medical treatment, can or should be called choice architecture or 
nudges. In my view, they share the two main features of nudges, since they are 
neuroscientifically-informed and design-based, though I accept with respect to the 
former that there is a difference between the evidence relating to cognitive biases and 
heuristics, on the one hand, and that relating to severe memory loss, on the other. But, 
given the license granted by a discussion of future research, it is interesting to note that 
the case of the demented poses an interesting puzzle for my general theory, since this 
theory rests on an account of living well that posits a particular relation between 
autonomy and human flourishing. Hence, any application or adaptation of my theory to 
cases of this sort would require engaging with a distinctive set of normative questions 
concerning, for instance, what it means to live well as a non-autonomous agent and 
what duties we have to respect the continuity of life, in addition to caring for the 
demented person’s experiential interests, if any.171  
This research would speak directly on one of the UK’s policy priorities, namely, 
the “national crisis” in dementia care.172 Interestingly, the UK government has recently 
launched a national dementia strategy which they have called Living Well with Dementia. 
There is, however, no specification of what “living well with dementia” means in the 
policy papers (Department of Health 2009). Hence, returning to the points about the 
relationship between political theory and policy, this strand of research could link 
important work in philosophy on this issue with the current development of this policy 
strategy, and examine the ethical dimensions of the possibility of bringing design-based 
treatments, such as all-day reminiscence therapy, into mainstream use.   
      
§6.4.2: Shifting Attention to Private Nudging   
A second category for future research is the extension of the theory of political morality 
of nudging beyond the confines of governments and into the private realm. The 
psychological evidence about the relationship between social organisation and individual 
agency also raises questions about how governments might permissibly regulate public 
environments in light of the extensive private nudging that citizens’ experience, as well as 
                                                          
171 For the philosophical debate on these issues, see, in particular, Dworkin (1993), Shiffrin (2004), and 
Jaworska (1999). For a very good overview (and extension) of these arguments, see McKerlie (2012).  
172 For former Prime Minister David Cameron’s reference to dementia care as a national crisis, see e.g.: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-17507678. 
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questions about the responsibilities of the corporate actors themselves to develop 
ethical best practice guidelines with respect to their ongoing and future development 
and use of influencing techniques.  
Innovations in ways of influencing behaviour are driven by the private sector: 
by the time nudging was being discussed as a novel means of intervention in the public 
sector, these kinds of influences had already been in use by advertising and marketing 
agencies for over half a century (Packard 2007 [1957]). New and emerging techniques 
for private nudging tend to be highly personalised forms of nonargumentative 
influence, based on algorithms that work using big data and deep learning (‘artificial 
intelligence’).173 These techniques are making possible manipulations that “have no 
precedent in human history and that are currently well beyond the scope of existing 
regulations and laws” (Epstein 2016). They have been made possible by recent 
developments in technology and society, including: (i) the Internet becoming part of the 
backdrop of human experience, with devices becoming more persistent companions 
through life; (ii) rapid advances in measurement and analytics, which are enabling us 
more quickly to optimise technologies to reach greater levels of persuasiveness (or 
“behaviour design”); and (iii) the explosion of information and media, which some have 
referred to as causing “a crisis of distraction” (Williams 2013). Another factor in the 
development of so-called “persuasive technology” (Fogg 2003) has been the application 
of knowledge of psychological biases to technology design, and it is this factor, in 
particular, that brings these persuasive technologies into the debate over nudging.174     
Several complex and highly pressing issues are raised by private nudging; I am 
able to touch on only a few of these here. First, there is a conceptual question about 
how and to what extent these techniques and technologies could be thought of as acting 
persuasively, if at all (Verbeek 2009). As discussed in the previous chapter, persuasion is 
generally understood – within political theory, at least – as seeking to change a person’s 
behaviour by changing their beliefs or desires through the giving of reasons; so, to what 
extent is “persuasive technologies” a misnomer for these practices? Or, to what extent 
can these private nudges be understood via the concept of public-ecological persuasion, 
introduced in this thesis? Answering these questions requires carrying out careful 
                                                          
173 For some examples and discussion of these new advertising techniques such as “digital insertion”, see 
a post I wrote on the Justice Everywhere blog: http://justice-everywhere.org/economics/freedom-versus-
free-stuff (19th November 2015). 
174 This field of research was originally called “captology”, a term derived from the acronym ‘Computers 
As Persuasive Technologies’ (Fogg 2003). Since then, the practical phenomenon that it examines has 
exploded: each day, new computing products – be they mobile apps, websites, video games, etc. – are 
being designed to change people’s behaviour and beliefs.    
  
172 
 
taxonomical and conceptual work in order to assess several of these new and emerging 
techniques and to categorise them variously as persuasive, manipulative, or even 
coercive.  
Second, it is important that liberal political theory engages seriously and 
systematically with the regulatory and moral issues raised by these technological 
developments and the powers they have conferred on private nudging. The debate over 
nudging (this thesis included) can be said to have suffered, thus far at least, from a 
“libertarian bias” since it has focused on the dangers created by governmental action 
without considering to the same extent “whether private action might present 
comparable dangers or whether the government might help overcome the dangers 
created by private action” (Strauss 1991: 361). Since it is clear that private nudging is at 
least as dangerous as public nudging, arguably the main question that needs addressing 
is whether, and under what conditions, governments might be permitted to constrain or 
regulate such private influencing activities (see, e.g., Moore 2017).175  
Addressing this question would require engaging with a host of normative 
questions relating to, for instance, the freedom of expression of private actors (and, in 
the US, its protection by the First Amendment), the privacy claims of citizens, and 
issues around informed consent.176 It would also require further consideration of the 
ethics of “counter-manipulation”, that is, when certain manipulative techniques are used 
as a means of countering manipulation (Wilkinson 2016). What difference does it make 
to the ethics of manipulation when it is counter-manipulation? In this case, might 
otherwise impermissible public nudges be used permissibly for the sake of countering 
the manipulative efforts of private nudges?177 Sunstein does offer a brief discussion of 
what he calls “regulating manipulation”, which is rather pessimistic on account 
revolving around the severity of the free speech barriers (2016a: 111; see also Strauss 
1991). A fuller discussion might look to apply to private nudging the theory of the 
                                                          
175 Indeed, “Denmark has recently announced that it would be creating a new diplomatic posting – a 
“digital ambassador” – to deal not with states and international organizations, but with giant technology 
companies like Facebook and Google” (Taylor 2017). For an interview with Anders Sandersen, the 
Danish Foreign Minister, detailing why such a position is deemed necessary and what it might look like in 
reality, see Taylor (2017). 
176 With respect to the last of these, consent, it is important to note that Facebook defended the huge-
scale emotional priming experiment, which manipulated over 700,000 users’ news feeds in order to see 
how this might affect the positivity or negativity of their own posts (Kramer et al. 2014), “on the grounds 
that its users’ consent to their terms of service was sufficient to imply consent to such experiments” 
(Shaw 2017).  
177 Returning to our discussion of nudging children, too, there is a further question to those outlined in 
§6.4.1 relating to counter-nudging for the sake of protecting them (and their nascent autonomy) from child 
advertising. 
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political morality of nudging developed in these pages (or to apply an alternative 
account). This task would require carrying out the conceptual analysis and addressing 
the distinctive normative questions outlined above, before factoring this new work into 
those considerations about well-being, autonomy, and moral reasoning – and the 
appropriate role of the political community in protecting and promoting these values – 
already captured by the theory.178 
Third, there is now a pressing public debate about the ethical guidelines that 
should apply to the ongoing and future development of “persuasive technologies”. In 
recent months, the world’s most (persuasively) powerful global corporations – Google, 
Facebook, Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, and Apple (which joined later) – have come 
together to form the “Partnership on AI” in order to set societal and ethical best 
practice guidelines for artificial intelligence research and development.179 This is a 
welcome advance in light of the vast power held and exerted by these corporations as 
“Attention Brokers” (Wu 2017) within what is now often referred to as the “attention 
economy” (Davenport and Beck 2001; Terranova 2012).180 Future research can, 
alongside this corporate partnership, consider the issue of what sorts of (new) social 
responsibilities accrue to those corporations acting as attention brokers, and how any 
such responsibilities should be understood (for example, are they collective responsibilities 
and, if so, by which mechanisms might we be able to hold these corporations to 
account?).  
Such questions are all the more pressing in light of recent events and the move 
into what many have described as a “post-truth world” of “fake news” and “alternative 
facts” (see, e.g., Levy 2017). Given Facebook’s role as a news source and its ability to 
manipulate what we see and subsequently how we feel (Kramer et al. 2014), and given 
the power in Google’s hands to decide which webpages to include in search results and 
how to rank them (Epstein 2016), there are important questions about whether there 
are any circumstances under which choice architecture might permissibly be used to 
nudge citizens towards particular evidence-based news sources or away from 
categorically fake news sources.   
                                                          
178 I view this extension, which I plan to carry out as my postdoctoral research project, as being the 
second part of a two-part broader research project, entitled “Living Well, by Design” – of which this 
thesis is the first part.  
179 For more information, see: https://www.partnershiponai.org. 
180 “Attention brokers” are firms that attract and resell attention (or, more precisely, the data produced 
when one’s attention is given to, e.g., Facebook) to advertisers.   
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§6.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to present in its essential form the central thrust of the 
normative analysis offered in the preceding chapters and to engage with more practical 
concerns and issues relating to its impact on the way in which behavioural policies are 
designed, especially within the UK context. On the first, it has provided an account of 
the agency-enhancing potential of PCA and has set out two ethical principles that 
follow from this so-called transformative nudge model. On the second, it has engaged 
with current policymaking practices, and has presented an ethically sensitive version of 
the BIT’s existing policy development framework, which represents the first attempt, to 
the best of my knowledge, to integrate ethical concerns into current policy practices. It 
has also outlined and reviewed some of the limitations of this means of intervention 
(generally speaking), which would also apply to my transformative nudge model and to 
its successful and all things considered permissible implementation in practice. Finally, 
the chapter has discussed some of the limitations of the argument presented in these 
pages, which principally pick out ways in which it could be extended to include further 
issues that relate to both public and private nudging.  
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7. Conclusion: Living Well by Design 
 
We are living in an age of the behavioural sciences. Our updated understanding of 
human agency is increasingly being used as the basis for designing environments that 
direct behaviour in particular ways, often without us being aware. These developments 
call for serious philosophical engagement to clarify the conceptual and normative terrain 
and to assess the permissibility of such influences; for, although behavioural policy 
holds out some promise for helping us to live well, it also comes with the risk of 
significant ethical and moral costs. This thesis has responded to this call. Focusing on 
the governmental use of these design-based behaviour change strategies, it has defended 
a complete account of the political morality of public nudging, which takes advantage of 
the promise of PCA while clarifying and, as a result, managing to avoid its normative 
costs. It is an account of living well by design, as this relates to governmental behavioural 
policymaking.    
 Rather than rehearse my arguments in favour of this account, I wish to conclude 
by briefly issuing a few concluding remarks. First, this thesis has investigated one 
particular instance of how the recent discoveries about human nature unsettle orthodox 
positions in political theory. There is much more to be done in considering the potential 
implications of these new models of human agency. All systems of normative theory 
and practical ethics make certain presuppositions about human agents; but, if people are 
shown to lack these assumed capacities in a systematic way, as has been shown by the 
evidence, then “the many practical injunctions that follow from ethical discourse come 
to seem misguided” (Mele and Shepherd 2013: 62). The account of permissible public 
influence offered in this thesis is distinct from traditional autonomy-based accounts in 
the literature, because it has sought to take seriously the internal threat to autonomy 
from the psychological findings relating to our automatic and context-sensitive mental 
processes. This has had important implications for the normative analysis. I hope that 
other political theorists will engage in a similar way with the empirical research in order 
to explore in more detail its various (applied) theoretical implications.    
Second, the purpose of this thesis has not been to solve a philosophical puzzle. 
Although it has engaged with a full range of conceptual and normative issues, often at a 
high level of philosophical abstraction, the thesis started with, and has sought to remain 
disciplined by, a subject of practical political importance. In so doing, it has been able to 
deliver a bespoke theory of political morality for public nudging, and it has used this as 
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the basis for exploring what an ethically-sensitive behavioural policy framework might 
look like in practice. This was done by integrating the relevant normative considerations 
into the current practices and framework of the BIT, to show that this would not need 
to involve a wholesale revision of its existing intervention design process. There are, no 
doubt, many further practical issues that need to be taken into account. Nevertheless, 
the thesis’s efforts to present its argument in an accessible way marks a genuine attempt 
to start a more productive, two-way discussion between political theorists and policy 
practitioners about the inclusion of ethical considerations into the design framework for 
nudging – something that is increasingly urgent in light of the recent vast expansion of 
behavioural policy.   
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